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A sympathetic reviewer has noted that the best a critic of Rorty can do is to
compare his views invidiously to alternative views. Taking this advice to heart, I
contrast Rorty' s social and political views to Dewey's, and then to an alternative
account which I elaborate. My standards of comparison are two liberal ideals than
which, according to Rorty, none others are higher. These are. ( 1 ) amelioration of
suffering, and (2) leaving people alone to pursue their own visions of personal
perfection.
In Chapter One, I point out that there are significant differences between
Rorty and his alleged progenitor, Dewey, notably when it comes to their respective
conceptions of how to harmonize personal freedom with public responsibility.
Unlike Dewey, Rorty advocates abandoning the attempt to fuse the public realm of
altruism and the private realm of sublimity by means of one all-encompassing theory.
In Chapter Two, 1 argue that the existing liberal democracies Rorty is
concerned to defend bear little resemblance to his democratic utopia, in which "the
quest for autonomy is impeded as little as possible by social institutions.” I introduce
an alternative vocabulary, according to which political institutions, broadly
conceived, traverse nearly the entire length and breadth of the private sphere in the
north Atlantic democracies.
In Chapter Three, 1 argue that existing liberal democracies fare little better
with reference to Rorty's public ideal of ameliorating suffering than they did with
reference to his private ideal of making room for self making. Then 1 suggest an
alternative setup which I believe to be more promising for purposes of ameliorating
suffering.
In the final chapter, I argue that Rorty’s private role as ironist and his public
role as self-described apologist for bourgeois liberal democracy are not so much
incommensurable as they are incompatible. The better he fulfills one role, I argue,
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Until recently, the best known liberal thinkers from Locke to the present
have imagined liberalism as standing on “the grounding in natural law, the appeal to
the light of reason, the evocation of homo humanus Their opponents, from
Robert Filmer to the Frankfurters, have disputed this characterization.
2
Critics both
on the right and the left have endeavored to show that Reason does not dictate the
practices and institutions associated with liberalism and human nature does not
legitimate them, the assumption being that this in itself constitutes a definitive
indictment of liberalism.
In recent years, however, some self-described liberals themselves have
abandoned the familiar philosophical rationales for their tradition. While conceding
that liberalism is no more rooted in universal reason or human nature than any other
1
.
) Comay, p. 120. A wide variety of beliefs and authors have been associated
in various contexts with the word liberal and its cognates. I will offer a few
preliminary words of clarification forthwith and expand on them in Chapters One
and Two.
2.
) Refer to Filmer, pp. 251-308, and to Rorty's discussion of Horkheimer and
Adorno in Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (henceforth CIS), pp. 56-7. All
source references from Rorty's works are listed by title or abbreviated title and
appear chronologically under the author’s entry in the bibliography below. All
other references appear under the name of the author.
political creed, they have nevertheless maintained their allegiance to liberal
institutions and counseled others to do so, too.
Richard Rorty may be counted among the latter category of liberal His
particular defense of liberalism does not depend for its force on claims to be
grounded in reason, or on epistemological guarantees or transcultural and
ahistoncal notions of human nature. He tells us he wants to “retain Enlightenment
liberalism while dropping Enlightenment rationalism.”
4
Thus, what he has to say in
defense of liberalism is likely to be received with sympathy by an audience which,
having read lots of books by, say, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault and the
communitarians, has come to doubt still-prevalent enlightenment assumptions about
human nature, community, historical progress and so on—assumptions which
traditionally have been deployed to repel attacks against liberalism. Moreover, if it
turns out that Rorty's case against Philosophy with a capital “P”~that is, roughly, his
case against foundational ism, representationalism and essentialism discussed below
in this mtroduction-is incompatible with alternative political and social views, then
so much the worse for those alternative views.
If, on the other hand, the discussion in the following pages succeeds in
breaching Rorty’s defense of liberalism, then readers whom he has convinced to
abandon more traditional defenses might well register this as a blow against
liberalism per se. What is at stake in the present discussion, then, is the
defensibility of liberalism when it is stripped of its familiar enlightenment
rationales.
3.) Refer, for example, to Rorty, “Dewey between Hegel and Darwin,” p. 68,
and to his paper, “Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism.”
4.) CIS, p. 57.
Rorty understands a liberal, in its occasional meaning borrowed from Judith
Shklar, to be a person who thinks that ‘'cruelty is the worst thing we do.”
5
He also
uses liberal and its cognates to describe certain actual and imaginary' political set-
ups. These include his preferred utopia, characterized by the public and private
ideals introduced in Chapter One, as well as a number of existing institutions
characteristic of what Rorty, following Roberto Unger, has dubbed the “rich North
Atlantic democracies
" f
' Rorty holds these institutions to be paradigmatically
liberal. In the course ot this discussion, it will become increasingly clear that there
are discrepancies between Judith Shklar's liberals and the institutions and practices
ot the “rich North Atlantic democracies.”
Before proceeding to examine Rorty’s defense of liberalism, a few words are
in order to frame the discussion in relation to the larger body of his own writings on
other topics. In the balance of this introduction, 1 will do several things: After
saying a few more words in the first section about why it is worthwhile to take a
serious look at Rorty’s social and political views, I will indicate gesturally in what
respect I agree with him and why. This will motivate the discussion in the chapters
that follow and help to narrow its scope. Remarks in the second section about his
views on some chief concerns of analytic philosophy segue to related observations
in the third and final section of the Introduction about his projected audience.
Critics of Rorty' s social and political views need to come to terms with these
considerations if they are not to beg important questions he poses.
5.
) CIS, pp. xv, 74.
6.
) Refer to: “Unger, Castoriadis, and the Romance of a National Future,”
included in Rorty's book Essays on Heidegger (henceforth EH), pp. 1 77-192.
4
Framing the Conversation
Rorty's name, if not his opinions, is as well known outside divisional
meetings of the American Philosophical Association as that of any other
contemporary American philosopher. His name has appeared in public discussions
about the curricula of liberal education,
7
feminism,* the “culture of human rmhts”
9
and the state of postmodern politics, and his works have been translated into at
least seventeen languages, including Chinese, Arabic and Serbo-Croatian. The fact
that a living American philosopher’s name is recognizable east of the Atlantic and at
some remove from academia is remarkable enough to prepare us for analogies with
Dewey.
Still, it would be easy to overstate his influence beyond academia. As a New
York Times Magazine interviewer put it, “Rorty is, in fact, about as widely-esteemed
as any American philosopher has been in the past forty years-which is to say, not
very widely.”
11
Questions of name recognition and influence aside, what Rorty has had to
say about social and political philosophy has resonated with the din of the
collapsing Berlin Wall. The rhetoric of the victors in the Cold War has been
7.
) Refer, for example, to D’ Souza, p. A1 8.
8.
) Refer, for example, to Lovibond 1989.
9.
) Refer to Shute and Hurley.
10.
) Refer to Haber. Also refer to Stephens, p. 30, as well as Rorty's remarks
regarding philosophers like himself who “...find ourselves denounced in magazines
and newspapers which one might have thought oblivious to our existence” (Rorty,
“Relativism: Finding and Making,” pp. 19-20).
11.) Klepp, p.117.
dominated by jubilant accolades to "the free market,” "democracy” and
liberalism Much of what he has had to say about liberalism, in particular,
corroborates the view of a well-known columnist, to the effect that "political
philosophy is over. Finished. Solved .”
12
Even after popular disillusionment with
free market reforms in Eastern Europe, a variety of post-Cold War commentators
in the West still suppose that liberal democracy has vanquished all contenders for
all time, and that the final years of the American Century' have deposited us at the
threshold of a New Millennium of Western-style democracy and free-market
capitalism
n
Rorty’s writings on a range of other topics also were consonant with the
views of some relatively influential writers years before the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact. In particular, a variety of writers who, like him, have been associated
with the term postmodernism
1
4
have for decades repeated the same pragmatist




) Krauthammer. Although Rorty has a hunch that "Western social and
political thought may have had the last conceptual revolution it needs” (CIS, p 63),
he might have reservations about the claim that political philosophy is “solved
”
This point should become clear in the following pages.
13.
) Refer to Fukayama. It should be emphasized, of course, that by rejecting
".
. .both religious and philosophical accounts of a suprahistoncal ground or an end-
of-history convergence’ (CIS, p. 68 ), Rorty stands far apart from Fukayama (see.
Rorty, "The End of Leninism”). Their differences, however, only make their
similar conclusions with respect to the future of political philosophy more poignant.
14.
) I use this term reluctantly. As Sabina Lovibond notes, "post-modernism” is
a term which "bears only as much in the way of determinate meaning as may be
injected into it by this or that writer” (Lovibond 1992, pp. 56-7). Nevertheless, each
of the writers cited either identifies himself as a “postmodernist” (cf. Rorty,
“Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism”) or is frequently described as such (as Rorty
is by Bhaskar 1991, p. 139; Lovibond 1989, p. 5; Nielsen, pp. 133, 139, and Haber,
p. 6, among others). According to David Hall, however, Rorty remains a modernist
(Hall, pp. 24, 5 1 ). Perhaps under the influence of Bernard Yack’s The Longing for
Total Revolution , Rorty more recently has expressed misgivings about incorporating
the term into his self-description:
6
Rorty has launched an audacious flanking maneuver against the fully-
arrayed ranks of analytic philosophy, which he takes to be the main contemporary
tradition of epistemology-centered philosophy.
16
In Philosophy and the Mirror of
Nature (henceforth PMN), published in 1979, he deftly identified the stakes of the
battle and stated his aim: If philosophy since Descartes and Locke is the attempt to
meet skeptical doubts concerning the problem of our knowledge of the external
world or other minds, then we should abandon philosophy altogether. 1 In its place
1 have sometimes used “postmodern” myself, in the rather narrow
sense defined by Lyotard as “distrust of metanarratives.” But 1 now
wish that I had not. [...] I have given up on the attempt to find
something common to Michael Graves's buildings, Pynchon's and
Rushdie's novels, Ashberry’s poems, various sorts of popular music
and the writings of Heidegger and Demda. (EH, p. 1 .)
Compare this passage to relevant remarks in Rorty, “Movements and Campaigns,”
15.
) Refer, tor example, to: Kuhn, Baudrillard and in some respects Lyotard.
1
6.
) William E. Connally succinctly restates Hegel's account of what Connally
calls the “dilemma of epistemology” as follows:
[E]very criterion of knowledge is itself a claim to knowledge and
thus must itself be proven; but any attempt at validation must either
appeal to the criterion itself or to a new criterion which is, in turn, in
need of validation. The first strategy is circular while the second
fosters an infinite regress. (Connolly, p. 124)
1
7.
) Refer, for example, to PMN, p. 181. Rorty has been accused of what Kant
called “indifferentism,” “the mother in all sciences of chaos and night” (Kant, p. 8
(Ax); cf., for example, Bonjour, p. 14). Pretending to reject all metaphysics,
inditterentists fall back into metaphysical positions, while hiding their regression
“by substituting a popular tone for the language of the Schools," and in this way
excusing themselves from giving their metaphysical views the attention they
deserve (Kant, Ax-xi, pp. 8-9). It should be noted, however, that in the first two-
thirds of PMN, much of Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (henceforth ORT) and
other wntings, Rorty does offer something in the way of reasons for advocating
walking away from sticky epistemological problems—even if those reasons amount
to little more than pointing out that, after centuries of futile endeavor, no one has
come close to solving these alleged problems (Rorty, Consequences ofPragmatism
(henceforth CP), pp. xvi-xvii).
7
Rorty offers a different conception of philosophy, notably in Part 111 of PMN and
the essays published together as Consequences ofPragmatism (henceforth CP).
This is philosophy as one form of literature alongside others, including poetry,
novels and literary criticism. Philosophy, by this conception, need be little more
than
An attempt to see how things, in the largest [or “broadest possible”]
sense of the term, hang together, in the largest [or “broadest
possible”] sense of the term.
18
The cash value ot philosophy so conceived is not to establish an unshakable
foundation for the Tree of Knowledge, nor to adjudicate all knowledge claims from
on high, nor finally to get it right after all these centuries. Its cash value, rather, is
simply to “continue the conversation.”
10
Philosophers, accordingly, should view
themselves as “all-purpose intellectuals,”
20
para-professionals ready and willing to
“kibbitz" on a wide range of topics.
Rorty hopes this different conception of philosophy, philosophy with a
lower-case “p,” will eclipse philosophy as it has been practiced within the analytic
tradition-that is, roughly, the contemporary anglophone tradition that sees theories
ot knowledge, philosophy of language and philosophy of science as providing
foundations or guarantees for the truth of knowledge claims in all of the most
important areas of culture.'
1
In its place he envisions “a post-Kantian culture, one
1
8.
) Rorty invokes Wilfred Sellar's formulation in CP, pp. xiv, 29, 226, and in
PMN, p. 114.
19.
) PMN, p. 391.
20.
) Kolenda, p. xii.
21.
) The word “culture” might be understood loosely to designate “. . the large
and constant features of human sufferings, enjoyments, trials, failures and successes
together with the institutions of art, science, technology, politics and religion. . .”
8
in which there is no all-encompassing discipline which legitimizes or grounds the
others.”
22
Rorty s disparagement of the “traditional problems” of philosophy and his
desire to thoroughly “de-divimze“ culture in the rich North Atlantic democracies
provides a thematic and programmatic continuity, be it ever so tenuous, linkinu his
socio-political writings with his views on epistemology, philosophy of mind,
philosophy ot language and so on. Beyond this, however, there does not appear to
be much more to the manner in which his views on a wide range of topics “hanu
together.”
This observation is fully in keeping with his intentions; He disparages what
he calls “systematic philosophy” in favor of “edifying philosophy ” conceived as
philosophy ...designed to make the reader question his own motives for
philosophizing, rather than to supply him with a new philosophical program.”23
“Systematic philosophy,” by contrast, is philosophy that aims to map the whole
domain of knowledge of all of culture and provide an epistemological or ontological
basis for such fields as ethics, politics and art.
24
(John Dewey, “Half-Hearted Naturalism,” in Journal ofPhilosophy, 24 (1927), p
59, quoted in CP, p. 73). Cf. Rorty's similar characterization in ORT, p. 12.
22.
) PMN, p. 6.
23.
) PMN, pp. 5-6.
24.
) Using an expression reminiscent of Sellars' definition of philosophy cited
above, Rorty's mentor moderated his earlier anti-systematic claims:
1 find that with respect to the hanging together of various problems
and various hypotheses in a perspective determined by a definite
point of view, I have a system. In so far I have to retract disparaging
remarks I have made in the past about the need for a system in
philosophy. (Novack, p. 77. Novack quotes Dewey from “Nature in
Experience,” in Philosophical Review
,
Vol. 49, pp. 244-5.)
9
This discussion will focus on what Rorty has had to say about liberalism,
selfhood and community. His early books, written through the 1970s,
25
and most
though not all of his articles and reviews published between 1959 and the late
1 970s do not take these "moral and social questions”
27
as their first topic of
discussion. Rather, the bulk of these early writings target the views of truth as
correspondence
2
* and knowledge as an assemblage of representations,29 together
with the notions of reason,
30
and theories of meaning and reference
3
' which are
parasitic on this view, as well as the notion of “system,” which, in the post-Kant
north Atlantic, at least, has been associated with it.
32
Arguably, however, the
“moral and social questions” which long have been a concern for Rortv
33
have
become more explicit in recent years.
25 ) Including The Linguistic Turn (1967); Exegesis and Argument (1975)' and
PMN (1979).
26.
) As far as 1 am aware, the most comprehensive published bibliography of




) PMN, p 1 66. According to the truth as correspondence view, truth is
constituted by a relation between a truth-bearer—a belief, utterance or statement—
and something not essentially mind-dependent, such as a fact, a state of affairs, a set
of objects, a sequence of members of a domain, or a piece or spacio-temporal real
estate (cf. Gerald Vision, in Malachowski, pp. 75-6).
29.
) PMN, p. 136.
30.
) PMN, p. 126; Pt. 11.
31.
) PMN, Chapter IV.
32.
) PMN, p. 138.
33.
) That is, at least as early as his 1960 review of David L. Miller's Modern
Science and Human Ereedom.
10
For Rorty, to “continue the conversation” in which our predecessors have
engaged is a worthy end in itself. Indeed, if we are to believe him it is the single
most worthwhile activity remaining for philosophers today. Erudition for its own
sake, however, may strike some of us as a rather poor incentive for plowing through
the works of a prolific philosopher. Perhaps a more compelling reason for taking
his social and political views seriously is that so many others invoke his name and
reputation to bolster favorite themes which for years have been the stock-in-trade of
writers on the winning side of the Cold War. Since the prestige of Rorty’s earlier
non-political writings, especially PMN, has transferred at least to some extent to his
social and political interventions, it would be a good idea to review some of his
favorite non-political themes.
Three Anti-Isms
Rorty’s salutary departures from Platonic and Cartesian perspectives may be
appreciated by turning to three related positions he promotes in the first two-thirds
ot PMN. These are: (a) anti-foundalionahsm, (b) anti-representationalism and (c)
anti-essentialism. Without claiming that these three “anti-isms” are in any way
foundations of his thinking, I will devote space to an exposition of them simply
because this is a convenient way of placing what he has to say about “moral and
social questions” within the context of his larger body of writing.
34
(a) Anti-foundattonalism: In PMN, CP, Parts I and II ofORT and
elsewhere, Rorty has presented a strong case for abandoning the search for
34.) Kai Nielsen reports that Isaac Levi similarly has identified “anti-
foundationalism, anti-representationalism, and opposition to glassy essences” as
chief characteristics of Rorty's thought (Nielsen, pp. 168-9; Nielsen cites Isaac Levi,
“Escape from Boredom: Edification According to Rorty,” in Canadian .Journal of
Philosophy XI, No. 4 (1981), pp. 589-602).
foundations tor knowledge, or conditions for the possibility of knowledge,
experience and science. He has noted that most philosophers nowadays consider
themselves to be anti-foundationalist; nevertheless, he disparages analytic
philosophers, in particular, for foundationalism, at least to the extent that they are
still ...committed to the construction of a permanent and neutral framework for
enquiry, and thus for all culture.”
35
Rorty's anti-foundationalism depends crucially on what he has to say about
vocabularies
,
in contrast to sentences or beliefs. Vocabulary shifts such as those
Plato, St. Paul, Newton and Freud provoked amount to literalizations of new
metaphors. Taking his cue from Donald Davidson,
36
Rorty holds a view of
metaphor as having no agreed-upon use, and hence no meaning other than the literal
meaning of its constituent words, their prevailing normal use. A metaphor produces
ettects on its audience, and thus can be a cause of beliefs; nevertheless, it should
not be counted as a ground or reason for beliefs.
37
35.
) PMN, p. 8. At least one critic has argued that Rorty is himself a shamefaced
foundationalist (refer to Sosa). Whether or not this criticism hits the mark,
however, Rorty's case against foundationalism in PMN and elsewhere might yet
withstand the occasional relapse into the view he is concerned to attack
36.
) Frank B. Farrell has argued that there are “profound differences” between
Rorty and Davidson (Farrell, p. 1 1 7). For Davidson, but not always for Rorty, there
is a sense in which some beliefs get nonlinguistic matters right (Farrell, p. 1 19).
(Judging from his remarks in his Afterthoughts to “A Coherence Theory of Truth,”
Davidson has been lukewarm to Rorty’s overtures.) Farrell’s remarks
notwithstanding, it will become clear in the following pages that 1 interpret Rorty
more charitably as holding that nonlinguistic events often cause beliefs to be
accepted as true.
37.
) Although some might dispute the point (refer to the discussion in Farrell, pp.
117-147), Rorty follows Davidson in claiming that, while explanation is always
under a description, pain and causality are not. Thus, for example, Rorty writes that
“...what shows us that life is not just a dream, that our beliefs are in touch with
reality, is the causal
,
non-intentional, non-representational, links between us and the
rest of the universe” (ORT, p. 159; also refer to CIS, p. 40; Rorty, “Feminism and
Pragmatism,” p. 4; and Hall, p. 92).
12
Rorty views words as “nodes in the causal network which binds the [human]
organism together with its environment.”38 When certain metaphors “catch on” or
are adopted widely and become current, they eventually may become literalized.
He cites the example of a mouth of a river or a bottle. The terms private sphere and
public sphere are also likely candidates. The designation sphere in this context is
one of a number of spatial metaphors, including “circle,” “domain ” “realm” and
“arena," all of which have been used to differentiate the sum of public communities
and activities from the sum of private ones. As should become clear in Chapter
Two, these metaphors, routimzed in law and custom,
31
' have largely ceased to
function as metaphors. Such metaphors are now “dead”: Like the bread of the
Eucharist in the orthodox doctrine of transubstantiation, they, too, have acquired a
conventional use.
When metaphors die, they cease to be merely causes and become reasons
for beliefs
4 " Recurring to Wittgenstein's slogan that the meaning of a word is its
use, together with Davidson’s definition of a (living) metaphor as a figure of speech
that has no agreed-upon use, we may say that, as a dying metaphor gradually
acquires a meaning
, it comes to produce effects through that meaning.
In PMN, Chapter One of CIS and elsewhere, Rorty has made a strong case
that there is no way rationally
41
to adjudicate vocabularies, in the manner that one
38 .) “Relativism: Finding and Making,” p. 12.
39.
) Rosenblum, pp. 66-7
40.
) ORT, p. 171.
41
.
) In Rorty’s view, “rationality” is a name for “...a suitable balance between
respect for the opinions of one’s fellows and respect for the stubbornness of
sensation” (CP, p. 195; also refer to the discussion in Kolenda, p. 7). This
formulation is not inconsistent with his occasional definition of rationality,
mentioned below, as “the way we do things around here.”
13
may adjudicate sentences within a “normal" discourse or vocabulary. There is no
such a thing as an irrational nonlinguistic effect; there are only irrational
justifications-that is, certain sentences with no use within a pregiven language
game with set rules. Moreover, since any set of rules must be stated in an already-
existing vocabulary or language, it is futile to seek, as Philosophers have, an over-
arching set ot super-rules adjudicating all language games for all time.
What distinguishes a metaphor from an inarticulate sound or mark is that the
former is made up of words-that is, sounds or marks with literal meanings; sounds
or marks that, in Rorty’s terminology, are “about" something. Without literal
meaning, there can be no metaphors. Thus, metaphor is parasitic on agreed-upon
vocabularies or, to borrow a term from Kuhn, on normal discourse. Dead
metaphors make up a large part of any given discourse, normal or abnormal. As
metaphors are created, literalized and killed, vocabularies change and supplant one
another, and new physical theories, manners of versification and moral and religious
creeds eclipse incumbent ones. In this way, “...progress in the cultural interests of
poetry, science, philosophy, or politics results from 'the accidental coincidence of a
private obsession with a public need.'“
42
So it is not an exaggeration to say that for Rorty, “the motor of history, the
chief vehicle of intellectual and moral progress" is the successive creation of new
tropes and the literalization of metaphors.
4
' When he urges readers to change their
political vocabularies from Althusser's to Unger's, for example,
44
he is aware that
such a shift may not only register a change in the political climate, but also
42.
) Hall, p. 1 7, quoting Rorty.
43.
) Fraser, in Malachowski, p. 306.
44.) EH, p. 189.
14
contribute to such a change. He confirms this assumption when he salutes Unger's
many years ot hard work here in North America, changing the curricula of many of
our law schools and the self-image of many of our lawyers,”45 and the
thousands of recently graduated lawyers who [Rorty assures us,
despite appearances to the contrary-MM], influenced by Unger and
other members of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, are now
helping make institutions in the United States slightly more flexible
and decent.
46
This example lends credence to an interpretation of Rorty according to which poets,
in the extended sense as metaphor-makers, are “the unacknowledged legislators of
the social world.”
47
Tom Sorell summarizes Rorty’s “deflationary" account of the development
of culture well:
...individuals who happen to have been bom at certain times, who
have been driven by certain obsessive states, who happen to have had
neurons firing in response to certain random stimulations, happen to
invent forms of words that are made public at the right time and
place and catch on.
4x
This account resonates with Kuhn's case that scientific progress has less to
do with discovering truth than adoption by a scientific community of new
paradigms, or conceptual vocabularies. Rorty draws on Kuhn, among others, to
make the case that the pronouncements of the hardest of the hard sciences have no
epistemological privilege or priority over poetry. All are concerned with the
45.
) EH, p. 177.
46.
) EH, p. 182.
47.
) Cf. Fraser, in Malachowski, p. 306.
48.
) Hornsby, in Malachowski, p. 20.
15
production of new descriptions; to call one set of descript,ons more accurate than
another amounts to little more than the claim that the preferred set has paid its way
better than others.
There are, of course, different ways of paying one's way. Some ideas prove
useful to many people for coping, for making life less difficult. Others produce
tingles in spines. The realization of either the romantic intellectual’s impulse to
create herself anew by redescribing, or Shklar’s imperative to ameliorate cruelty
depends on the creation of new final vocabularies. Both the poet and the reformer
set their faces against metaphysics; both distinguish abnormal discourse from
normal discourse, the invention of a new metaphor from its literalization or social
application.
4 '
Since, according to Rorty, the chief vehicle of intellectual and moral
progress is the creation of new tropes, it is imperative that the scope of admissible
alternate forms of words, descriptions, metaphors, literary genres and final
vocabularies be unlimited in principle. “[I]t is central to the idea of a liberal
society," Rorty writes, “that, in respect of words as opposed to deeds, persuasion as
opposed to force, anything goes.”
50
(b) Anti-represenlatumalism: Rorty counts the tendency to treat
vocabularies, or congeries of metaphors, as if they could be warranted like
statements, beliefs or propositions as the cardinal sin of traditional philosophy. This
49.
) Fraser, in Malachowski, p. 309.
50.
) Quoted by Tom Sorell, in Malachowski, p. 23. Taken as a normative ideal,
of course, this formulation has been espoused by lots of people, not just liberals.
Rosa Luxemburg was every bit as adamant on this point as was John Stuart Mill.
Few of Rorty’s opponents on the left would dispute that, when it comes to the
exchange of ideas, we should let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of
thought contend (Rorty approvingly quotes the slogan Mao popularized at CP, p.
219).
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is because there are no reasons not already couched in some vocabulary which
could establish once and for all that one had the right vocabulary
51
Correspondence of a belief with a non-linguistic state of affairs, then, is not
a criterion of knowledge or truth. Rather, according to Rorty, an anti-
representationalist account of knowledge is one which “...does not view knowledue
as a matter of getting reality right, but rather as a matter of acquiring habits of
action for coping with reality.’
02
Anti-representationalism, for him, is “the
abandonment of a 'spectator' account of knowledge and the consequent
abandonment of the appearance/reality distinction.”
53
Following Wittgenstein and Davidson, Rorty makes a particularly
convincing case that the relation between language and the world is causal
, rather
than representational. It is a mistake to treat vocabularies or languages in
Tractarian fashion as a collection of representations, or as a medium more or less
well-suited to the purpose of representing nonlinguistic objects. To say that a
language such as, say, the language of modem chemistry, represents nonlinguistic
objects and events is merely a way of paying that language a compliment.
0
What Rorty has to say about representational ism depends crucially on what
he has to say about sentences or beliefs. Beliefs do not represent non-beliefs. Like
51.
) Fraser, in Malachowski, p. 305. Rorty’s case against representationalism
appears in Part Two of PMN and his essay “The World Well Lost” (CP, pp. 1-18),
among other places.
52.
) ORT, p. 1.
53.
) Rorty, Introduction to Murphy, p. 2.
54.
) ORT, p. 60.
55.
) “Truth is simply a compliment paid to sentences seen to be paying their
way” (Klepp, p. 118, quoting Rorty).
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the unhyphenated coherentist, “The pragmatist recognizes relations ofjustification
holding between beliefs and desires, and relations of causation holding between
these beliefs and desires and other items in the universe, but no relations of
representation
,o6
Of course, the world causes beliefs to be accepted as true or
rejected as false; nevertheless, these causes themselves cannot constitute
justifications or reasons for retaining beliefs. Beliefs can be caused by any of
innumerable nonlinguistic events or states of affairs: but they can only be justified
by other beliefs. Thus, there are no causes for the truth of beliefs.
57
Rorty places himself squarely within the tradition of American pragmatism,
represented by William James, who held that a true belief is more fruitfully viewed
as one that “pays its way,” rather than one which accurately represents reality.
58
The “core of pragmatism,” Rorty writes, is “to replace the notion of true beliefs as
representations of 'the nature of things' and instead to think of them as successful
rules for action."
5
' Accordingly, he advocates blurring “the positivist distinction
between the semantic and the pragmatic, [...] theory and observation.”
60
56.
) ORT, p. 97.
57.
) ORT, p. 121.
58.
) PMN, p. 176; CP, pp. 162-3; also refer to the discussion in Murphy, pp. 104-
5. According to James,
“
The true is the name ofwhatever proves itselfto be good
in the way ofbelief and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons' ’ (James, pp. 75-
6). Since these “assignable reasons” for a belief to be true function as determiners
of epistemic value which are privileged in the sense that they allegedly require no
further justification, they would appear to constitute transcendental conditions of
knowledge. Perhaps this is why, as Davidson reports, Rorty has explicitly
repudiated James' version of pragmatism (Davidson, in Malachowski, p. 138).
59.
) ORT, p. 65.
60.
) CP, p. xvii. In keeping with this point, Rorty advocates abandoning all
theories of reference, in favor of an everyday notion of “talking about" and “really
talking about” (PMN, pp. 289-93; 300- In).
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By this conception, truth has become, “...in William James’ phrase, what is
good tor us to believe.”
61
Like the ancient sophists, James and Rorty recognize that
usefulness is always usefulnessfor someone or some group. Since something can
be said to be useful or good in the way of belief only in relation to a given need or
purpose, usefulness and goodness, and hence truth, depend upon “our” needs and
aims.
6
“ And this, in turn, depends upon who “we” are, since we are who we are, in
large part at least, because we have certain needs. There is no usefulness or good,
then, apart from usefulness for a given 1 or we. As we will see below, this
observation, together with Rorty’s account of selfhood and self-creation, has
important ramifications when it comes to assessing his social and political views'.
(c) Anti-essent lalism: Rorty’s rejection of the notion of representation of an
outer essence of Nature or Reality is symmetrical with his case against the notion of
expression of an inner essence, or true self. “To abjure the notion of the ’truly
human
,
he writes, “is to abjure the attempt to divinize the self as a replacement for
a divinized world.”
63
However great his differences with Hume in other respects, Rorty lauds the
Scotsman's redescription of selfhood as nothing but a loose bundle of preferences,
fears, hopes and other mental atoms.
64
For Rorty the “nominalist,” selfhood is not a
thing with attitudes, but simply the set of attitudes themselves,
65
“a network of
beliefs, desires, and emotions with nothing behind it--no substrate behind the
61.
) ORT, p. 22; Rorty, in Rajchman and West, p. 5.
62.
) Novack, p. 180.
63.
) CIS, p. 35.
64.
) EH, pp. 145-8.




a network that is constantly reweaving itself, “a centerless web of
historically conditioned beliefs and desires.”
67
These attitudes are not expressions
or attributes of selftiood, but rather constituent elements of selfhood: Strip away the
attitudes, and there is no self left.
“For such philosophers as Davidson and Sellars,” Rorty reminds us,
“language is not a medium of expression for something pnor called ’experience’.”68
Selfhood, rather, is “a tissue of contingencies,”
6” a concatenation of beliefs, desires,
emotions and other putative mental states.
70
He views it as “centerless, as an
historical contingency all the way through,” rather than as the locus of a center, a
divine spark, or a truth-tracking faculty called “reason.”
71
Thus,
...we do not need a categorical distinction between the self and its
situation. We can dismiss the distinction between an attribute of the
66.
) “Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,” p. 217.
67.
) ORT, p. 192. Geras has noted that: “Rorty sometimes writes as though
people were simply what their society and culture make of them They have no
inherent nature” (Geras, p 49). Geras does not discuss the possibility that one could
deny that “socialization goes all the way down” (CIS, pp. 64, 1 85), while at the
same time denying an inherent human nature distinct from the biological makeup of
Homo sapiens sapiens. This possibility occasionally appears to have been lost on
Rorty, too, as when, in contravention of his acknowledgment that humans have
something in common with other animals (“Feminism and Pragmatism,” p. 4), he
recommends to us “a picture of human beings as children of their time and place,
without any significant metaphysical or biological limits to their plasticity” (the
cited passage, from Rorty's article “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids,” appears in
Geras, p. 89).
68.
) Rorty, in Balslev, p. 85.
69.
) CIS, p. 32.
70.
) CIS, pp. 23-43; Rorty, in Malachowski, p. 299, note 24.
71.) Rorty, in Malachowski, p. 288.
20
self and a constituent of the self, between the seifs accidents and its
essence, as “merely' metaphysical.
72
By Rortv s lights. Metaphysicians" are people who are on the lookout for
“
. ..continuities-overarching conditions of possibility which provide the space
within which discontinuity occurs”
77 A prime example of such a continuity is the
story of our alienation from and ultimate return to a universal and ahistoncal human
essence. Instead of human essence, Rorty wishes to substitute a characterization of
the self as “the accidental tangle of compulsion, desires and roles that we crudely
refer to with the pronoun ’I.'“
74
He favorably contrasts his view of the self as an historical product to the
non-empirical self which Kant had to postulate in the interests of Enlightenment
rationalism.
7
' This helps to explain his high esteem for Freud, or at least Donald
Davidson’s interpretation of the Austrian neurologist.
7
*’ According to Rorty, Freud
corroborated a conception of the self neither as a discreet, integrated consciousness.
72.
) Rorty, in Malachowski, p. 289.
73.
) CIS, p. 25n. Cf. Hall, pp. 131-2.
74.
) Klepp, p. 122. Norman Geras has argued that, in the course of making his
case for solidarity and decency, Rorty surreptitiously relies on a conception of
human nature (refer to Geras, Chapters Two and Three). Similarly, Haber has
claimed that Rorty assumes that humans have a universal essence, namely a moral
subject within them that can be humiliated (Haber, pp. 67-8).
75.
) Rorty, in Malachowski, p. 301, note 39.
76.
) Refer to Rorty's excellent paper, “Freud and Moral Reflection,” included in
EH, pp. 143-163, and “The Contingency of Selfhood,” included in CIS (pp. 23-43),
especially pp. 30-39. The Davidson-Rorty interpretation of Freud has not gone
uncontested. By Martin Hollis’ lights, for example, Freud does not reject human
essence, but rather holds that “...poetically speaking, our glassy essence is an
essence but not glassy” (Hollis, in Malachowski, p. 246). Even if Hollis were right,
however, Davidson and Rorty might well have produced a “productive misreading”
of Freud that deserves to be taken seriously.
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a “natural kind with an intrinsic nature, an intrinsic set of powers to be developed or
left undeveloped, nor as merely a “decentered machine.” In this way, “Freud
himself eschewed the very' idea of a paradigm human being.”77
Davidson and Rorty’s Freud showed us how the more sublime creations of
fantasts and poets may be traced not to an essence expressed but to idiosyncratic
events of the past, neuroses, infantile experiences and the like. Strong poets, then,
are not external izers or expressers of an essence within: Their metaphors catch on
not because they resonate with something universal and atemporal within the human
heart, but because for any of a number of contingent reasons it just happens to meet
the needs of members of a particular community at a particular time.
78
Proust's
madelleine was not so much a light turned inward for self-discovery as a catalyst to
self-creation.
These observations subvert a line of criticism leveled against liberalism
This is the criticism, which Rorty associates with communitarians, that political
institutions presuppose a doctrine about the nature of human beings and that such a
doctrine must, unlike Enlightenment rationalism, make clear the essentially
historical character of the self.
77
As we have seen, Rorty advises us to tell stones of our past as the saga of
successive comings of new tropes and the literalization of metaphors. Metaphor is
the growing point of language.
80
Keeping in mind that metaphors are causes of
77.
) Passages quoted in the last two sentences are from CIS, p. 35.
78.
) CIS, pp. 34-5.
79.
) Rorty, in Malachowski, p. 282. Also see: Guignon and Hiley, in
Malachowski, p. 342.
80.) EH, p. 12.
belief, this amounts to advising us to view history as predominantly "cultural
history, and cultural history as in large part the literalization of metaphor.
Muzzling strong poets, then, is more than an attack on one individual's
freedom It amounts to promoting the "freezing-over of culture” and the
dehumanization of human beings.
”
81
Here, Rorty's precursor is J.S. Mill, who in
Chapter Two of On Liberty famously argued that, to borrow Kuhnian terminology,
if abnormal discoursers were one day to disappear, it would behoove normal
discoursers to raise them up themselves.
In a paper entitled “Pragmatism and Choosing to Believe,” Jane Heal
challenges a view she associates with Rorty, namely the view that acquiring beliefs
is a matter of choice.
8
“ Although Heal does not deny that "men and women may
actively consider the sort of persons they want to be,”
83
she questions Rorty's
emphasis on the contingency of self-creation.
Heal's criticism might loose some of its force, however, in view of Rorty's
recognition that the strong poet is a rare individual, and even this rare individual
depends on normal discourse, which is composed in large part of "unchosen
belief.”
84
When Rorty characterizes the strong poet as one who is free to invent and
move on to new and exciting forms of discourse, we should recall that for him
81.
) Guignon and Hiley, in Malachowski, p. 339.
82.
) Included in Malachowski, pp. 101-14. Charles Taylor echoes Heal's doubts
(Malachowski, pp. 258-9).
83.
) Rosenblum, p. 135.
84.
) Rorty presents these views in "The Contingency of Selfhood” (CIS, pp. 23-
43), a rewrite of a Northcliffe Lecture he delivered in 1986. The only writings of
Rorty that Heal mentions in “Pragmatism and Choosing to Believe” are PMN and
CP.
freedom is the recognition of contingency.*
0
He recognizes that the strong poet has
little or no choice when it comes to the forms of life into which she was bom and
the blind impresses which her behavings, including her discursive behavings, bear
Indeed, one thing that makes a strong poet strong is her refusal to try to escape this
contingency.
86
Rorty has indeed produced an account of selfhood that assumes that
acquiring some beliefs is a matter of choice. However, even when it is the strong
poets' choice of descriptions that make up the story of her appearance on the scene,
the chooser is always a finite, historically and culturally constituted subject, a
chooser who is herself a tissue of contingencies.
Part of this finitude, this historical and cultural specificity, has to do with the
array of choices perceived to be available, the range of “live options.” Some
commentators, problematizing the perception and range of these options, have
identified what they have dubbed the problem of adaptive preferences. As Marx
recognized, our preferences are often, and perhaps always, adaptations to social,
economic and political circumstances beyond our control. What liberals typically
assume to be free and voluntary consent may simply be adaptations to
circumstances in which live options have been confined to narrow limits. In recent
years some feminist writers have noted this problem and have deployed it in attacks
against liberal notions of consent. Their claim is that what liberals take to be
women’s free and voluntary consent to various arrangements is spurious when and
because it is based on preferences that are adaptive to circumstances over which
87
they have little or no control
85.
) CIS, p. 26.
86.
) CIS, p. 28.
87.
) Refer, for example, to Walker.
24
The term adaptive preferences, however, might well be a pleonasm. As we
have already noted, all beliefs have causes, even if they do not all have reasons. So
in this sense, at least, even the most capricious or whimsical preferences
conceivably could be described as adaptations to “nonsubjective” factors,




Long before Dewey, Jefferson made the connection between pragmatism
and the experiment of democracy, although he used utilitarian-sounding words to do
so:
[Njature has constituted utility to man, the standard and test of
virtue. Men living in different countries, under different
circumstances, different habits and regimens, may have different
utilities; the same act, therefore, may be useful, and consequently
virtuous in one country which is injurious and vicious in another
differently circumstanced.
KX
Jefferson also recognized that a particular description of institutions and
practices that proves useful to some people may be worse than useless to others
within the same country. It all depends on who “we” are. Recognizing this, as we
have seen, his pragmatist successors, like his sophist predecessors, have shined a
spotlight on “us” and directed the question of who “we” are to center stage.
Like Jefferson and James, Rorty acknowledges the non-universal,
on
contingent, “historically-situated” character of his own normative views:
88.) Jefferson, pp. 639-40.
89.) EH, p. 42.
...what counts as rational or as fanatical is relative to the group to
which we think it is necessary to justify ourselves-to the body of
shared belief which determines the reference of the word “we.”
90
Educated inhabitants of the rich North Atlantic think it is necessary to justify
themselves to various “we's” of different degrees of exclusivity. “We” in the
broadest sense might correspond to one’s ethnos
, which “comprises those who share
enough of one’s beliefs to make fruitful conversation possible.”91
Within the context of public affairs, then, it behooves seekers of truth to
abandon the search for conditions of possibility of experience, and instead to foster
“as much intersubjective agreement as possible”92 about what is good in the way of
belief. Extending the reference of “us” as far as possible in this way may involve
not only the persuasion of people with whom one already shares enough in common
to engage in fruitful discussion, but also the attempt to make oneself understood to
more and more people with whom one hitherto has not communicated.
Accordingly, Rorty has urged setting aside such “Kantian questions” as “What
should 1 do9 What may I hope? What is Man?” and fixing instead on “Deweyan
questions such as. Which communities' purposes shall 1 share0
”9 ’
Reviewing his references to the communities whose purposes he shares, it is
possible to group them into two broad categories: On the one hand, there is a
“private us,” an “us insiders who share [Derrida's] background, who find the same
90.
) Rorty, in Malachowski, p. 281.
91
.
) Rorty, in Rajchman and West, p. 13. One may, of course, be capable of
conversing with someone without thereby thinking it necessary to justify oneself to
that person.
92.
) Rorty, in Rajchman and West, p. 5.
93.
) “Dewey between Hegel and Darwin,” p. 67.
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rather esoteric things as funny or beautiful or moving as he does,”94 “we [...] who
have read and pondered Plato, Newton, Kant, Marx, Darwin, Freud, Dewey, etc.,”
95
an us tor whom the discourse of philosophy actually has been important.”96 On the
other hand, there is a “public us, as in “we liberal democrats,”97 “we social
democrats,”
98
“we liberal intellectuals,”99 “we modem inheritors of the traditions of
religious tolerance and constitutional government,”
100
“we [...] liberal Rawlsian
searchers for consensus”
101
and “us American liberals.”
102
When he writes that
“We should be more willing than we are to celebrate bourgeois capitalist society as
the best polity actualized so far,”
10
' he is explicitly addressing the latter “us.”
Presumably, the background “we” share with Derrida is first and foremost
educational: What “we philosophy professors”
104
or “we Anglo Saxon
philosophers”
10
" have in common with “we Western liberal intellectuals” 106 is
94.
) EH, p. 120.
95.
) CP, p. 173.
96.
) EH, p. 108.
97.
) Rorty, in Malachowski, pp. 279-302.
98.
) Rorty, “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 565.
99.
) Rorty, “Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodemity,” p. 173.
100.
) Rorty, in Malachowski, p. 287.
101.
) Rorty, in Rajchman and West, p. 1 2.
102.
) Rorty, “Pragmatism without Method,” p. 272.
103.
) CP, p. 210 note 16.
104.
) CP, p. 189.
105.
) Rorty, “Signposts along the Way that Reason Went,” pp 5-6.
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having read lots of books. For Rorty, philosophy with a small p is one form of
literature among others and should become or is in the process of becoming "culture
‘ '
’ „]Q7
criticism.’ So, in keeping with his views on the aims of philosophy, Rorty's
project would appear to consist in large part of “continuing the conversation” with
contemporaries and precursors in philosophy departments, as well as in English
departments and programs in comparative literature.
Education and the leisure time necessary to read lots of books, of course, are
not universally accessible. Slum dwellers in Lima, longshoremen in Lagos and
working mothers in East Los Angeles are not likely to have the leisure time-let
alone the acquired taste-for reading lots of books by Rorty's preferred authors. So
whether or not “we powerful, discursive types”
108
are powerful because we are
discursive, we certainly are discursive because we are powerful.
Rorty acknowledges this. As it turns out, “we” happen to be “the
community of the liberal intellectuals of the secular modem West,” 109 “us relatively
leisured intellectuals, inhabiting a stable and prosperous part of the world,”
110
“us...educated, leisured policy-makers of the West,”
111
“people like ourselves-




) ORT, p. 29; Rorty, in Rajchman and West, p. 12.
107.
) Hall, p. 19.
108.
) EH, p. 182.
109.




) CP, p. 203.
112.
) “Movements and Campaigns,” p. 4.
rich North American bourgeois; 11 ' “we rich, fat, tired North Americans" 114 and
the North Atlantic Bourgeoisie.”
11
’ Rom, then, is unlikely to dispute Roy
Bhaskar's characterization of him as catering to
...a leisured elite-intellectual vuppies-neither racked by pain nor
immersed in toil-whose lives may be devoted to the practice of
aesthetic enhancement, and in particular to generating self, other and
genealogical descriptions.
116
From the perspective of its public role, this leisured elite would appear to
correspond to Alastair MacIntyre's Managers, and perhaps to some of his Therapists,
too. These, together with the Rich Aesthetes (Rorty's “private we’s"), allegedly
dominate “our culture,"
117
both civic and private.
According to this picture, then, there are private communities dedicated to
aesthetic enhancement and there are public communities which dominate political
culture. Community, however, is preeminently a public category. This is because,
according to Rorty, the private sphere is the sphere of aloneness, narcissism and
idiosyncrasy: The point of private life in Rorty's liberal utopia, as he describes it in
The Contingency of Selfhood," is to have the opportunity to make oneself a
creature which is not only new but unique. Rorty denies that there is or should be
113.
) “Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,” p. 588.
114.
) EH, p. 178.
115.
) “Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,” p. 216. Compare this list of “we’s”
with the list in Comay, p. 120. Also refer to the relevant discussion in Bernstein,
pp. 553-4.
116.
) Bhaskar 1991, pp. 134-5. Also refer to relevant remarks in Held, p. 573.
Compare this with Kolenda's view of Rorty as a democratizer.
117.) Cited by Rorty, in Malachowski, p. 282.
29
any consensus about competing conceptions of the good life.
118
And in keeping
with this he does not emphasize private “we's,” except for “tiny circle[s] of
initiates, small bands of kindred souls drawn together by the private projects
they share.
Whether public or private, however, what Rorty's “we’s” have in common
evidently is a shared educational background, thanks to leisure and wealth in the
north Atlantic. Liberal intellectuals and policy makers share with the strong poets
and their necessarily elite audience leisure, wealth and freedom from censorship.
Thanks to this common background, “we” have the freedom to run for office or
write novels as we wish, depending on our idiosyncratic conceptions of personal
perfection.
Self-identification and considerations of audience have a crucial bearing on
the manner in which Rorty presents his views and on his evaluation of rational
argumentation. He would not agree that he himself has provided a sustained
argument against the old sort of philosophy.
12" Drawing on the arguments of Quine,
Davidson, Sellars and others whom he considers to be reductios of the analytic
tradition, he wants to convince his audience that a philosophical defense of
liberalism is unnecessary.
This is not to say, however, that he does not believe in promoting liberalism.
He most emphatically does. Indeed, he describes himself frankly as engaged in
apologetics
,
in the sense of “a circular justification of our practices” which “makes




) CIS, p. 29; Berstein, p. 552.
1
19.
) CIS, p. xiii.
120.
) PMN, p. 6.
121.) CIS, p. 57.
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Noting that for him, as for Wittgenstein, language is a “tool,” not a medium
of communication open to rational analysis from a position outside of any particular
language, David Hall has concluded that:
There is little to be gained from attempting to micro-manage, fine-
tune, disassemble, or deconstruct the account Rorty provides. The
best one can do is to judge the relative attractiveness of Rorty’s views
by recourse to alternative visions.
123
Unfortunately, Hall goes on to conclude that “Rorty's philosophy is closed to
rational analysis, critique or dialectic.”
124
This conclusion is precipitous. The fact
that Rorty emphasizes rhetoric over argumentation and deploys a wide variety of
rhetorical techniques in making his point does not imply that he has entirely
eschewed argumentation, if we use the word as he does, in a sense in which the
term “rational argumentation” is pleonastic.
12
" As the reader might have guessed
from remarks earlier in this section, Rorty’s only criterion of rationality, if indeed it





) Hall, p. 4.
124.
) Hall, p. 6.
125.
) Rorty has defined philosophical argumentation as “the practice of playing
sentences off against each other in order to decide what to believe” (EH, p. 125n).
It is easier to distinguish argumentation from suasive rhetoric, however, if we view
them as different sorts of language games with distinct goals: Deciding what to
believe, after all, is not the same as convincing others to believe something.
1
6
) Rorty offers this definition for the words scientific and objective (EH, p.
101 ). It could as well apply to rational , however (cf. “Postmodernist Bourgeois
Liberalism,” p. 587; Rorty, in Rajchman and West, p. 6; and “Relativism: Finding
reader might have guessed from the preceding section, “around here” is, if not
exclusively philosophy departments, then at least in large part academia-that is, an
enclave inhabited by people unusually well-prepared to produce sentence sequences
which conform to the rules of formal logic, to engage in dialectic and criticism, to
recognize informal fallacies when they encounter them, and so on
At least one commentator is puzzled that in the course of making his
positions look good Rorty appears to argue for them much as other writers do 127
Rorty offers reasons for changing certain subjects; he respects logical consistency as
well as the next philosopher, and he attacks opponents when they resort to so-called
informal fallacies.
I2X
As we can see, however, his recourse to philosophical
argumentation remains justifiable on pragmatic grounds even though he does not
address his writings of recent years exclusively to analytic philosophers but to a
broader audience of “individuals in all precincts of the intellectual community .” 129
Because the educated intellectuals, philosophers and professors with whom he
identifies himself and to whom he thinks it is necessary to justify himself are
specially trained to identify and defer to cogent arguments,
13
" philosophical
and Making,’ pp. 22-25). It is true that on other occasions he offers different
definitions of rationality, including the attempt to make one’s web of belief as
“coherent” as possible (ORT, p. 106; EH, p. 30). He offers little in the way of
justification for his emphasis on the coherence of beliefs (Geras, p. 125); however,
one possible justification might be that seeking to make one’s body of beliefs as
coherent as possible, whatever that may entail, is just one of the ways things are
done around here.
127.
) Geras, p. 122.
1
28.
) Such as ad hominem arguments against the philosopher Heidegger, the
genetic fallacy with reference to the ignominious origins of existing liberal
democracies, and so on
129.
) Hall, p. 9.
130.
) Refer to his remarks on “philosophical ability” in CP, pp. 219-20.
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argumentation of the sort one finds in PMN and elsewhere is an especially effective
rhetorical technique for bringing his audience around to his point of view.
True, Rorty s audience, however broadly or narrowly we may describe it. is
probably less impervious to flattery and argumenta adpopulum than many members
of the audience would like to admit: As Rorty points out in his paper “Philosophy
in America Today,”
1 ' 1
the way things are done in philosophy departments in the
anglophone countries today typically resembles more closely the practice of a clever
lawyer, juggling briefs, citing precedents and case law, and so on, than that of
white-smocked laboratory researchers driven only by the passion for disclosing
truth. Nevertheless, what distinguishes “us for whom the discourse of philosophy
actually has been important” from a wider audience presumably is that members of
the former community are more impressed by the sort of argumentation of which
philosophers have long considered themselves to be exemplary practitioners.
So Hall may be right when he writes that,
.Rorty's dependence upon metaphors rather than statements,
pictures rather than arguments, and global interpretations, rather than
internal analyses of the thinkers he employs, means that the
persuasive dimension of his thinking is stressed above that of the
strictly logical.
132
He is mistaken, however, if he assumes that the persuasive dimension of Rorty's
thinking can be promoted effectively without the “strictly logical” dimension: In
view of his projected audience, the latter dimension is a pragmatically authorized
instance of the former.
* * *
131.) This article appears in CP, pp. 211 -30.
132.) Hall, p. 7.
So far, 1 have stated the problem to be taken up in this discussion, indicated
what is at stake and located the problem in relation both to the larger body of
Rorty's published work and to his audience. In Chapter One I will turn attention to
Rorty's liberal predecessors, focusing on his debt to Dewey and differences between
the two pragmatists when it comes to their conceptions of democracy and liberty
and their proposals for allaying the traditional opposition between the public and
private spheres.
Dewey once wrote that “All intelligent political criticism is comparative.
In Chapter Two I will compare some liberal assumptions about the relationship
between the private sphere and state institutions to an alternative account which
emphasizes the political character of the private sphere and private selfhood. The
alternative description that I present in rough outline seriously compromises Rorty’s
evaluation of existing liberal democracies.
With some key terms for an alternative conceptual vocabulary in hand, I will
turn a critical eye in Chapter Three to Rorty's claim that the liberal democracies
already contain institutions and practices well-suited to advancing the public ideal
of ameliorating suffering. 1 will then suggest an alternative political setup which
appears to hold greater promise in relation to this ideal.
And finally, in Chapter Four, I will suggest that, at the end of the American
Century, Rorty’s role as private ironist is incompatible with his role as apologist for
133.) Dewey 1984, p. 304.
“bourgeois liberalism.”
134
The better he fulfills one role, 1 will argue, the more
compromises the other.
1 34. ) Regarding this term Rorty writes:
1 call it “bourgeois” to emphasize that most of the people I am
talking about would have no quarrel with the Marxist claims that a
lot of those institutions and practices [which supposedly typify it,
such as an independent judiciary, a free press and free universities]
are possible and justifiable only in certain historical, and especially




Of the three main heroes of PMN, Rorty has written that he has come to feel
the closest affinity to John Dewey.' He wistfully appreciates Dewey and other
engaged American philosophers of the New Deal era who played a significant role
in articulating public policy and establishing the tone of public discourse in the
United States.
1 (
Like Dewey, Rorty has been concerned to defend liberal
institutions in the West-including “a free press, free universities, and enlightened
public opinion,’' as well as an independent judiciary and electoral representation
137-
against their intellectual detractors. Indeed, he has described himself modestly as
little more than an updater of his pragmatist predecessor.'
38
Rortv's self description
would appear to be accurate, at least in view of the fact that he has offered little in
the way of a positive political vision that Dewey, standing on the shoulders of Mill.
Jefferson and Locke, had not already proposed. Acknowledging this, Rorty, with
equal modesty, has apologized for his “lack of imagination.”
139
Dewey, then, would appear to be a reasonable point of departure for an
investigation of Rorty’s social and political views. Comparing the two American
pragmatists at close quarters, however, it becomes clear that Rorty is more original
135.
) CP, p. 49; “Relativism: Finding and Making,” p.l; Berstein, p. 541.
136.
) CP, pp. 63; 207.
137.
) CIS, p. 63. Compare with the list in “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 567.
138.
) Klepp, p. 122.
139.) EH, p.l 84.
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a thinker than his self-evaluation would lead one to believe. There are important
differences between the two pragmatists.
One reason these differences might not be more apparent from a reading of
Rorty alone is that his Dewey is, as one commentator has put it, “a surgically
revised specimen, to be sure.'’
140
One Dewey scholar, J.E. Tiles, for example, draws
a sharp distinction between the two philosophers when it comes to their conceptions
of the tasks of philosophers:
141
True, both Dewey and Rorty hold that philosophy, if
it is to be anything at all, should be an attempt to see how things, in the broadest
possible sense of the term, hang together, in the broadest sense of the term. Beyond
this, however, they offer divergent views of what the scope and ends of philosophy
should be. Rorty disparages defenses of liberalism which rely on high theory-
"Philosophical Liberalism" of the sort Kant is held to have provided. He prefers
instead a defense of liberalism which casts a bright light on commonsense liberal
beliefs such as the belief that slavery is bad, and that people should be allowed to
worship God as they please. I4 ~ “We should 'privatize philosophy,’^ Rorty' counsels,
“and say that when it comes to the communal self-reassurance of the modem
democratic societies, most of the work gets done not by deep thinkers [. . .] but by
superficial dreamers."
14
' Recognizing this, one commentator has noted that what is
unique about Rorty’s position on social and political questions is that it “manifests
140.
) Hall, p. 84. Also refer to Rajchman and West, pp. ix-xxx, p. xxviii, note 7.
Rorty’s interpretation of Dewey may be culled from: “Overcoming the Tradition"
and “Dewey's Metaphysics," in CP, pp. 37-59 and 72-81, respectively; “Pragmatism
and Post-Nietzschean Philosophy,” in EH, pp. 1-5; and “Dewey between Hegel and
Darwin.”
141.
) Tiles, pp. 3-4.
142.
) Rorty contrasts common sense to irony in CIS, p. 74.
143.) Rorty, “Posties,” p. 12.
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the insight that actually there is not much to be said that is distinctive'” 144 Dewey
by contrast, had grander ends in view. As Tiles put it:
The point of having a broad vision was for Dewey to have a vantage
point from which to criticize, judiciously and sensitively, existing^
cultural institutions. Such criticism was for him the distinctive role
ot philosophy and it could not be conducted properly without an
understanding of the methods of science. To mount such criticism
effectively, moreover, requires certain distortions in our conceptions
of experience and of reality to be corrected, and it cannot be carried
out without a sound grasp of the nature of the general goals of
intellectual endeavor (such as “truth”) and how these goals are
progressively refined as our methods for pursuing them develop.
145
If Tiles is correct, then he has made it difficult to imagine Dewey as
authorizing Rorty's view of a “post-philosophical culture” and the vision of a liberal
utopia presented in CIS. Tiles casts aspersions on Rorty's claims to Dewey's legacy:
[Rorty] is in the end no more prepared to take seriously and develop
the philosophic position for which Dewey argued than are those who
remain firmly within the analytic tradition. He is no more able to see
how Dewey's arguments might achieve what they set out to achieve




) Burrows, in Malachowski, p. 327.
145.
) Tiles, p 4. On the same page. Tiles adds that
All this leaves intact a great deal of what Rorty stigmatizes as
“Philosophy,” and moreover presents “Philosophy” as instrumental
to the proper conduct of “philosophy.”
Similarly, Kai Nielsen has noted that “For Dewey (pace Rorty), considerations of
method were central” (Nielsen, p. 168).
146.
) Nielsen, p. 5. The citation within the quoted passage is from CP, p. xvii.
Also consider David Hall's doubts about Rorty's “strong misreading” of Dewey as a
hero of anti-foundationalism (Hall, p. 1 16).
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Whatever the merit of Tiles’ misgivings about Rorty’s similarities to Dewey
when it comes to the public role of philosophy, however, other differences between
Rorty and Dewey are more relevant to the present discussion. Two such difference
are the two pragmatists' divergent conceptions of liberty and their different attitudes
towards democracy. The balance of this chapter will focus on Rorty's debt to and
departures from Dewey when it comes to their conceptions of liberty, democracy
and alternatives to the diremption of public and private persons.
The first section of this chapter consists of a sketch of Dewey's account of
the public-private split. This will prepare us in the second and third sections to
appreciate Rorty s debt to him and to take measure of the distance separating the
two pragmatists on these issues. As we shall see, these differences have an
important bearing on how the younger pragmatist conceptualizes and defends his
brand of liberalism.
Dewey and the Public/Private Split
In at least one important respect, Dewey shared a crucial assumption with
his best-known liberal predecessors: All agreed as to the most basic constituents of
society. “Society,” Dewey wrote, “is composed of individuals: this obvious and
basic fact no philosophy, whatever its pretensions to novelty, can question or
147.) Dewey 1957, p. 187. Also refer to Dewey 1984, p. 278: “...‘society’ is
individuals in their connections with one another.” Rorty rarely uses the word
society {Bhaskar 1989, p. 4; Lentricchia, p. 137), and when he does, his usage does
not noticeably diverge from Dewey’s. (My own very different conception of
society, according to which its constituents are not individuals but rather practices
of production, appears in Melkonian, pp. 33-55.) In the present discussion, I will
avoid using the word society
,
except in citations or when the word is bracketed by
quotation marks or appears in such terms as “civil society” and “political society,”
as these are discussed below. The qualifier social as I shall use it in this discussion
39
This basic fact notwithstanding, it is a mistake, according to Dewey, to
think that humans are what they are independently ofliving in association with
others or to think of humans as creatures who only enter into association as a means
of getting what they are quite capable of wanting regardless of whether they live
socially or in isolation.
14X
Humans both make up and have been formed by
. . .societies, associations, groups of an immense number of kinds, having different
ties and instituting different interests.'’
149
1 o appreciate the last point more fully, it will help to be more specific about
these "societies, associations and groups.” Dewey's inventory of latter-day
examples includes:
...gangs, criminal bands; clubs for sport, sociability and eating;
scientific and professional organizations; political parties and unions
within them, families; religious denominations, business partnerships
and corporations; and so on in an endless list. The associations may
be local, nation-wide, and trans-national.
1 ""
Of course, none of these groups and associations have existed in their
present form from time immemorial. Dewey noted that defunct forms of
association that existed three to four centuries ago restricted trade and shackled
should be taken as interchangeable with “collaborative” or “cooperative.” This
usage is consistent with Dewey's: “In the broad sense any transaction deliberately
carried on between two or more persons is social in quality” (Dewey 1984, p. 244).
148.
) Tiles, p. 207.
149.
) Novack, p. 205. Novack cites: Intelligence in the Modern World: John
Dewey's Philosophy (Joseph Ratner, ed ), (New York: Random House, 1939), p.
382.
150.) Dewey 1984, pp. 278-9.
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inquiry. The latter point is easy to discern in the cases of, say, guilds, the
apprenticeship system and ecclesiastical education. Those who struggled against
the old restrictions formulated their opposition to existing institutions by appeal to
the sacred authority resident in the protesting individual. These appeals gave rise to
a theory which endowed singular persons in isolation from any associations, except
those which they deliberately formed for their own ends, with native or natural
rights.”
152
Dewey could see no reason why the political appeal should have been to the
individual s rights rather than to the right of “some primary groupings,” except that
similar battles were being fought on several fronts, religious and intellectual as well
as commercial and political, and the individual was the lowest common
denominator for the protesters on all fronts to make common cause. 153 Thus arose
the belief in the naked individual, to whom “all associations [were] foreign to his
nature and rights save as they proceeded from his own voluntary choice, and
guaranteed his own private ends.” 134
As shall become clear below, the activities of individual members of
consensual associations figure prominently in both Dewey's and Rorty's
characterizations of liberal communities. Nevertheless, they both opposed the
picture of the “ready-made and complete individual” making choices and forming
these associations, preferring instead to characterize individuals as socially
151.
) The discussion in this section draws from Dewey 1 984, especially the
chapter entitled “The Public and Its Problems,” pp. 235-372, and from the
discussion in Tiles, pp. 204-27.
152.
) Dewey 1984, p.289.
153.
) Dewey 1984, pp. 289-90.
154.) Dewey 1984, p. 290.
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produced, historically variable and unfinished .
155
Both pragmatists would have
agreed with George Herbert Mead's view that, at least in large part, the self is a
social creation Furthermore, Rorty would agree with Dewey that “Individuality
in a social and moral sense is something to be wrought out
” 157
and that social
arrangements, laws and institutions are means of creating individuals.
Observing that the lines drawn between the activities of different individuals
and between their activities and those of public officials are redrawn as
circumstances change,
1 ^ Dewey advised against attempting to trace such lines
before examining the particular historical circumstances within which the public-
private split is inscribed. This reasonable advice, presumably, is an instance of
Dewey’s “historicism” for which Rorty applauds him .
159
Language makes it possible for interactions to take the form of collective
actions with anticipated consequences or ends. These ends often serve as the
immediate means of setting collective powers into operation, and inform or are
present in the various stages of activity leading up to achievement of them.
160
To
the extent that individuals in a group hold such ends in common, they are united
into a group with an identity of interest. The anticipation in common of particular





) Refer to James Gouinlock's Introduction to Dewey 1984, p. xxx.
156.
) CIS, p. 63.
157.
) Dewey 1957, p. 194
158.
) Tiles, p. 220.
1
59.
) Refer, for example, to PMN, pp. 9-10; CIS, pp. 57-8, 63.
160.
) Tiles, pp. 158; 200, 207.
161 .) I am not convinced that it is useful to distinguish between true, authentic or
objective interests on the one hand and false or illusory interests, on the other. At
makes participants in a collective activity a community
, rather than a mere
aggregation ot individuals who happen to be working towards the same end without
realizing it. 'The planets in a constellation would form a community,” Dewey
wrote, if they were aware of the connections of the activities of each with those of
the others and could use this knowledge to direct behavior.” 162 When such a
common interest obtains,
...there is generated what, metaphorically, may be termed a general
will and social consciousness: desires and choice on the part of
individuals in behalf of activities that, by means of symbols, are
communicable and shared by all concerned. 163
Dewey sensibly recognized that persons more and more are joined together
not so much because they have voluntarily chosen to be so united, but because “vast
currents are running which bring men together.” 164 Still, unless and until prison
inmates, refugees or bonded laborers come together to form gangs, resistance
organizations, unions or other formally organized and more-or-less voluntary
associations, he was not prepared to count them as communities. Conversely,
community does not obtain when only one member of a group is aware of what
events mean and manipulates them in furtherance of personal private interests and
goals. Thus, child labor contractors, Elmer Gantrys and imperious gurus do not
qualify as community leaders, since those over whom they wield authority do not
any rate, for purposes of this discussion it will suffice to use the word interest in a
sense in which the term perceived interest is redundant. By this usage, there is no
such thing as an interest of which no one is aware. For an alternative view, refer to
Geuss, pp. 45 ff.
162.
) Dewey 1984, p. 251
.
163.
) Dewey 1984, p. 331.
164.) Dewey 1984, p. 301
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constitute proper communities. Nor does community obtain when one member of a
group forces others to surrender their interest, as in the cases of slavery, forced
religious conversion or dictatorship. To the extent that neither egregious
manipulation nor forced renunciation of self-interest takes place within an
organized group, however, associated life therein constitutes community life,
however rudimentary.
It may, of course, be futile to attempt to draw a sharp line of distinction
between voluntary and involuntary acts of association or to try to quantify coercion
or consent. As with many other things, however, one often can distinguish greater
or lesser degrees of consent by, say, comparing particular cases, with an eye to the
rough extent to which members of a group share common ends, and the extent to
which collective activity is conducive to these ends.
165
When people act in association with one another with certain ends in view,
their actions often have unintended or unforeseen consequences. Sometimes these
consequences are tor all practical purposes confined only to those who share in it.
At other times, cooperative actions considerably affect people who are not directly
engaged in them. Dewey tied his distinction between public and private to the
distinction between people who are directly affected by some cooperative activity
and others who are indirectly but endunngly and extensively affected by it. 166
This distinction between public and private, it should be noted, is not the
same as that between social and individual .
167
Dewey recognized that many
165.
) Similarly, Rorty notes that “There is, to be sure, no neat way to draw a line
between persuasion and force.” Nevertheless, he adds, “the distinction is no fuzzier
than most” (CIS, p. 48).
166.
) Dewey 1984, p. 243-4.
167.) Dewey 1984, p.244.
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cooperative (and in this sense social) activities do not have serious indirect
consequences tor many people. In this sense, these activities remain merely private.
Unsurprisingly, on the other hand, people who are not directly engaged in
some activity often recognize that they have an interest in it. Those who are not
direct participants in a transaction but nevertheless are seriously affected for good
or evil may constitute a public m By this account, a public comes into being as the
result of the recognition of a common interest in relation to the indirect
consequences of conjoint activity, notably the activities of private associations. So,
for example, an association consisting of concerned residents in the vicinity of an
oil refinery constitutes a public group, if they are indirectly affected by the refinery's
operation in an enduring and extensive manner, such as, say, air quality or property
value assessment. On the other hand, the board of directors and top echelons of
management of the oil company constitute a private group directly engaged in
ownership and management of the refinery.
It is clear that one and the same act-say, a decision by executive officers to
increase production, or to close the refinery down—can have both a public and a
private character. Furthermore, the line between public and private, which “...is to
be drawn on the basis of the extent and scope of the consequences of acts which are
so important as to need control, whether by inhibition or by promotion,”
16V
would
appear to be highly variable. For one thing, the notion of “indirectly and seriously
affecting for good or evil" may, of course, be interrogated further: Whether or not a
collective activity may be judged to affect seriously for good or evil may depend
crucially on one's final vocabulary. Jefferson's assertion that “it does me no injury
168.) Dewey 1984, p. 257.
169.) Dewey 1984, p. 245.
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for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no God," 170 for example, clearly is
at odds with the Hebrew scriptural account of the judgment of nations by a jealous
God
This last illustration underscores the importance of consensus to Dewey’s
vision of community and the importance to him of a common interest or a common
final vocabulary as "ties which consciously hold the members” of a public
together. According to him, when individuals are not aware that they share a
common interest in the indirect consequences of some activity which affects them,
these individuals constitute only a potential public. When they are aware but lack
any institutional means to control such consequences, they constitute what Dewey
called an inchoate public.
172
To regulate the activities which affect its interests, a proper public must
have some institutional means, however rudimentary or ill-adapted it may be. An
institution which possesses any form of organization allowing some degree of
regulation of the indirect consequences of private activities constitutes a public
organization. These consequences, of course, are controlled and regulated not by
"the Public” as “something/?^ se, something intrinsically manifesting a general
will and reason,”
173
but by individual persons acting conjointly. Those who are
invested with the duty of controlling these consequences in a manner responsible to
170.
) Jefferson, p. 274.
171.
) The quotation from Dewey is from Tiles, p. 212. Tiles cites Dewey:
Middle Works Vol. 9 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University
Press, 1984), p. 89.
172.
) Dewey 1984, p. 317.
173.) Dewey 1984, p. 278.
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the public are officials. These officials, taken together, constitute a government
,
and the public thus organized thereby becomes a form ofpolitical state .'
14
According to Dewey, then, a state is a politically organized public. It is “the
organization of the public effected through officials for the protection of the
interests shared by its members .” 175 Dewey’s state, moreover, is not an all-inclusive
entity which incorporates the entire life of the community, as does Hegel’s state.
One may be a member of many associations, and in most instances, according to
Dewey, these associations do not have consequences requiring regulation .
176
In Chapter Two it will be seen that there is room to doubt some of the
formulations in the preceding paragraphs. In the meantime, it will be noticed that,
since Dewey defines a public in terms of indirect consequences of con)oint
behavior, what public we define depends on what consequences we have in mind
Accordingly, a state conceived as the politically organized public will also depend
on what consequences we have in mind.
177
It might be noted in passing that this picture has prompted complaints to the
effect that Dewey flattens out qualitatively different types of association and ties
them all together under the heading “the public.” According to one critic.
Such a theory of free-floating and equally graded publics might have
had a certain semblance of plausibility in reference to a small trading
and fanning community of the nineteenth century like Burlington,
Vermont, where property was more or less evenly distributed and
distinctions of wealth and social standing were not too glaring. But
1
74.
) Dewey 1 984, p. 257. “Government is not the state, for that includes the
public as well as the rulers charged with special duties and powers” (Dewey 1984
p. 253).
175.
) Dewey 1984, p. 256.
176.
) Dewey 1984, p. xxvii.
177.
) Tiles, p. 208.
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it ignores the fundamental fact of life in the highly centralized
monopoly capitalism today.
17 *
The question then arises how these various voluntary' associations,
communities or publics are to coexist as components of larger national
communities. Dewey hoped for a community of communities or “partial publics" in
which pulls and responses of different groups reinforce one another and their
values accord.”
1711
For him, the ideal of such a Great Commumty-a community in
which harmony has been achieved without coercion, manipulation and domination-
is the idea of “. . .a society in which the ever-expanding and intricately ramifying
consequences of associated activities shall be known in the full sense of that word,
so that an organized, articulated Public comes into being.”
180
This ideal was
intended to meet a need to resolve a conflict of interests, to find a framework of
purposes which incorporates each conflicting interest and reveals thereby how far
each reasonably may be pursued 1X1 It is the hope for compromise, class peace, 182
piecemeal reform, experimentation and open debate.
Dewey claims that his conception of the state and the public “gives a
criterion for determining how good a particular state is: namely, the degree of
178.
) Novack, p. 206.
179.
) Dewey 1984, p. 328.
180.
) Dewey 1984, p. 350.
181.
) Tiles, p. 214.
1
82.
) For Dewey, according to one commentator’s interpretation.
The shared universal human relations summarized in the category
“social” are, should be, or will be (his tenses are not always clearly
defined) predominant over narrow class factors-provided the
scientific method of instrumentalism is brought to bear (Novack, pp.
204-5).
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organization of the public which is attained, and the degree in which its officers are
so constituted as to perform their function of caring for public interests,”
183
Further
down in the same essay, he acknowledges that “The forms of associated action
characteristic ot the present economic order are so massive and extensive that they
determine the most significant constituents of the public and the residence of
power.” At times of widespread domestic conflict, then, it would seem by
Dewey’s account that a “constituent of the public” could be transformed into a
community opposed to the public interest, as defined by much less numerous but
more “significant constituents of the public and the residence of power.” As events
in France in 1995 remind us, such a scenario is not entirely hypothetical, even
within the rich North Atlantic democracies. Although Dewey surely did not intend
it as such, his vocabulary lends itself to those who would claim that one or another
state which is well enough organized to defeat a more numerous but less efficiently
organized opposition is a good state, protecting the interests shared by its members,
and thus acting in the public interest.
For Dewey as for Rorty, human communities bring together those who, by
virtue of the contingency of their circumstances, happen to be susceptible to
persuasion ot the desirability ot the community's aims, or guiding purpose.
Conscious and voluntary choice, then, is a necessary (though not a sufficient)
condition for community. Seeing themselves as falling under certain descriptions,
community members may view these descriptions as constituting optional and
desirable forms of life, rather than expressing pre-established facts.
185
183.
) Dewey 1984, p. 256
184.
) Dewey 1984, p. 302.
1 85.) Kolenda, p. 16.
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It is significant that Dewey appears to view membership in an economic
class not in the first place as inclusion in a social group identifiable with reference
to its relationship to appropriation of the social surplus or ownership and control of
means of production or some other criterion independent of consensual association,
but as membership in a particular community with shared ends in view. According
to this view, in an era ot dwindling union membership and declining support for
explicitly working-class political initiatives, wage earners would constitute at most
an inchoate public.
Dewey’s emphasis on the consensual character of political association has
important implications when we turn to the rationales he and Rorty have offered for
liberalism. Before counterposing a different vocabulary to that which they share,
we should register several significant differences separating the two American
pragmatists.
Dewey on Liberty and Democracy
Traditional English liberalism from Locke through Mill has rested on a fairly
simple “negative” conception of liberty as freedom from the constraints of the state,
conceived of as a system of public institutions. This is the liberty of classical
liberalism, a liberalism which did not go much further than setting its face against
absolutism to demand religious freedom, central national authority with well-
defined and limited powers and at least some degree of control by the ruled.
186
Locke defined liberty as a state which an individual enjoys when she or he is under
186.) Merquior, p. 297.
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no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth, and
as the progressive elimination of the arbitrary from political and social regulation.
187
Mill, who is often represented as one of the most consistent advocates of
negative liberty, mapped the domain exempt from public intervention in broad
strokes:
It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness, demanding
liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense, liberty of
"
thought and feeling, absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on
all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or
theological.
188
He added that “the liberty of expressing and publishing opinions” is inseparable
from liberty of thought itself, as is the “liberty of tastes and pursuits, of framing the
plan of our life, to suit our own character, of doing as we like,” as well as the liberty
of combination among individuals; freedom to unite for any purpose not involvinu
harm to others.”
189
Mill's “inward domain of consciousness,” free from “political and social
legislation corresponds to the classical liberal representation of the private sphere,
as well as to Berlin's “inviolable private sphere,” the domain of Rorty's strong poets.
Many liberals have viewed this “inward domain of consciousness” as “...something




regulation of the private sphere is undesirable, since it is pointless to regulate or
187.
) Two Treatises ofGovernment, in Locke 1988, p. 112.
188.
) Mill, p. 71.
189.
) All citations in this paragraph are from Mill, p. 71.
190.
) Merquior, p. 34.
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interfere in activities that do not have serious indirect effects for good or evil
outside the circle of a voluntary association.
Although classical liberals believed, like the decidedly non-liberal Hobbes,
that the liberty of "particular men [depends] on the silence of the Law,” 191 they were
a far cry from anarchists. Classical liberal proponents of negative liberty' viewed
state institutions as a necessary evil, securing what Locke called the “civil interests”
of Life, Liberty and property.”
1
These civil interests include law and order at
home, defense against foreign invasion and security of possessions. Even Mill-who
insisted that “...the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others --conceded that the state may invade the private domain in order to
promote education, hygiene, social security or justice.
194
English liberals have maintained that the law can also extend the liberties of
subjects by curbing and limiting the executive. Like subsequent liberals including
Dewey and Rorty, they held that the law should properly reflect a public concern
that the public sphere not encroach on the private sphere. Thus, they promoted laws
ot habeas corpus and bail, and legal restrictions on police entry and arrest.
The traditional form of English political liberalism went hand in hand with
the classical economic doctrine of laissez-faire.'
9
''
In his first inaugural address of
191.
) Hobbes, p. 271
192.
) “A Letter Concerning Toleration,” in Locke 1979, p. 172.
193.
) Mill, p. 68.
194.
) As, for example, Isaiah Berlin noted (Berlin, p. 192).
195.
) Refer to the interesting discussion in Dewey 1984, pp. 282-303.
1801, Locke’s most illustrious American follower summed up this doctrine in a
well-known passage:
;
a wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from
injuring one another, which shall leave them otherwise free to
regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall
not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned This is the
sum of good government, and this is necessary to close the circle of
our felicities.'
96
Although Dewey admired Jefferson, he found much to criticize in Jefferson's
belief that that government governs best that governs least, and in the related
Lockean conception of liberty.
197
Dewey’s differences with Locke and his followers
become especially acute when it comes to the relationship between liberalism and
democracy. The American philosopher acknowledged that some public institutions
may involve each member of the public in every decision taken; more commonly,
however, decisions will be taken by official representatives of the public on its
behalf In either case, we have what he is prepared to call a form ofpolitical
democracy. Dewey defined a democratic state as “a public articulated and
operating through representative officers.”
198
Locke and Burke as well as James Mill and Bentham viewed political
democracy in this sense as one of the chief “immoderate” threats to the common
weal.
1
Locke did not propose to make the people into the governing authority, nor
196.
) Jefferson, p. 323.
197.
) Bernstein, p. 546.
198.
) Novack, p. 207; Novack cites: Intelligence in the Modern World (Joseph
Ratner, ed.), p. 379.
199.
) Cf. Macpherson. Macpherson separated Merquior's pre-industrial heroes
into two often opposing camps: utopian democrats epitomized by Rousseau, and
anti-democratic liberals. With reference to the elder Mill’s “dread of pure
democracies,” refer to Dewey 1984, pp. 293-4.
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to raise the people to the level of co-equal with the monarch; rather, he was
concerned to provide a criterion, namely collective community consent, by which to
gauge the right of a political authority to rule, while at the same time providing
guarantees against “the credulous superstition of the giddy multitude.”
200
Even
more famously, the younger Mill identified “the tyranny of the majority” as one of
his chief concerns in On Liberty. Montesquieu and the Whigs, 201 as well as such
classical liberals as Tocqueville, the Mills and their conservative liberal successors,
all warned of the danger to “the public welfare”'
11
' when democracy is extended too
far, in the form of universal adult suffrage.
These early liberals or proto-liberals, then, did not portray democracy as an
end in itself, or something intrinsically good. According to some of the best-known
early and classical liberals, if the “governors judge democracy to be less
efficacious than other means of securing “the public welfare” or the “interest and
will of the nation,”'
1 ’ 3
they could be forgiven for limiting democracy, or jettisoning
it altogether, as needs arise. C.B. MacPherson has pointed out that liberals only
began to espouse egalitarian democracy-the sort of democracy that could be
summed up by the slogan One man one vo/e-when, well within the industrial era, it
gradually became clear that extending the franchise did not threaten the propertied
classes. As it has turned out, of course, representative democracy with full adult
franchise has proven itself, in England, the United States and elsewhere, to be a
200.
) “A Letter Concerning Toleration,” in Locke 1979, p. 219.
201.
) It will be recalled that English Whigs came to be known as liberals in the
1 830s, with the passage of the first Reform Bill.
202.
) The term is from Two Treatises ofGovernment , in Locke 1988, p. 122.
203.
) Mill, p. 60.
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particularly effective means for securing the consent of the ruled, and hence the
property and prerogatives of the rich and powerful.
On the eve of the French Revolution, as we know, Rousseau entered the
stage as Locke's foil Rousseau's followers looked forward to an egalitarian
democracy in which the state was not viewed as a necessary evil, but as a servant
for the common well-being, an instrument of collective betterment. They embraced
a conception of liberty as freedom of opportunity to develop one's individual
capacities, and they viewed the state as a positive instrument for attaining liberty
thus conceived. This conception of liberty is conducive to Rousseau’s civic
republicanism, Jefferson's civic humanism and Dewey's "community.” The word
autonomy sometimes has been used interchangeably with "liberty” so conceived. 204
Subsequent liberals, embracing such a "positive” conception of liberty or
autonomy, have portrayed participation in democratic institutions not merely as an
instrument for attaining the good life, but as part of the good life itself. Like Hanna
Arendt and other latter-day disciples of Aristotle,“
(
they view citizen participation




) Lovibond 1989, p. 9. For Rorty's views on self-creation and private
autonomy, refer to CIS, p. xiii.
205.
) Rosenblum, pp. 80-82.
206.
) Robert Paul Wolff, for example, has argued that there is a distinct class of
values (a distinct class, that is, of objects or states of affairs which might or actually
do motivate a person to act for or against them), namely social or community
values, which are not reducible to private values (Wolff, pp. 168, 170). Among
these social values, direct democracy is an end in itself, and “not merely the
efficient means to such desirable political ends as peace, order or distributive
justice” (Wolff, pp. 191-2).
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Judging from passages such as the following, Dewey also may be counted
prominently among these non-classical liberals:
Liberty is that secure release and fulfillment of personal potentialities
which take place only in rich and manifold association with others:
the power to be an individualized self making a distinctive
contribution and enjoying in its own way the fruits of association. 207
Reading this passage in the light of what has already been said about Dewey's
conception of the public, it becomes clear that what is described here is not the
negative liberty of the classical liberals, the freedom of the individual from the
state, but something more akin to the Rousseauians’ positive liberty.
Furthermore, Dewey distinguished between political democracy as a system
of government and democracy as what he called a “social idea.” As he explained.
The idea of democracy is a wider and fuller idea than can be
exemplified in the state even at its best. To be realized it must affect
all modes of human association, the family, the school industry
religion.
208
Regarded as an idea, the author states, democracy is not an alternative to other
principles of associated life. Rather, “It is the idea of community life itself.”
209
There are ways to draw a connection between liberty and democracy without
invoking the notion of autonomy in the public sphere. According to a familiar
liberal rationale for American-style representative democracy, for example,
experience has taught us that unless there are some widely accepted and enforceable
constraints on individual behavior, individuals, each pursuing her or his own
207.
) Dewey 1984, p. 329.
208.
) Dewey 1984, p. 325.
209.
) Dewey 1984, p. 328
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irreducibly unique vision of personal perfection, are likely to come into conflict
with one another Thus, individuals find they must have some form of recognized
government to adjudicate and ameliorate conflicts among private parties, for the
good of the larger public. Unfortunately, people in positions of authority, including
government officials, have an advantage over others when it comes to procuring the
means to realize their non-political, private aspirations and aims, while those not in
positions of authority may find their own aspirations thwarted by magistrates
availing themselves of the advantages of their positions. Thus, leaving institutions
of government in the hands of people who do not have to answer for what they do
invites abuse. The most effective way so far found to prevent such abuse is to make
the institutions of government answer ultimately to everyone. When everyone is
subject to the same constraints, at least formally, and those constraints are enforced
by authority widely deemed to be answerable to everyone equally, the governed
recognize themselves in the government, or at the very least do not consider
government to be hostile or externally-imposed. Under such a regime of political
democracy, government takes place peacefully, with the consent (however passive
or tacit) of the governed. Political democracy, thus conceived, is an instrument for
resolving conflicts between individuals pursuing their own private aims. 210 And
liberty is the classical liberal freedom from excessive government.
Whatever the merits of this rationale, Dewey rejected it. 21
1
In contrast to
many of his liberal predecessors, he viewed participation in democratic institutions
not as a mere means to an end, but as something intrinsically good, and good not
only for the community as a whole, but for each individual member of the
community: For Dewey, public institutions as well as the family and friendships are
210.
) Tiles recapitulates this rationale on p. 206.
211.
) Refer to the discussion in Dewey 1 984, pp. 282-304.
pan of being not only a responsible citizen, but also a fulfilled private individual
As he put it.
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Law, state, church, family, friendship, industrial association, these
and other institutions and arrangements are necessary in order that
individuals may grow and find their specific capacities and
functions.
Dewey is well known for having viewed elementary education as a creative
experience in its own right, rather than exclusively as a preparation for adulthood.
Similarly, he viewed participation in democratic institutions as an autonomous
activity in its own right. In this respect, then, the inextricably related institutions of
democratic participation and public education are as much components or instances
of the good life as they are instruments for attaining it. By participating in these and
other noncoercive public institutions and identifying herself with policy, the
individual-as-citizen becomes a person more securely in possession of capacities
and resources which these institutions have helped to foster. Since, as we shall see,
Dewey's evaluation of public life contrasts sharply with Rorty’s, it is worth quoting
him at length on this point:
When a state is a good state, when the officers of the public
genuinely serve the public interest, this reflex effect is of great
importance. It renders the desirable associations solider and more
coherent; indirectly it clarifies their aims and purges their activities.
It places a discount upon injurious groupings and renders their tenure
of life precarious. In performing these services, it gives the
individual members of valued associations greater liberty and
security': it relieves them of hampering conditions which if they had
to cope with personally would absorb their energies in mere negative
struggles against evils. It enables individual members to count with
reasonable certainty upon what others will do, and thus facilitates
mutually helpful cooperations. It creates respect for others and for
one's self. A measure of the goodness of a state is the degree in
212.) Dewey 1957, p. 188.
58
which it relieves individuals from the waste of negative struggle and
needless conflict and confers upon him positive assurance and
reinforcement in what he undertakes. This is a great service, and
there is no call to be niggardly in acknowledging the transformations
ot group and personal action which states have historically
effected.
Dewey disputed the view of means and ends which permits us to treat public
democratic institutions merely as external means adopted to ensure a fulfilled
private life/ According to him, the relationship between means and ends is
thoroughly reciprocal: What individual human selves desire constrains and provides
the standard of adequacy for means; means, as they are hit upon, refine and enlarge
ends. Ends are not pre-given: They are constituted in the course of pursuing means.
Nor are there “genuine” or “authentic” ends, in view of which all means, past
present and future, may be evaluated with respect to how conducive they are to
realizing those ends. Dewey urged us to treat our ends as open, so that our means
can become “genuine instruments”~that is, constituents of our ends. Participation
in democratic institutions constitutes a particularly important body of shared
experience which, in turn, bolsters those institutions, extending and deepening
democratic participation Treating our ends as open helps us to adapt to the
contingencies of our existence, thereby helping us to act freely.
21 ^
If Dewey's view of the relationship between means and ends on the one hand
and freedom on the other appears to be tenuous, this is because of a set of
presuppositions underlying the familiar rationale, presuppositions which he viewed
as distortions of important facts These presuppositions represent individual human
213.
) Dewey 1984, pp. 279-80.
214.
) Tiles, p. 204.
215.
) Tiles, p. 204. Compare the account in this paragraph to the account in
Dewey 1984.
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selves and what they desire as something given, something already there.
216
These
givens then function as absolute constraints on inquiry which in turn give nse to
fruitless conceptions of our relationships as individuals to political institutions and
the larger communities of which we are a part. 217
Thus, for example, debates about psychological egoism versus altruism,
about whether or not people always or usually pursue their self-interests and what
those self-interests are, quickly lead into familiar philosophical cul-de-sacs.
Recognizing this, one Dewey scholar has noted that.
The individualism of “classic Liberalism” has bequeathed to us an
opposition between self-regarding and other-regarding, egoism and
altruism, neither of which is satisfactory and between which we
should not feel we have to choose. 2
Dewey refused to enter into such debates. He abandoned the problem of
“the celebrated modem antithesis of the Individual and Social, and the problem of
their reconciliation. For him, as the previously cited source noted.
The choice is not between a self-regarding person and an other-
regarding person, but between a person whose regard for self is
regard for something narrow, trivial, transient and exclusive, and a
person whose regard for self is for something wide and inclusive
enough to embrace the interests of other people and permanent and
significant enough to flourish only in an environment sustained by
shared values and cooperative action.
22 "
216.
) Dewey 1957. p. 193.
217.




) Dewey 1984, pp. 289-90.
220.) Tiles, p. 219.
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As we have seen, Dewey’s conception of liberty as autonomy, and his
evaluation of democratic participation and public education as ends in themselves
represent significant departures from classical liberalism. In few other places is this
departure clearer than in his refusal to endorse the opposition of public and private
persons.
On the other hand, Dewey's use of key terms such as interest
, government
political state Apolitical democracy is not noticeably inconsistent with Rorty’s
vocabulary. The same is true, also, with reference to “community,” as in Rorty’s
question, cited above, “Which communities' purposes should I share'’” And, as we
shall see, Rorty agrees with Dewey in so far as both rejected the choice between
either the narrowly self-regarding egoist or the exclusively other-regarding person of
the neo-Aristotelians.
In the following pages, however, it should become clear that Rorty's way of
averting the clash of public and private persons differs significantly from Dewey's
It should also become clear how much weight the public and private spheres must
bear as repositories of altruism and egoism, respectively, to sustain Rorty’s view.
Rorty on Liberty and Democracy
One well-known controversy among classical liberals concerned J.S. Mill
and his father. The author of On Liberty came to feel that the liberalism of
Bentham and James Mill one-sidedly focused on “external culture”~reason and
truth-and did not take proper account of “internal culture”~the individual's
feelings, passions, impulses, natural inclinations and idiosyncrasies. The younger
Mill was convinced that individual freedom was increasingly threatened by “the
tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling” as well as the tyranny of
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magistrates. His reaction was to insist on reserving as large a space as possible
exempt from the intervention of magistrates and the majority. This space is Mill's
“appropriate region of human liberty*’ which we encountered in the previous
section.
J .S. Mill's liberal successors have thought of themselves as standing in
defense of individuality and self-creation, of maximizing and defending the region
of individual liberty against others, whether singly or organized as governments or
non-governmental associations. At the same time, however, liberals have also stood
for the containment of individuality and self-creation. Thus, for liberals like
Benjamin Constant, Liberalism's task is to protect against personal politics and the
chaos of unconstrained self-expression.
’222
Like Mill, Rorty also prizes idiosyncrasy, individuality and what one
reviewer has called “the idea that freedom makes room for self-making”222 as ideals
which his liberal utopia is bound to count as its chief purpose, if not its only one.
One commentator underlined the importance of this ideal for Rorty, noting that
The imperative “Know thyself' now is interpreted as coming to a
knowledge of that which is private, idiosyncratic. The object of self-
knowledge is whatever divides the public from the private self, and
the private self from all other public and private selves.
224
For Rorty, as tor Mill, freedom from the tyranny of prevailing opinion and
feeling is a precondition for pursuit of one’s self-perfection. Consider, for example,
Rorty’s approving description of Dewey:
221.
) Mill, p. 63.
222.
) Rosenblum, p. 36.
223.
) Kolenda, p. 66.
224.) Hall, p. 100.
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He assumed that no good achieved by earlier societies would be
worth recapturing if the price were a diminution in our ability to
leave people alone, to let them try out their private visions of
perfection in peace. He admired the American habit of giving
democracy priority over philosophy by asking, about any vision of
the meaning of life, “Would not acting out this vision interfere with
the ability of others to work out their own salvation?”225
The authority of law should intervene only when it becomes clear that one
person s pursuit of private perfection is interfering extra-linguistically with
another's—only when strong poets and revolutionaries make life harder for others by
deeds, rather than just words.
226
For Rorty, the ideal liberal community is one in
which “.. .the only sort of human liberty which is hoped for is Isaiah Berlin’s
‘negative liberty'—being left alone.”
227
Like Constant, however, Rorty also worries about the dangers of one-sidedly
focusing on this ideal.
“
x
These dangers are not limited to whatever cost the
225.
) Rorty, in Malachowski, p. 294.
226.
) CIS, pp. 60- 1 Compare to Mill, p. 141, and to Mill's “one very simple
principle,” that “the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-
protection” (Mill, p. 68).
227.
) “Habermans, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy,” pp 1 6-7.
228.
) And like many liberals since. Karl Popper, for example, wrote:
Politics, I demand, must uphold equalitarian and individualistic
principles; dreams of beauty have to submit to the necessity of
helping men in distress, and men who suffer injustice; and to the
necessity of constructing institutions to serve such purposes. (Popper
1963, p. 165.)
A note of caution, however: Leaving aside the question of his use of the terms
historicism and totalitarianism
,
his association of these two terms puts him at
philosophical cross-purposes with Rorty, despite their common polemical and
political concerns.
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community may have to bear for withdrawal or aloofness from public affairs on the
part ot aesthetes and visionaries. Strong poets may well pose a greater threat when
they make politics 'an arena for heroic self-display.”229 By placing inordinate or
exclusive emphasis on individual self-assertion, we invite into the public arena
passionate visionaries intent on realizing their utopian obsessions by any means
necessary (to borrow an expression popularized by one such visionary).
Like Plato, St. Paul and Kant, Marx allegedly tried in his own way to
produce a single vocabulary capable of serving two different purposes, namely
making oneself a new creature and establishing justice on Earth. 230 And at a point,
it seemed he succeeded:
Marxism has been the envy ot all later intellectual movements
because it seemed, for a moment, to show how to synthesize self-
creation and social responsibility, pagan heroism and Christian love,
the detachment of the contemplative with the fervor of the
revolutionary
C
Marxist revolutionaries, and other revolutionaries besides, have viewed the
public sphere as an arena within which to do two things simultaneously: In the
course ot building the revolution, the revolutionaries reinvent themselves in the
image of the New Socialist Man. 2 ' 2 As Bernard Yack describes “the discontent of
messianic radicals,” it
...is so intense partly because they believe that the redemption of the
world hastens their own redemption. The fate of the institutions they
229.
) Rosenblum, p. 4.
230.
) EH, pp. 127-8. The attribution of this aim to Marx is disputable.
Admittedly, however, some Marxists have subscribed to it.
231.
) CIS, p. 120.
232.
) According to Rorty, Marxists “see one’s own inner transformation as
auguring the transformation of the human world” (EH, p. 137).
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hate determines the success of their pursuit of psychic health The
destruction of the old order redeems their souls as it cleanses the
world. The end of the old world ends their dissatisfaction with
themselves.
233
Dr. Wolfgang Huber, of the Psychiatric Neurological Clinic of Heidelberg
University, provided a caricature of this view when, at the height of the activity of
the Rote Armee Fraction
, he counseled his patients to “Bomb for mental health!”
After Herculean efforts in this century, however, attempts thus to fuse public
and private aims have ended in debacle. Self-proclaimed Marxist regimes in the
East have either collapsed in the face of popular discontent or, as in the case of
China, have thoroughly capitulated, if not to Western-style democracy, then to the
profit motive, the “Free Market” and the sanctification of the public/private split.
This record of failure in practice is the best argument against attempting to
fuse public and private aims in theory. Accordingly, Rorty urges us to:
... stop looking for a successor to Marxism, for a theory which fuses
decency and sublimity. Ironists should reconcile themselves to a
private-public split within their final vocabularies, to the fact that
resolution of doubts about one's final vocabulary has nothing in
particular toydo with attempts to save other people from pain and
humiliation.
234
As Constant's heirs are quick to point out, the means visionaries in the public
sphere have deemed to be necessary have often included cruelty and the violent
obstruction of the self-creative acts of others.
235 When politics becomes the terrain
233.
) Yack, p. 25.
234.
) CIS, p. 120. On at least one occasion, Rorty appears willing to concede that
Marxism, like Foucauldianism, might be useful as a private vocabulary, as a way of
tracing “the blind impresses our behavings bear” (refer to Rorty’s review of
Derrida’s Spectres ofMarx (henceforth: “Review of Spectres ofMarx”), p. 13).
235.
)
Rosenblum, p. 80. This is why the romantic sensibility is said to be safe
under no other system but liberalism, with its “regular and pacific liberty”
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of sublimity, narcissism and the romantic impulse to make it new, and visionary
self-asserters are tempted to merge politics and sublimity, then large numbers of
people may be swept up into the romance of history 236 and deposited at the
slaughter bench. Thus, where private projects conflict with minimizing the
possibility of humiliation, these projects should be privatized, de-politicized.
237
Rorty's examples of dangerous self-asserters prominently includes such
“nonpoets”~
3x
as Lenin, Stalin, Hitler and Mao.
2V
’ The list is noticeably skewed
against Uncle Sam’s bates noirs
,
and at least one commentator views Lenin's
inclusion on it as little more than a gratuitous anti-Marxist political gesture. 240 In
spite of misgivings about his choice of illustrations, however, Rorty's warning is
clear enough: When the aesthetic obsessions of a strong public figure supervene
over tolerance and all other ideals as the chief values in public discourse, the stage
is set for evitable cruelty' on a grand scale.
For Rorty, as for Dewey, thinking of oneself as a member of a community is
a necessary part of being a member of a community. Rorty has defined a liberal
community as one with no ideal or purpose other than making life easier on strong
poets, allowing them to continue to change language.
241
In this way he registers his
(Rosenblum, p 25). Other well-known liberals, by contrast, have opposed
romanticism to liberalism (Popper 1963, p. 168).
236.
) “The End of Leninism,” p. 3.
237.
) CIS, p. 197.
238.
) CIS, p. 159
239.
) Refer, for example, to: CIS, pp. 66, 1 57 and “The End of Leninism,” p. 2.
240.
) Fraser, in Malachowski, p. 320, note 5.
241.
) CIS, p. 4 1 Rorty may, of course, value liberal community for other reasons,
too, including protection of rights, maintenance of peace and so on.
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concern to avert the tyranny of the majority. It is difficult to imagine any additional
ideal or purpose (with the possible exception of protection of property rights),
whether emanating from a public or a private impulse, which would not, at least to
some extent, encroach on Mill's “internal culture.” Accordingly, Rorty has
sometimes defined a liberal community as “one which has no purpose except
freedom, the freedom which makes room for self-making.
On other occasions, however, he has defined a liberal as a person for whom
cruelty is the worst thing we do,
24
' and insisted that the defining ideal of liberals is
amelioration of evitable suffering.'
44
According to him, vocabularies of public
decency in the West are concerned with the alleviation of cruelty, and most notably
with that peculiarly human form of cruelty, humiliation, or “forced
redescription.
' 4
Rorty has stated that no goal, public or private, is more important
than ameliorating suffering. Despite manifest problems with utilitarianism, he
claims that “Our political imagination has not been enlarged by the philosophy of
our century,”'
46
and sees no better way of stating duty to others than the greatest
happiness principal.
242.
) CIS, pp. 60-1.
243.
) CIS, p. xv.
244.
) CIS, p. 65.
245. ) Rorty's claim that humiliation so conceived is the worst form of suffering
has not gone undisputed (refer, for instance, to Haber, pp. 68-71, 86). This claim
underscores his emphasis on the efficacy of linguistic practices, sometimes at the
expense of non-discursive causal processes. At times this has resulted in far-fetched
formulations, exemplified by his approval of “a Whitmanesque sense that our
democratic community is held together by nothing less fragile than social hope"
(EH, p. 48). Having said this, however, it should be noted that one could easily
redefine suffering along less emphatically discursive lines without thereby
abandoning Rorty's particular utopian vision.
246.) EH, p. 26.
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By Nancy Fraser’s lights, Rorty at one time made the case that the two ideals,
making the world safe for strong poets and ameliorating suffering, complement
each other: the romantic poet and the pragmatic reformer are “natural partners.”
247
By de-divinizing things about which they are concerned, both figures encourage us
to cease pinning our hopes on God, Reason, Human Nature and the Moral Law, and
in this way they direct us away from objectivity to ungrounded solidarity, to
clinging together against the night. By redescribing our situation in various and
unfamiliar ways, strong poets teach us to view life as a tissue of contingencies,
ourselves as finite, and liberal institutions as fragile human inventions. This earlier
Rorty, according to Fraser, has emphasized that we only see the practices of earlier
ages as cruel and unjust because the poets have taught us how to redescribe them
using metaphors and vocabularies they invented. Moreover, by redescribing and re-
redescribing hitherto familiar objects, they teach us tolerance of alternative
perspectives and accommodation to the opinions of our fellow citizens. In this
light, the freezing over of culture is a threat to a far broader constituency than just
romantic intellectuals. Thus, by making society safe for strong poets, we make it
safe for everyone-except perhaps those who aspire to become Orwell’s O’Brien
Fraser's periodization of Roily's views on the usefulness of the romantic poet
to liberal democracy may be too tidy: Even in more recent work he sounds in some
respects like an advocate of the “natural partners" view .'
4
1
In any case, events since
247.
) Fraser, in Malachowski, p. 304-5.
248.
) Fraser, in Malachowski, p. 307. Cf. Rorty, “Solidarity or Objectivity?” in
Rajchman and West.
249.
) As when he states: “To sum up, poetic, artistic, philosophical, scientific, or
political progress results from the accidental coincidence of a private obsession with
a public need” (CIS, p. 37).
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the collapse of the Berlin Wall have brought home very graphically the dangers
posed when romantic poets-in Russia, in the Baltic republics, in the Caucasus and
Central Asia, in ex-Yugoslavia and, yes, even in the Czech Republic-are propelled
into high political office. Not so long ago Rorty wrote that "‘...in contemporary
Russia and Poland, poets, playwrights, and novelists serve as the best examples of
certain [...] moral virtues.” As soon as the former dissident novelists and poets
became the acknowledged legislators of the social world, however, the result has
often been tyranny and misery far worse than the worst of their immediate
“nonpoef
'
predecessors. In a few short years the Karodics and Tudimans, the
Gamsekhurdias, Elchibeys and other former dissident intellectuals (the list could be
extended to an impressive length )-for whom liberals in the West have for years
provided generic paeans-have embezzled hundreds of millions of dollars, expelled
or imprisoned a new generation of dissidents, assassinated political opponents,
impoverished tens of millions of their compatriots, turned millions of others into
refugees and presided over ethnic-cleansing campaigns in a dozen locales, from
Tajikistan to the Trans-Dniester. Not even Rorty’s liberal hero Vaclav Havel has
remained unsullied: The playwright and first President of the Czech Republic has
given his imprimatur to repressive legislation which was objectionable even to the
editors of the Wall Street .Journal
,
who complained that he
...just signed a new law calling for up to two years in prison for




) ORT, p. 62.
251.




Measures Violate Freedom ofExpression and Due Process Standards , Human
Rights Watch seventeen-page report on the Czech Republic (April, 1992). With
reference to persecution of Gypsies under the Havel regime, refer to
Czechoslovakia's Endangered Gypsies (Human Rights Watch, August, 1992).
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By Rorty’s lights, the production of imaginative literature is “. . .the principal
means by which bright youth gam a self-image.”252 Even before it became clear to
the syndicated columnists that the balance of power in Eastern Europe had
irreversibly shifted in lavor of Bonn and Washington D C., however, Rorty had
come to discern a “selfish, anti-social motive in Romanticism, one that represents
the very antithesis of communal identification.”255
Developments in the early 1990s, then, have made it all the more difficult to
view cultural innovators and seekers of social justice as “natural partners.” These
developments only underscore the conclusion that to take either self-creation or
public welfare alone and elevate that single ideal to the status of sole definitive
purpose of a liberal community is to invite disaster. On the one hand, as we have
seen, the romantic impulse to make it new, when unleashed in public, can lead to
evitable pain and humiliation. On the other hand, solely focusing on the public
welfare or the greater good can lead to Mill's tyranny of the majority and Rorty's
“freezing over of culture." One of the most difficult tasks of liberal Utopians is to
invent some sort of modus vivendi for these two liberal impulses, these two ideals
of liberal society.
To claim as Rorty does that freedom for self-assertion and alleviation of
cruelty both deserve equal claim to our allegiance, while at the same time
acknowledging that there is a constant tension between the two is entirely in
keeping with a long-standing self-image of liberals as promoters of tolerance and
compromise. Like Constant, Rorty can think of no better way to achieve a
compromise between equal opportunity and the freedom that makes room for self-
252.
) CP, p. 66.
253.
) Fraser, in Malachowski, p. 309.
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making than to distinguish carefully between private and public spheres of life, as
the spheres of altruism and self-perfection, respectively. As he emphasizes.
The core of my book [CIS] is a distinction between private concerns,
in the sense ot idiosyncratic projects of self-overcoming, and public
concerns, those having to do with the suffering of other human
beings.
254
The distinction between public and private concerns, Rorty hastens to add on the
same page, is emphatically not the distinction between the domestic hearth and the
public forum, between oikos and polis
”
For Rorty, the private sphere is the space within which idiosyncratic projects
of self-overcoming take place, and the public sphere is the realm of shared concerns
of the community. For the latter-day Rorty of what Fraser calls the partition
position, it is imperative to keep these two spheres apart. It is not surprising, then,
that he envisions
...political institutions that will foster public indifference to such
issues [as theology and metaphysics, the nature of the self, the nature
of God, the point of human existence and the meaning of life], while
putting no restriction on private discussion of them.
2"
These liberal institutions than which nothing is more precious include an
independent judiciary, free universities, a free press and so on.
2>6
“A liberal
democracy,’' he has written, “will not only exempt opinions on such matters
[theology, metaphysics, etc.] from legal coercion, but will also aim at disengaging
254.
) Rorty, “Habermas, Demda, and the Functions of Philosophy,” p. 1, note 1.
255.
) ORT, p. 1 82n.
256.) “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 567.
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discussions of such question from discussions of social policy.”
257
In this respect
he is indeed a continuator of Jefferson, who, in Rorty's words, held that citizens:
. ..must abandon or modify opinions on matters of ultimate
importance, the opinions that may hitherto have given sense and
point to their lives, if these opinions entail public actions that cannot
be justified to most of their fellow citizens."
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Part of the originality of Rorty's position is his use of an anti-essentialist
vocabulary to defend Jefferson’s compromise between an individual's opinions on
matters of ultimate importance and her public actions. The best-if not the only-
way to ensure that the romantic urge for "total revolution” remains unavailable for
political exploitation is to ensure that the ideal of noninterference with the self-
creation of strong poets will not be the one and only purpose of a community, but to
temper it with the ideal of ameliorating suffering. And a good way to check the
tyranny of the majority is to promote the freedom that makes room for self-making.
It is not surprising, then, that in Rorty's liberal utopia, the optimal political synthesis
of love and justice may turn out to be “an intricately-textured collage of private
narcissism and public pragmatism.”
259
It is, of course, unremarkable for the decent citizen and the strong poet to be




) ORT, p. 183.
258.
) ORT, p. 175. It is interesting to note that Rorty left his last philosophy
department in 1983, to become Kenan Professor of Humanities at the University of
Virginia in Charlottesville-Jefferson's “bantling of forty years' growth and nursing”
(Jefferson, p. xlii) and the first North American university free of official church
recognition.
259.
) ORT, p. 210.
260.
) Refer to “Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens,” in EH, pp. 66-82, for Rorty's
invidious contrast of the philosophical treatise as a genre with the novel.
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Whitman put it, I contain multitudes' -many selves, more or less transient and
incomplete—we may expect that members of liberal communities typically will
contain both public and pnvate selves. Furthermore, as we have seen, it is possible
and desirable to imagine a liberal utopia which would serve both figures. This
utopia would place no ideal higher than the pursuit of self-perfection and the
amelioration of suffering. Moreover, thanks to the public/private split, it would see
no need to place one of these two ideals above the other.
Despite occasional appearances to the contrary, then, Rortv refuses to define
a liberal community—that is, a public in the broadest sense of the term—in terms of
one over-arching goal (as, say, the glorification of God, the greatest happiness for
the greatest number, or making room for self-making). This reluctance,
presumably, is a feature of his “pluralism.” Instead, he upholds “...the idea of a
community which strives after both mtersubjective agreement and novelty.”
261
To
strive for mtersubjective agreement on the need to ameliorate cruelty is to seek
liberal consensus, in Shklar's sense of the word “liberal. To strive for consensus
when it comes to granting every private self unlimited freedom of opportunity to
produce novel tropes is to strive to ameliorate humiliation in the public sphere while
at the same time promoting toleration of humiliation in words, but not in deeds, in
the private sphere.
Rortv praises Irving Howe for having taught during his editorship of Dissent
“...how one could combine the contemplative and the active lives without trying to
synthesize the two.”
26
' Rortv advocates abandoning the invariably unsuccessful
attempt to devise an algorithm for determining from case to case which ideal will
prevail. In the utopian future this task of determination will have to take place as it
261.
) ORT, p. 13.
262.
) “Movements and Campaigns,” p. 7.
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has in the past, by “muddling through ' as the need arises, with the institutions and
practices they have at hand. The closest thing to a guideline Rorty proffers is his
recommendation that the strong poet not be hindered from striving as much as he
likes tor selt-pertection-as long as he does it on his own time. In an interview, he
sloganized this ideal as follows: ‘Always strive to excel, but only on weekends.”
263
Rorty insists on the radical separation of the public and private spheres
Refemng to historicist writers concerned with private perfection and those
concerned to promote more just and free human communities, he writes:
We shall only think of these two kinds of waters as opposed if we
think that a more comprehensive philosophical outlook would let us
hold self-creation and justice, private perfection and human
solidarity, in a single vision.
264
Rorty, of course, is at the farthest remove from those who have held that the
private ideal of self-creation and the public-spirited ideal of greatest happiness for
the greatest number are realizations of eternally pregiven potentialities latent in
Man but only recently released, thanks to the Renaissance, the Reformation, the
French Revolution or the Romantic movement. For him, these and all other ideals,
purposes and goals are historically and culturally specific discursive productions.
Since his anti-essentialism prohibits him from positing a genuine human essence to
be expressed, repressed or liberated, these goals have no foundation in universal
reason. Rorty cannot imagine what a non-question-begging argument in favor of
these ideals would be like: They have long been part of a form of life prevailing in
the north Atlantic, and as such they are elements of what it is to be w.v.
263
263.
) Quoted by Klepp, p. 122.
264.
) CIS, p. xiv.
265.
) Hall, p. 130. These are themes Rorty enunciates in “Solidarity or
Objectivity?” (in Rajchman and West) among other places.
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Contemporary inhabitants of liberal democracies would be inclined to dismiss
anyone who would deny these ideals-in words, if not in deeds-as irrational rather
than taking them seriously To deny these ideals-again, in words, but not
necessarily in deeds-is just not the way things are done around here.
Moreover, Rorty adds, public debate should not problematize these ideals.
It there is one thing one should not allow oneself to be ironic about in public, it is
such ideals of justice/’ To the extent that ironism is the stock-in-trade of the
strong poet, this returns us to the injunction to exclude the strong poet from the
public square. And, to the extent that the strongest theorists are ironist theorists,
Rorty concludes that political theory is not very useful to contemporary liberals.
268
For the mature Rorty of the “partition position,” all attempts to merge public
altruism with private egoism into one all-encompassing theory are either futile or
inadvisable or both. The separation of public and private persons, of public
altruism and private sublimity, should also be a separation in “theory.” In the
absence of a universal essence which members of a community' share, an essence
which can bridge the public/private split, it is futile to try to do justice to these two
figures, decent citizen and strong poet, within one integrated theory, or to try, as the
stoics and their successors have tried, to combine inward tranquillity and duty to
others within one and the same ethical system.
Indeed, the attempt is ill-conceived at the outset. Since, as we have seen,
Rorty denies the value of any notion of human nature independent of what our latest
266.
) Rorty, in Rajchman and West, p. 12.
267.
) Refer to Rorty, “Review of Spectres ofMarx” p. 4.
268.
) Refer, for example, to Rorty’ s “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy”
(in Malachowski, pp. 279-302); “The End of Leninism” and “Movements and
Campaigns.”
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vocabularies put in play, there can be no such thing as grounding a human
community in a correct view of human nature. If the notion of an intrinsic human
nature from which to be alienated or authentic needs to be fulfilled falls by the
wayside, criticisms of institutions and practices because they allegedly defy these
natures or needs fall flat.
269
By Rorty’s nominalist lights, language amounts to “just human beings using
marks and noises to get what they want.”
270
One of the things we human beings
want to get with language, in addition to food and sex, is an enhanced sense of
solidarity with other humans, and still another may be “to create oneself by
developing one's own private, autonomous, philosophical language.”271 The latter
two items are distinct purposes, proper to public and private concerns, respectively.
Our concern for negative liberty and “self-enlargement”272 is backed up by a
picture of the self as a space of self-elaboration which can freely cenerate new self-
mterpretations-and hence new ways of being human-bv creating new vocabularies,
new forms of abnormal discourse. On the other hand, our community-oriented
sense of being one of us is backed up by the recognition that abnormal discourse
is possible only “at the margins, only against a background of normal discourse
which defines our shared identity.
These observations have prompted Rorty to conclude that his own anti-
essentialist vocabulary is more useful to contemporary liberalism than the
269.
) Rorty, in Malachowski, pp. 281-2.
270.
) EH, p. 127.
271.
) EH, p. 127.
272.
) That is, “...the desire to expand one's possibilities and to multiply one's
perspectives through curiosity and constant learning” (Guignon and Hiley, in
Malachowski, p. 352).
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essentialist rhetoric of natural rights. Reason and so on which has hitherto been
associated with liberalism. As we have seen, it is not very useful to theorize
liberalism, to ground it in a correct view of human nature; however, it is useful to
articulate liberalism, to make it attractive to the next generation, not by pretending
to ground political practices but by expressing political hopes.
273
When it is possible to bring together elements of a given discourse “.
. .under
a set of rules which will tell us how rational agreement can be reached on what
would settle the issue on every point where statements seem to conflict,”274 Rorty
describes these elements, in terminology he borrows from Thomas Kuhn, as
commensurable. Normal and abnormal discourses are incommensurable. Rorty's
claim that the private vocabularies of strong poets and abnormal discoursers are
incommensurable with the public vocabularies of decent reformers allows him to
deny the necessity of placing one ideal above the other, or claiming that one reduces
to the other or logically entails the other.
For this reason, he agrees with Dewey that we should not feel we have to
choose between public altruism and private egoism, in the form of the striving for
self-creation. In contrast to his best-known liberal predecessor, however, he
believes both are satisfactory, as long as laissez faire and individualism are reserved
for the private sphere, and equality, democracy and solidarity are reserved for the
public sphere. “Normal discourse,” Rorty continues, “is discourse in which
commensuration works. I his condition obtains when all, or most, contributions to




) Cf. Bernstein, p. 548 1 will return to this point in Chapter Four.
274.
) PMN, p. 316.
275.) Hall, p. 122.
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Abnormal discourse, by contrast, occurs in periods of transition from one theory to
another. In this transitional or “revolutionary” stage, “old terms take on exotic
meanings and new words are introduced.”276 Public discourse, the discourse of the
dutiful citizen, discourse which is useful for ameliorating suffering, is
incommensurable with private discourse, the discourse of the strong poet, aiming at
self-perfection.
To conflate the two sorts of vocabularies is to run together two distinct
language games. Rorty illustrates this with reference to Nabakov's disdain for
Orwell:'
77
The Englishman might or might not have tried and failed to fuse decency
with sublimity in his writing. What he is rightly praised for, however-and what
appears to have made little impression on Nabakov—was the manner in which he
brought our attention to evitable suffering, and in particular, to officially sanctioned
humiliation. Similar misunderstandings abound on the other side, too, as when
engaged writers condemn their aestheticist colleagues as irresponsible for
describing the color of the dying man's lips
27x
Rorty agrees with Dewey that we should not feel as though we have to
choose between either the role of a community spirited, dutiful public person or a
narcissistic private person. Like Dewey, the younger pragmatist rejects “the
celebrated antithesis of the Individual and the Social.” He disagrees with Dewey,
however, when it comes to the attempt to break down the distinction between duty




) Hall, p. 122.
277.
) Refer to “The Last Intellectual in Europe: Orwell on Cruelty,” in CIS, pp.
169-188.
278.
) Ruskin's image is cited in Rosenblum, p. 98.
279.) EH, p. 197.
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Dewey's attempt, described towards the end of the previous section, ,s characteristic
of a long-standing tradition in social philosophy since Plato, a tradition which sees
the pohs as man writ large. By Rorty's account, however, one of Dewey's
illustrious contemporaries showed us how to break with this tradition:
...Freud gave up Plato's attempt to bring together the public and the
private, the parts of the state and the parts of the soul, the search for
social justice and the search for individual perfection. [...] He
distinguished sharply between a private ethic of self-creation and a
public ethic of mutual accommodation. He persuades us that there is
no bridge between them provided by universally shared beliefs or
desires.
2X1
Pragmatists, in contrast to Plato's heirs, “promote the use of both
vocabularies of private self-creation and vocabularies of public praxis,”
282
without
trying to reduce the one to the other. Accordingly, Rorty proposes a division of
labor according to which.
The scientists, technicians, and engineers, with the exception of
those very few who are able to serve as paradigms of self-creation,
are accorded the task of easing the pains of social existence; the poet
and novelist are to provide new vocabularies which can serve as
models of private perfection.
28 ’
280.
) Robert Westbrook has criticized Rorty for ignoring the communitarian side
of Dewey and overemphasizing what Berlin called “negative liberty” (Westbrook,
pp. 541-2). With reference to Westbrook's claim that Dewey believed, as Rorty
does not, that “the springs of private fulfillment and of human solidarity are the
same,’ Rorty states parenthetically: “I am not sure whether or not Dewey thought
this and would urge that there is a lot of evidence on both sides” (“Dewey between
Hegel and Darwin,” p. 320, note 43).
281.
) CIS, pp. 33-4.
282.
) Hall, p. 22.
283.) Hall, p. 121.
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Rory's assignment of distinct stations and duties to public and private
persons allows him to shunt the dutiful citizen and the divine egoist off to separate
and incommensurable spheres. In the course of so doing, he boldly redraws the line
between altruism and egoism that Dewey tried to efface.
He does not deny, of course, that public and private persons do exist within
the same body: One and the same biography may contain the story of a dutiful
citizen, concerned with ameliorating pain and humiliation of his fellows, and the
story of a strong poet, striving for personal perfection. Moreover, he does not deny
that private obsessions occasionally coincide with public needs; on the contrary, he
acknowledges that when a private fantasy finds an audience, the result is
sometimes great art
284
Nevertheless, he does deny the assumption that duty to
others and duty to self can or should be combined into one multi-purpose
normative vocabulary, that “self-creation and justice can be brought together at the
level of philosophical theory.”
283
Rorty agrees with Dewey that there need not be any opposition between duty
to self and duty to others, but he differs with his predecessor when it comes to the
manner in which he wishes to avert this opposition. As we have seen, the elder
pragmatist believed that public education and democratic participation could and
should play a decisive role in promoting a broader, more inclusive and permanent
sense of selfhood and hence a convergence of self interest with common interests of
a larger public. Rorty also wants a more inclusive ethnos
; nevertheless, he does not
challenge the continuity of narrow individualism. He merely urges us to keep the
romantic desire tor self-creation and “total revolution” out of the public domain, out
of politics. He associates those who yearn for revolutionary movements, both
284.) CIS, p. 37.
285.) Kolenda, p. xiv.
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political and cultural, with self-surrender and the self-deceptive slogan: “Not my
will, but the movement's, be done
"- 8
'’
Rorty wishes to shunt self-assertion and
narcissism to the private sphere, while holding that “we consciousness" is more
appropriate to the public sphere. The exceptions--”tiny circle[s] of initiates,”287
kindred souls involved in the same private projects as we are ourselves-onlv prove
the rule, by virtue of their isolation and elitism.
Rorty' also differs from his pragmatist mentor when it comes to their
respective conceptions of autonomy. As we have seen, Dewey denied that
autonomy is something which all human beings have within them and which society'
can release by ceasing to repress them. In this sense, then, he is indeed waiting at
the end of the road Foucault was treading.
288
Nevertheless, Dewey held that public
institutions, and in particular schools and democratic institutions, should be viewed
as genuine instruments for creating individuals with more inclusive common
interests, and hence a stronger “we consciousness.”
This conviction contrasts sharply with Rortv’s. “We consciousness” for the
younger pragmatist is principally a public concern, not a private one.
286.
) “Movements and Campaigns,” p. 8. The citation is from an approving
discussion of Irving Howe's alleged repudiation of “movement politics.” Rorty
seems to be unaware that, though Howe disparaged the Black Power movement and
the New Left, he came to embrace one especially brutal messianic-redemptive
movement all the more enthusiastically. Zionism, both as a body of doctrine and as
a colonial settler project, epitomizes “movement politics” and the sort of yearning
Yack disparages. To acknowledge the Zionist commitments of Howe and other
contributors to Dissent (such as, say, Jacob L. Talmon, Jean Amery and others,
including Michael Walzer, of whom Rorty also approves) is to cast doubt on Rorty’s
characterization of them and on the motives he imputes to their selective
denunciations of political movements.
287.
) CIS, p. xiii.
288.) CP, p. xviii; EH, p. 207.
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If you accept the distinction between the public and the private
realms which I draw m Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, then [the
question of which kind of human being you want to become] will
divide into two subquestions. The first is: with what communities
should you identify, of which should you think of vourself as a
member'7 The second is [...]: what should I do with my
aloneness92
*0
Autonomy, the sort of thing some people actually achieve in their aloneness
and on their own time, is a private concern, not a public one:
The sort of autonomy which self-creating ironists like Nietzsche,
Derrida, or Foucault seek is not the sort of thing that could ever be
embodied in social institutions. Autonomy is not something which
all human beings have within them and which society can release by
ceasing to repress them. It is something which certain particular
human beings hope to attain by self-creation, and which a few
actually do. The desire to be autonomous is not relevant to the
liberal's desire to avoid cruelty and pain-a desire which Foucault
shared, even though he was unwilling to express it in those terms.
290
For Rorty, then, autonomy is private autonomy, autonomy synonymous with
selt-creation. Autonomy is something self-creators in the private sphere seek to
achieve, and which some rare individuals actually do achieve Such rare individuals
are the results of incalculable contingencies, accidents and cosmic rays scrambling
neurons. This being the case, public institutions cannot embody autonomy and
should not be expected to do so.
Participation in democratic institutions and public life has no special place
in Rorty’s vision of private perfection, either. And in this respect, too, he differs
from Dewey. David Hall has noted that, compared to Dewey,
289.
) ORT, p. 13.
290.
) CIS, p. 65. Cf. Yack, p. 365,
291.) CIS, p. xiii.
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Rorty's democratic sentiments (or, at least, his democratic
expectations) are seriously qualified. Democracy is the vehicle for
the rise in the minimum standards of life-increased freedom and
autonomy. But the freedom is a formal freedom, empty in the sense
that only a very few will be able to exercise it in a meaning creatinu
and, therefore, meaningful manner. And the autonomy is, for mosf a
blind autonomy, unguided by a sense of relevance. 292
For Rorty, as tor Hegel and Sidney Hook, democracy is little more than one
of the most efficient ways of selecting candidates for government office and
conferring legitimacy on them nowadays. It should not be surprising, then, that
Rorty would describe his “democratic utopia,” uninspiringly enough, as one “...in




As we have seen in this chapter, Rorty differs from Dewey when it comes to
their respective views on autonomy, liberty and democracy. These differences have
to do with the very different manners in which the two American praumatists view
the relationship between the public and the private. For Dewey, public institutions,
notably public education and democratic institutions, are indispensable from the
perspective of positive liberty or autonomy, as he used these words. Rorty, on the
other hand, has reverted to a classical liberal conception of private autonomy and
liberty as exemption from state intervention. Autonomy, for him, does not entail
merely a duty to self, but a duty to self which, even at those felicitous moments
292.
) Hall, p. 37. Hall's remarks concerning Rorty's democratic sentiments
contrast sharply to Bernstein s remarks with reference to Dewey, in Berstein, pp.
539-40.
293.
) “Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy,” p. 4.
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when it happens to coincide with duty to others, is necessarily in contrast to
others™
Though Rorty might refuse the neo-liberal tag, he, like contemporary' neo-
liberals, views democracy not as an end in itself, as Dewey viewed what he called
the idea of democracy, but as a means for securing other ends. In Rorty’s case, as
we have seen, these ends are amelioration of suffering and making the world safe
for strong poets. The alleged fact that Dewey's vision of democratic community'
advances liberal ideals suffices to legitimize it.
We have noted that Rorty' subscribes to the idea that freedom makes room
for self-making. But what of the freedom from want and humiliation which is the
concern of his decent, dutiful citizen in the public sphere9 “Thugs” and the secret
police are impediments to this freedom. So are corporate managements that
promote "lean production," thereby eliminating the leisure time and energy required
for self-creation and autonomy. In the latter case, it is clear that some of Rorty’s
celebrated “institutions of large market economies” stand in the way of freedom 295
Rorty recognizes this, of course, but can think of no better remedv than constant
adjustment and compromise between state intervention and the market.
He also acknowledges more than once that poverty' is an impediment to
autonomy. Nevertheless, his stress on the role of one particular institution of “large
294.
) Compare to Haber's claim that Rorty assumes humans have a universal
essence, namely a moral subject, something within them that can be humiliated
(Haber, pp. 67-8).
295.
) Recent figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics bear out U.S. Labor
Secretary' Robert B. Reich's view that U.S. workers, struggling to maintain their
standard of living in the face of declining wages, are working longer hours and at
more jobs to make ends meet (cf. “Employees Get a Real Workout” {Los Angeles
Times
,
September 4, 1992) pp 1, A22).
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market economies" in promoting freedom has prompted one sympathetic
commentator to write:
I wish Rorty had included in his discussion of political theory some
reflections upon the relationship between liberal democracies and
their economic determinants. [...] Rorty's tailure to treat these issues
in any argumentative detail makes his reflections on political life
seem somewhat detached. Viewed in the light of his endorsement of
the idea that cruelty is the worst thing we do, his programmatic
interests come off as rather thinly urgent at best. 296
We will return to the question of Rorty s programmatic interest in
ameliorating suffering in Chapter Three. Before that, however, we should first turn
attention to his defense of liberal institutions with reference to the ideal of impedinu
the quest for autonomy as little as possible. This will be the focus of the next
chapter.
296.) Hall, p. 113.
CHAPTER 2
THE ELUSIVE IDEAL OF FREEDOM
One of the most common representations of modem states-a representation
which has gamed even more force since the proclaimed end of the Cold War-
depicts political power chafing at an external limit posed by the private sphere. As I
indicated in the previous chapter, Rorty subscribes to this conventional model of the
relationship between the private sphere and political authority. This is most evident
when, as in the passage cited above, he celebrates existing liberal democracies as
setups which "leave people alone to let them try out their private visions of
perfection in peace.”
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1 his conventional model may have been an accurate picture of the
relationship between the private sphere and political authority in eastern Europe in
the final years ol the Cold War; however, I will argue in this chapter that it is not an
accurate representation of the state of affairs in the rich North Atlantic. In the latter
case, as the sanctity of the private sphere has been proclaimed ever more
vociferously, the scope of surveillance, regulation and control by agencies of
political authority has become ever more efficient and has extended ever further
into the private sphere.
One account of the latter development immediately presents itself: The
accessibility of private life to surveillance and control by state agencies requires a
relatively high level of development of information collection, retrieval and
management, a level that is attainable only at a relatively advanced stage of
technological development and centralization of economic practices. A medieval
king in his castle cannot make decisions about how his peasant subjects will live
297.) Rorty, in Malachowski, p. 294
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when he has no way of even knowing how many subjects he has, or w here they live,
let alone their birth and death rates and levels of productivity. As Marx pointed out.
it is capitalism that first develops the forces and relations of production in ways that
make a high degree of centralized control possible. Since Poland or Russia, with
their pre-capitalist economies, lacked much of “the power that modem
technology makes available to thugs,”298 it is unsurprising that regimes there would
not have been able to mount the sort of massive invasions and manipulations that
are standard operating procedure in France, Japan and the United States.
This account, of course, has more than an element of truth to it. Certainly,
simple access to the technical means of surveillance and manipulation will go a
long way in accounting for the greater scope of authoritarian control in, say,
Pakistan-tormerly a U.S. Cold War ally which, until the end of the Najibullah
regime in Kabul, was a beneficiary of relatively unimpeded computer technology
transfers--as compared with Pakistan's erstwhile “nonaligned” neighbor to the East.
A narrowly technological account of the expansion of state control,
however, ignores problems that should not be ignored. For one thing, by portraying
innovations in the technologies of surveillance and control as more or less
unilaterally determining the scope ot state intervention, we risk understating the role
of state institutions in promoting or squelching the large-scale deployment of certain
technologies. In a state such as the old Soviet Union, for example, where guards
were posted at tax machines, where telephone directories were classified secrets,
and where mimeograph machines, photocopiers and even typewriters were required
to be registered with one or another mimstry-in such a state, it is not surprising that
the productivity of labor would have fallen far below that of the advanced capitalist
298.) “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 567.
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economies, and that citizens would be deprived of consumer goods and services
available to many people in the West.
Aside from the devastation of the Second World War, there were at least
three reasons for the lack of development and widespread application of these
technologies in the Soviet Union: (a) A technology and trade embargo enforced by
the West deprived the Soviet Union of credit, foreign capital and labor and
consumer markets, and of the opportunity to emulate Japan, China or the Six Tigers
of the Pacific Rim, whose nascent high-tech industries have relied in large part on
copying foreign designs; (b) a constant push to increase the productivity of labor
through automation would only have made it harder to maintain the charade of
constitutionally-guaranteed full employment; and (c) new' technologies, notably
telecommunications and computers, fueled the official fear of the samizdat, the
audience for w'hich was burgeonmg-thanks in large part to high literacy rates, state
subsidization of intellectuals on a scale unknown in the West and what
(paraphrasing Nabakov) we might call capitalist propaganda, disseminated through
Radio Liberty, the Voice of America, black-marketed videocassettes and so on.
2w
The officially imposed fetters on the productivity of labor had a predictably
disastrous impact on the All-Union economy. Ironically, what happened in the first
workers' state was exactly what Marx expected would happen wrhen dominant
relations of production persistently retard the development of the productive forces.
In the rich North Atlantic, by contrast, the story has been very different.
There, the rhetorical apotheosis of the private sphere has proceeded in lock step
299.) Rorty believes that “...it was images of freedom, conveyed through
magazines and movies, that finally brought down the Berlin Wair (Klepp, p 122).
He does not discern “any useful distinction between propaganda and the use of
reason” (Klepp, p. 122). Nevertheless, one still could raise lots of questions not
only about how these images were received and interpreted, but how they were
financed, selected, framed and transmitted.
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wnh increased surveillance, manipulation and control by institutions both public
and private in that very same sphere. In the democracies of this region, we have
witnessed an expansion of regulation in almost all aspects of life, while at the same
time odes to the inviolable private sphere have become louder and found an ever
larger audience.
This strikes me as remarkable, and in need of a sort of explanation that the
narrowly technological approach cannot provide. In considenng how it is that these
two trends have taken place, surely we ought to consider whether, and if so in what
manner, the degree of violability of the private sphere on the one hand and the
efficiency of political authority on the other hand are related by more than just the
common preconditions provided bv development of the productive forces, narrowly
conceived along technocratic lines. This is the problem to be broached in the
balance of this chapter. It will be helpful to begin by examining at closer quarters
representations of the triumph of the inviolable private sphere
Depicting the Apolitical Private Sphere
In an oft-cited article, Francis Fukayama suggested that we “might” have
reached the end of history: Western liberal democracy, lately universalized on the
stage ot world history, is to be "the final torm of human government,” while in the
domain of the economy (which evidently has to do with little more than the
selection and consumption of commodities which inexplicably pop up on display
shelves and showroom floors), ‘‘easy access to VCRs and stereos” is the actualized
ideal of the universal homogeneous state.
31
" For Fukayama, then, economic
300.) Refer to Fukayama. The End of Flistory, of course, has been a regularly-
repeated theme of “futurists” and “culture critics” of various stripes. Not ten years
earlier than Fukayama, for example, Jean Baudrillard announced that history had
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liberalism amounts essentially to the satisfaction of ever more sophisticated
consumer demands by a market which is free, presumably in the sense that buying
and selling, investment, hiring and resource allocation decisions are largely in
private hands.
1
Accordingly, when control and ownership of the means of
production are wrested from the state and returned to private hands, the absolutely
free will has taken a stride forward in its career of self-actualization.
Similar paeans to the private sphere have been voiced by contemporary'
figures who might be thought to have little in common with Fukavama. Rorty, for
example, approvingly quotes Milan Kundera's announcement that w'hat is most
precious about European culture is “...its respect for the individual, for his original
thought, and for his right to an inviolable private life.”
302
The hallmark of
Kundera's “European spirit of freedom,” we are told, is the sanctity of a sphere of
conscience, a private sphere protected against incursions by the state.
These paeans have not been limited to the usual anti-Communist
millenanans of the New World Order, either. In his address to the 1 989 congress of
come to an end, thanks to the allegedly homeostatic coexistence of “the Big Two”~
that is, the United States and the Soviet Union (Baudrillard, p. 66).
301.
) Fukavama, pp. 3- 1 7. Though it has proven useful for Radio Libertv
programmers, the term free enterprise is more than dubious as a description of
leading contemporary economies, in view of: (a) the crucial role of state fiscal and
monetary policies and regulation in these economies; (b) increasingly centralized
private sector planning (cf. Munkirs); and (c) the increasingly close interaction and
identification of state agencies and corporate capital. Recognizing this, David
Bazelon has observed that.
...the only existential meaning of enterprise is what businessmen
generally happen to be doing at the moment, and free is merely the
accompanying demand that they be left alone to do it. (Quoted in
Munkirs, p. 102.)
302.
) The quote, from The Art ofthe Novel , appears in CIS, p. 10.
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the Communist Party of Great Britain, Martin Jacques, editor ofMarxism Today
,
suggested that in both the East and the West “We live in a society which is
increasingly driven by civil society rather than the state.”
303
As evidence for this
development he invites us to “Think of the enormous membership of environmental
groups, or the range of cultural activity, or the massively enhanced role of the
media.’' This postwar development has been a source of crisis for the left, says
Jacques, because leftists have always seen the state as the centerpiece of political
change. However, if the state at one time used to represent politics in a
concentrated lorm, it should no longer be seen like that: Power has shifted from the
state to civil society. According to this picture, then, it would seem that civil
society, whatever else it may be, is a pluralistic domain of political power which at
least for the most part lies somewhere safely beyond the reach of the state.
In order to execute its constitutionally mandated function of preserving the
peace and securing property, even Mill, as we have seen, conceded that government
must periodically make limited forays into the private sphere. For the sake of
preserving freedom, however, these forays must be checked by a vigilant public, a
free press, free universities, an independent judiciary and other agencies
independent of the government.
A recent emigre writer restated the conventional paradigm well when he
claimed that the distinction between the public and private spheres is determined by
“the actual intrusion of the state or other organizations into the activity of groups
and individuals.”
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In the case of “authoritarian societies like the Soviet Union in
which the state controls all major spheres of social life,” the distinction between the
public and private spheres lies in “the degree of individual autonomy from
303.) Reprinted in Jacques, p. 18.
304.) Shlapentokh, p. 4.
govern, interference.”305 Thus, in both the authontanan East and the liberal
dentocrac.es of the West, actmt.es wh.eh belong to the private sphere-act,vines
wh'ch include a person's cho.ee of occupat.on and place of work, mamage-partner,
rel.g.ous convictions and consumption habits-are distinguished from public
activ.ties in that the former enjoy a larger degree of independence from intervention
by the state and ' other organizations.” Presumably, these other organizations
correspond to "secondary associations,” or Hegel’s Korporat,onenm of civil
society.
It IS evident, then, that the conventional paradigm admits degrees of
privateness: The circle of family and fnends, for example, is held to be more
pri vate by virtue of being less intruded upon by other institutions, governmental or
otherwise, than the sphere of such voluntary associations as. say, chambers of
commerce, unions and sports clubs. The distinction between public and private,
then, is not absolute: “the concept of a continuum is more appropriate in the
application of this paradigm to social analysis.”
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According to this paradigm.
With an aggressive state like Stalin’s or Mao’s, private life in a
society can be reduced to almost zero, with family and other small
305.
) Shlapentokh, pp. 5-6.
306. ) This is the word Hegel uses to refer to the decentralized administrative
bodies which lie halfway between the universal will of the state and the particular
will of “private enterprise.” Among these constituents of civil society we may
include commercial associations, chambers of commerce, guilds (and their modem
analog, trade unions), professional associations and the like. It will be noted that
Hegel’s Korporationen more closely resemble Dewey’s “public” than does Hegel’s
civil society,” since the latter, a “welter of competing wills,” lacks a uniting
interest and hence an organizational embodiment of that interest.
307.) Shlapentokh, p. 5.
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groups almost completely exposed to the regular
agencies, usually the political police.
308
intervention of state
In the liberal democracies of the West, by contrast, there is supposedly less
intervention by state agencies in the activities of individuals, family and friends, and
voluntary associations.
In the vocabulary ot this paradigm, when the government or the state
supposedly divests itself of whole domains which it had previously controlled or
supervised directly, it is said that privatization has taken place.
309
The degree of
privatization that has taken place is “a leading indicator of dynamics in democratic
and non-democratic societies.”
310
In view of how widespread this paradigm is, it is
not surprising that the decisions of central authorities to privatize the Russian and
Chinese economies have been hailed by some as the dawn of a new era of
democracy, while the same sources have denounced popular victories in Guatemala,




-1 08. ) Shlapentokh, p. 5. To his credit, Shlapentokh admits the inadequacy of his
knowledge about “America and other countries” (Shlapentokh, p. 14).
309.
) As we shall see below, privatization may better be understood as a process
of expansion of the private sphere at the expense of the public sphere-but not
necessarily at the state’s own expense, as Shlapentokh's picture would have it. For
the time being, we might take privatization to refer merely to the economic,
political and ideological expansion of the private sphere, regardless of how this
expansion takes place.
310.
) Shlapentokh, p. 7.
311.
) Jo Burrows has noted that a prominent feature of liberal rhetoric is “to see
'totalizing', ideological monsters lurking in every alternative creed” (Burrows, in
Malachowski, pp. 327-8). This certainly appears to have been the case with some
of Rorty's heroes, including Isaiah Berlin, Sidney Hook and Leszek Kolakowski. It
is interesting to note in this regard that Dewey himself has been a recipient of the
epithet “totalitarian” (Lamont, p. 1 13).
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As already noted, and as should become even clearer below, Rorty
subscribes to this picture of the relationshlp between the pnvate sphere and
governmental institutions in the liberal democracies. I will argue, by contrast, that
private individuals, as well as “primary” and “secondary groups” in the rich North
Atlantic democracies are controlled and defined to an unprecedented extent by
dominant political forces, which project power far beyond the institutions of the
state proper.
According to a common assumption which contrasts sharply to the view I
defend, the legal right to privacy, like the nght to property, is a natural relation
which has finally come to be respected and protected by the liberal democratic
state In this regard, we may refer to an exemplary “expert opinion” which
appears in an anthology published by a prestigious university press:
One basic finding of animal studies is that virtually all animals seek
periods ot individual seclusion or small-group intimacy. This is
usually described as the tendency toward territoriality in which an
organism lays private claim to an area of land, water or air and
defends it against intrusion by members of its own species. 313
The author proceeds to expatiate about meadow pipits, three-spined
sicklebacks and the long-suffering laboratory rat. And then the cultural
anthropologists are trotted out on cue to testify to the universal need for privacy
among the Tikopia, the Tlingit and the Tuareg. Thus, in the figure of the Savage we
discover once again the requisite link between Nature and Civilization.
The author ot this passage has given academic imprimatur to a pervasive
prejudice which Karl Marx excoriated a century and a half ago. Referring to the
312.) The notion of privacy as a distinct right originated in English and colonial
American opposition to arbitrary police intrusion and search and seizure
(Rosenblum, pp. 67-72). Louis Brandeis notwithstanding, no such right is
mentioned in the U.S. Constitution.
313.) Westin, p. 56.
political revolution which resulted in the foundation of the secular democratic
republics ot his day, the twenty-five year old Marx wrote:
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Its attitude to civil society, to the world of need, to work, to private
interests, private law is that they are the foundation of its existence
its own presupposition that needs no further proof and thus its
natural basis.
As recent interpreters ot "animal studies” confirm, it is still a widely held belief
today that Natural Man is the precondition for civil society, which in turn is the
basis ot the bourgeois state. Today, as in 1 843, we are invited to draw the
conclusion that bourgeois social relations and the relations of domination which
they inscribe are as immutable as the natural order.
315
One need do little more than state these assumptions explicitly in order to
cast doubt on them. It is tempting to suspect, for example, that the whole history of
our species has been retrospectively reconstructed to conform to an historically
contingent contemporary prejudice.
One would expect Rorty, the historical nominalist, to support Marx's view.
After wnting-perhaps with some degree of naivete-that “There is not, in fact,
much naivete left these days,” he adds: “Tell a sophomore at an American college
that something is only a social construct, and she is likely to reply 'Yeah, I know.
So are you, Mac.'"
316
Since Rorty views humanity as a product of luck and chance,
presumably he also views the public/pnvate split, as it is institutionalized in the
liberal West today, as such. When he is explicit about the contingency of the self
314.
) Marx, On the .Jewish Question , p. 56.
315.
) This brings to mind a remark by an emigrant from Eastern Europe. When
asked by an N.P.R. interviewer in 1990 why he prefers the West to the East, he
responded that capitalism is “more natural” than socialism.
316.) “Review of Spectres ofMarxf pp. 1 1-12.
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and community, he does sound like one of the “histoncist, including Marxist, critics
of 'liberal individualism. 1
”’ 17
At crucial junctures, however, he occasionally writes
as though he has slipped back into the view Marx criticized. This is apparent, for
example, when, as we saw in the previous chapter, he reinstates the egoistic private
person alongside the altruistic decent citizen as perennial and ineradicable members
of any remotely attractive polity (any polity, that is to say, that is conducive to
Rawls two principles ofjustice).’
17
It is also apparent, though perhaps less
obviously so, in his approval of what Berlin and Kundera have referred to as the
inviolable private sphere.
Whether or not we reject the assumption that the private sphere was
ordained by nature, however, we are still confronted with the impression that, in the
modem period at least, it certainly appears to be ineradicable. After all, it has
reasserted itself time and again, with almost irresistible tenacity, both in
contemporary reality and in the works of the great dead modem political thinkers in
the West, from Hobbes and Locke to Constant, Tocqueville, the Mills and Dewey.
One reason Hegel has attracted renewed attention from liberal thinkers like
Fukayama might be that, while he acknowledged the historical specificity of the
private sphere, he also emphasized the inevitability of its appearance. Hegel also
provides insights into the relationship between the notions of the private sphere and
civil society, and between the latter and political institutions. In his Philosophy of
Might, the author contrasted “the family,” as the embodiment of abstract
particularity, to burgerlich Gesellschaft, conceived as a “system of needs.” Within
317.
) CIS, p. 1 77. Cf. CIS, p. 1 73, with reference to Orwell.
318.
) “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 567. Refer to Rawls, pp. 60ff. David Hall
similarly has noted that there is a tension between Rorty s “radical separation of the
public and private and his belief in a centerless self’ (Hall, p. 167).
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CIV, I society, that welter of particular wills, some persons recognize that their
particular interests are consonant with the interests of others. On the basis of this
recognition of common interests, an association is formed which resembles
Dewey’s Great Community.
What Hegel calls the political state, as an “objective organization” distinct
from “civil society;" 1 '’ presents itself to the immediate observer m the form of
specialized public institutions and arrangements that typically are subsidized
through “public funds,” chiefly in the form of tax revenue. In contemporary terms,
a system of such institutions is composed of a wide variety of institutions, including:
the head of state; the legislature; the administration (which now extends far beyond
the traditional bureaucracy of the state to take in a large variety of mimstnes,
committees and other bodies such as central banks, policy planning groups, and
regulatory commissions); the judiciary; sub-central, regional, prefectural and
municipal governments; the military, police, courts, penal systems, as well as such
ancillary setups as postal services, social services and welfare bureaucracies, public
school systems and so on
' 20
The public sphere is sometimes thought of as encompassing the state,
conceived as the sum total of these institutions in their specific global organization
and interaction, plus all other social institutions not included in the private sphere.
Recurring to Dewey’s advice, encountered in Chapter One, it might not be worth
the trouble to attempt to draw a more precise line between public and private
spheres, before examining particular historical circumstances. In any case, we need
not attempt to do so for present purposes.
J 19 ) Hegel, p. 364, translator's note to remark 267. Cf. Dewey's use of the term
political stale, discussed in Chapter One above.
320.) Cf. Miliband, pp. 49-54; Therbom, p. 41; Bendix, p. 145.
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Now that we have at least the rough contours of the ‘'political state” m view,
we are ,n a position to compare the preceding sketch of the private sphere as a
refuge from political authorin' to an alternative description of the relationship
between the system of state institutions we have identified and the private sphere.
My aim in the next section ,s to present, in as brief a space as possible, some key
terms ol an alternative vocabulary for conceptualizing this relationship
State Power and the Private Sphere
Let us begin with an under-acknowledged but empirically verifiable
observation: In the countries of the rich North Atlantic, among other places, a large
part of the social surplus is systematically appropriated by owners and controllers of
means of production who themselves are not producers. 321 In a Marxist sense of the
term, then, these communities are class-divided. i2
This would not appear to be a terribly difficult position to defend,
particularly in view of the enormous and increasing gap between rich and poor, both
globally and within the richest countries themselves. In the last quarter of the
321.
) A class may be defined as a social group with a common relationship to the
production and appropriation of surplus labor, a common relationship which differs
greatly from or is opposed to one or more other such social groups (cf. Melkoman,
pp. 50-52). I am aware ot alternative definitions of class, including a definition
based on relationship to ownership or control of the means of production (cf.
Miliband, pp. 15-22; Wright, pp. 96-7). These two definitions, of course, are related
in an obvious way: Ownership and control of the means of production permits
appropriation of surplus labor or surplus value. Since one effect of class divisions is
great inequalities of wealth and power, both of these class entry points are congenial
to the present discussion.
322.
) Even limiting our view to the United States of America—perhaps the most
often-alleged contemporary example of a classless country-there is an enormous
amount of compelling literature linking wealth to class location (refer, for example,
to: Kloby, Eitzen and Feagin).
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twentieth century, workers in the north Atlantic countnes have witnessed record-
high corporate profits, skyrocketing stocks and bonds markets, gigantic mergers and
eight-digit salaries for top CEOs. They have also witnessed feverish
“downsizing,'”
2 ,
massive capital flight in search of cheap labor markets, escalating
anti-union campaigns, relative pauperization,
324




*' and slumping living standards.
327
Clearly, these trends are
instances and effects of well-organized and invigorated capitalist forces wresting
* Rcfer’ for example, to the series on downsizing that appeared in the New
)ork Times
, Sunday, March 3, to Saturday, March 9, 1996. According to the Times
Chase Manhattan’s assets grew 38% between 1985 and 1995 (from $87.7 billion to
$121.2 billion), while its work force shrank by 28% (44,450 employees in 1985
33,500 employees in 1995)(ATT, March 4, 1996). The authors cite this as an
especially clear exemplification of trends with reference to other corporations and
industries.
324. ) Refer, for example, to Berberoghlu, pp. 99- 1 06, and the Los Angeles Times
articles cited above.
325
) Berberoghlu, pp. 100-101 (the author cites Victor Perlo, Super Profits and
Crises: Modern U.S. Capitalism (New York: International Publishers 1988) d
512).
’
j 26. ) Berberoghlu, p. 101, Table 5.1 (the author cites Statistical Abstract of the
United States for years 1987 and 1988, and Economic Report ofthe President for
years 1987 and 1990). Also refer to more recent Bureau of Labor Statistics figures
cited in the Los Angeles Times (September 4, 1995): Al, A20, A22.
327. ) According to the New York Times series cited above, the percentage change
in real income for four-fifths of the U.S. population from 1990 to 1994 was between
negative one and negative five percent, while the top five percent registered a
fifteen percent rise (NYT, March 8, 1996: A 12). Annual median family income,
adjusted for inflation in 1994 dollars decreased from 1990 to 1993, and only slightly
rebounded in 1994 to approximately the 1992 level {NYT, March 8, 1996: A 12; the
authors cite U.S. Department of Labor, Department of Commerce and Datastream
sources). Assuming a positive correlation of consumption and income levels, and
assuming furthermore that consumption levels play a central role in the
determination of living standards, these figures confirm that living standards for a
large part of America are slipping.
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concessions and higher rates of exploitat.on from disorganized and demoralized
workers.
Rorty rarely acknowledges the class-divided character of liberal
democracies, whether utopian or actual. For him, it seems, a class, whatever else
we may understand it to be, must be a class/or itself This interpretation is
consistent with Dewey’s view, mentioned in Chapter One above, that, in the absence
of a commonly accepted ends-in-view embodied in distinct institutions, wage
earners constitute at best only a potential or inchoate public. Viewed in this light,
the only properly identifiable class that exists in the rich North Atlantic is “the
business community,” or the monopoly capitalist class, with its multitude of active
trade agreements, regulatory commissions, chambers of commerce, lobbies,
research and policy-planning institutes, interlocking directorates and so on.
328
So,
tor example, when Rorty discusses liberalism as “the attempt to fulfill the hopes of
the North Atlantic bourgeoisie,”
32 " there is no suggestion that these attempts are tied
up with the deployment ot political power against one or another social group, the
exploitation of workers or class conflict. By Rorty 's lights, the qualifier bourgeois
328. ) Referring to democracies exemplified by the United States, Tocqueville
wrote:
To tell the truth, though there are nch men, the class of rich men
does not exist; for these rich individuals have no feelings or
purposes, no traditions or hopes, in common; there are individuals
therefore, but no definite class. (Tocqueville, p. 160.)
Tocqueville was notoriously insouciant when it came to slavocracy in the South,
and he understated inequalities in the North and the West, too. Aside from the
question ol whether his description was accurate in the 1830s, however, it certainly
is not true today.
329.) “Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,” p. 585.
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in the term bourgeois liberalism designates little more than unspecified “historical,
and especially economic, conditions.”330
This helps to explain how at times he may suggest that talk of class struggle
IS “clumsy”" 1 or otherwise not worth the trouble."2 When he has anything to say
about class struggle at all, he typically speaks of it as a thing of the past.
" '
Regardless ot how class conscious and compact capitalists are-or, more accurately,
became of this-and regardless of aggravated social divisions, there can be no
struggle between classes as long as only one class remains the only class for itself.
This observation confirms the more general conclusion that Rorty assumes an
absence of fundamental social antagonisms in the nch North Atlantic "4
Once we acknowledge that the nch North Atlantic democracies are divided
along lines ot exploiter and exploited, however, a dark shadow begins to fall over
330.
) “Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,” p. 585.
331.
) “Review of Spectres ofMarx," p. 1 8.
^2 ) The End of Leninism,” p 5. If we assume at the outset that there is a
“harmonization of diverse impulses into common purposes” in liberal communities,
then talk of class conflict may well be unqualifiedly useless. If, however, we




For example, he likens “nostalgia” for the class struggle to nostalgia for les
rois faineants (“Movements and Campaigns,” p. 4).
) Haber, p. 62 It should be noted that Rorty does not always eschew talk of
class antagonisms. His acknowledgment of the need to mitigate “class conflict,
social division, patriarchy, racism” (“Thugs and Theorists,” p. 567) is, after all, a
recognition of class division, among other evils. In response to a question from the
audience at a talk at Northwestern University, he even went so far as to endorse
Marx and Engels' formulation, “The executive of the modem state is but a
committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie”
(“Intellectuals at the End of Socialism,” a talk delivered at Northwestern University,
January 17, 1992).
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Rom -s liberal vision. For one thing, assuming that most workers have not chosen
to be exploited, Rorty's Deweyan picture of a liberal community composed of a
multitude of voluntary associations united by common ends-m-view begins to
appear either far-fetched or trivial, depending on what one wishes to mean by the
adjective voluntary.
In his justly influential essay, “Ideology and Ideological State
Apparatuses,”
335
Louis Althusser has noted that the institutions that make up the
state operate in large part by violence or the threat of violence, however attenuated
or symbolic the threat may be. Althusser has advanced the following description of
the state from a perspective of its coercive function:
The state is a machine of repression, which enables the ruling
classes [...] to ensure their dominion over the working class, thus
enabling the former to subject the latter to the process of suiplus-
value extortion (i.e. to capitalist exploitation).
336
This emphasis on the coercive character of the state has a long pedigree in
anarchist literature, as well as such Marxist classics as the Communist Manifesto
,
the Eighteenth Brumaire
, Class Struggles in France and Lenin’s State and
Revolution. Even “mainstream” political theorists come close to certifying the state
as a repressive machine when they represent it as monopolizing legitimate violence.
Althusser s formulation, as general as it is, would of course have to be
reformulated in an even more general way to cover some non-capitalist states. A
broader formulation from the same functional perspective might be stated as
j35.) Included in Althusser, pp. 127-186. I do not want to give the impression that
I endorse other well-known writings of Althusser, in particular some of his writings
on epistemology and the sciences.
Althusser, p. 137. It will be noticed that I use the word state to cover a
narrower range of institutions than Althusser would have it cover.
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follows: A state enables at least one class to subject other classes to one or more
forms of appropriation whtch tend to mcrease the share of the surplus product or „s
value appropnated by the former class or classes relattve to other social groups.
Thts process of subject,on takes the form of coercion, both wtth respect to , mental
discipline, censorsh.p and so on within a gtven institution, as well as coercion
projected outwards, beyond the institution itself.
The institutions of the “political state” mentioned above play a role in
maintaining or extending class domination by enabling one or more classes to
subject other classes to extortion of the social surplus. When particular classes are
able, thanks in large part to the state, to appropriate a relatively large share of the
social surplus, those classes may be described as ruling classes™ By virtue of its
relationship to the state as a whole,
a
ruling class may be said metaphorically to
“wield” state power. Accordingly, state power may be thought of as a special case
of political power: It is the power of one or more classes exercised over other social
groups through the state as a whole. James Madison alluded to this political
function of the state when he argued at the Constitutional Convention that the
proper aim of government is to protect “the minority of the opulent” against the
“majority.”
01 course, the individual agents whose actions directly secure the
dominance of a given class typically have remained unaware of their role, and are
not even for the most part members of a ruling class. This is confirmed by the
drama that workers play out hour by hour, day by day in the capitalist West, and it
337.
) Cf. Therbom, p. 161.
338.
) The qualifier “as a whole” is important here. As the example of the Umdad
Popular administration in Chile shows quite clearly, one class alliance can control
much of the government and local administrations, while failing to control the
political state as a whole. We will return to this point below.
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was especially poignant in the case of Polish workers, who enthusiastically
sacrificed much in the early years of Walesa’s tenure to bnng to power a capitalist
regime which has rewarded them with lower wages, job insecurity and the
dismantling of social programs taken for granted in the past.
When state institutions on the whole have ensured social relations conducive
to more than one mode of appropriating the surplus, we may speak of a ruling class
alhance. Slaveholding planters and northern industnal capitalists, for example,
formed a precarious ruling class alliance in the ante-bellum United States.
Moreover, certain social strata and fractions often may ally themselves with a given
class alliance. In the years leading up to the Civil War, for example, religious
leaders, publishers and other professional intellectuals in the North allied
themselves ever more closely with the northern industrialists. These considerations
complicate the picture, but they do not change the fact that there are ruling classes
and subaltern classes.
339
State institutions often survive transferal of state power to incipient class
forces. This observation, needless to say, does not apply solely to the postal system
and elevator inspectors. One may readily discern this point by considering the
continuity of a large part of the bureaucratic and military machinery of the former
Soviet state in the wake ot Yeltsin’s Fall 1991 counter-coup and the final, full
disenfranchisement of Russian workers started under Stalin's tenure.
Nevertheless, in order to extend their own organization and hamstring
incumbent ruling alliances, newly-ascendant class forces have frequently been
pushed to restructure, dismantle, gut and destroy old state institutions and create
339.) A concise defense of the existence of class rule in the U.S. against the
criticisms of pluralist sociologists appears in Domhoff. More recent studies of class
rule in the liberal democracies include: Szymanski, Jessup and Camoy.
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new ones in its own image™ 1 take „ the point is obvtous enough to allow us to
forego historical ,llustra„ons: When a new class alliance achteves state power, i,
does not as a rule simply take over the helm of a pre-ex,sting state which remains
the neutral terrain of class struggle.
It is also important to note here that individual state institutions are
themselves sites of class struggle, however unequal that struggle may be. 341 It
might suffice as an illustration of this point to consider that in the final hours of
waning class rule, even the ranks of the Praetorian guards may split, part of them
going over to the side of the insurgency. Moreover, m less tumultuous times,
representatives of subaltern classes may capture positions in municipal, regional and
national legislatures, governments and ministries. Indeed, we have witnessed
instances—most recently in Japan, Brazil, Italy and India-m which representatives
of normally militant working class organizations have occupied the highest
executive offices in non-revolutionary periods of political crisis.
The fact that a ruling class does not monolithically dominate every
institution of a modem state, however, does not imply that its political power is any
less effective or emphatic. For one thing, as we have already emphasized, state
power, though exercised in large part through state institutions, is not confined to
those institutions. One might compare here the discipline enforced within the ranks
of a police department to the violence the police force projects beyond its own
ranks. Key institutions of the modem state have projected state power ever further,
over an ever wider array of non-state institutions, including “private enterprise,” the
church and the family.
340.
) Cf. Lenin 1932, p. 96:
341.
) Althusser, p. 141
.
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It IS important to recognize, moreover, that extending the power of a ruling
class IS not exclusively the function of state institutions. Many non-state
institutions, both public and private, also mediate conflicts among ruling class
elements and enhance their coordination, compactness and agility, while thwarting,
hamstringing and fragmenting subaltern classes and strata. The latter category may
include, tor example, such -private’- economic associations as chambers of
commerce, cartels, interlocking directorates and lending institutions
As 1 have already indicated, and as should be clear in any case, violence and
repression are not the only forms that political domination takes. As Gramsci has
emphasized, even the most repressive ruling class would not be able to maintain the
social order for long if it were to rely solely on violence and the threat of violence.
Without securing at least some degree of consent from subaltern groups, class rule
cannot be maintained. To gain a more panoramic view of political power and class
rule, we need to cast a glance, however briefly, at some of the non-coercive
institutions and practices that have assumed great importance in the contemporary
West.
Gramsci proposed an alternative conception of the state,
...which is usually thought of as political society-i.e., a dictatorship
or some other coercive apparatus used to control the masses in
conformity with a given type of production and economy-and not as
a balance between political society and civil society, by which 1
mean the hegemony ot one social group over the entire nation,
exercised through so-called private organizations like the Church,
trade unions, or schools.
342
Elaborating on this train of thought, Althusser has provided a vivid picture
of the role of a wide variety of institutions in the reproduction of the social order.
342.) The passage, from a letter of September 7, 193 1 to Tatiana Schucht, appears
in Gramsci 1989, pp. 204-5.
106
He has noted that such institutions as spectator sports, churches and even the
family—forms of association which in the secular North Atlantic are represented as
paradigmatically distinct from the state-have in fact played a crucial role ,n the
reproduction of the skills of labor power and labor power's subjection the
established order.
343
With reference to the complex and variegated contemporary states of the
north Atlantic, then, it does not appear to be possible to distinguish between state
and non-state institutions solely on the basis of the function of ensuring the
reproduction of prevailing relations of production. Aside from the many
connections between the state and "private enterprise," another reason for this
difficulty is that, as noted, individual state institutions are themselves strategic
positions in the class struggle, positions that have been contested and captured by
opposing class forces even when state power and the class character of the state as a
whole has not faced a serious challenge. 344
The observation that there is no hard-and-fast line of demarcation between
the modem state and non-state institutions is instructive when it comes to evaluating
the conventional paradigm of the relationship between the private sphere and the
state. As Gramsci has noted and Althusser has repeated,
34
" the state itself is the
precondition ot any distinction between the public and the private. The distinction
343.) Althusser, pp. 131-2.
-•>44.
) It is increasingly difficult to draw other distinctions discussed in this chapter,
too. As one commentator has noted,
...the personal and private have been dissociated from virtually every
institutional setting. The result is a dramatic collapse of the
traditional distinction between public and private as between
government and society. (Rosenblum, pp. 66-7.)
345.) Althusser, p. 144.
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between the public and pnva.e spheres is, among other thmgs, a distinet.on between
categones of bourgeo.s law within what Marx metaphorically referred to as the
superstructure. It is a distinction, moreover, which is an effect of political power,
which in turn is always, at least to some extent, contested. In this regard, one might
consider the early clashes of the bourgeoisie with the ancien regime around
demands for the separation of church and state, protection of personal property
nghts, habeas corpus and probable cause. Or one might consider later struggles
over public education, labor legislation, regulation of industry and banks, anti-trust
laws and civil rights legislation.
We should keep in mind that the distinction between categones of bourgeois
law does not have an immaterial, ideal existence. On the contrary, beyond the
material embodiments of this legal distinction-in legislation and case law, in public
school curricula, architecture and urban design, in the institutional practices and the
normalization techniques which Foucault has described,
346
in the actual discourses
of physically and socially formed subjects-there is nothing else to point to, outside
ot the realm of theology and idealist metaphysics, as an instantiation of the
public/private split.
The diremption of public and private spheres accompanied (but of course
does not neatly correspond to) the progressive separation of the state from the
economy in the transition from feudalism to capitalism in parts of Europe.
347
Peasants were forced into the cities as land was capitalized; political power was
centralized, as it shifted from the countryside to the city; labor markets developed,
the guilds were transformed; constitutional nghts and obligations replaced
346.
) See: Foucault, 1979.
347.
) Poulantzas, p. 18.
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traditional alienees; the individual's conscience replaced pnests and confessors,
and simultaneously the private sphere evolved as a legal category.
In the nch North Atlantic at least, the public/pnvate distinction is not a
horizontal partition of a community into a lower private realm and a higher public
realm; rather, ,t is present at the “individual” and “primary group” levels, just as
much as at the level of the judiciary and the legislature . 348 Indeed, as Althusser and
others have argued, the public/pnvate split is a component of individuality itself;
One and the same individual human is both legal subject, accountable to the law,
and pnvate subject, accountable to her creator, her conscience and the market.
Unions, chambers of commerce, sports clubs, fraternal associations, schools,
churches and political parties-each of these voluntary associations exists by virtue
of constituting or reproducing individual humans as subjects-that is, by constituting
or reproducing a given mode of subjectivity or selfhood-either as mother or father,
union member, alumnus, religious believer or something else. In the absence of
religious believers, of performers of certain rituals, after all, there is no religion.
This observation, as far as it goes, resembles the claim, which we have
already attributed to Dewey, that individuals both form and are formed bv social
groups. When we turn to involuntary associations, however, differences between
the two views become significant. According to the view presented, political
institutions and practices of class rule, including wowvoluntary associations, play a
crucial role in reproducing individuals as legal subjects, wage earners, felons and so
on. State institutions, in particular, prescribe not only the character of public
348.
) Althusser, p. 144.
349.
) Gramsci observed that no one is disorganized and without a party;
individuals almost always belong to more than one private association. Indeed, he
asks whether readers of a newspaper constitute an organization (Gramsci 1971 p
265).
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selfhood, but also to a large extent the character of private, nonvoluntary
associations, and hence the character of private selthood. By enforcing the
separation of church and state, for example, judiciaries, legislatures, tax authorities
and so on have been instrumental in making religion "purely a matter of




which in turn has bolstered the Jeffersonian compromise and
enhanced the stability of bourgeois social relations.
In Chapter One we noted that Rorty has abandoned Dewey’s hope that
members of a democratic community could be reconstructed to efface the contrast
between private selfhood and community-spirited public selfhood. In view of the
preceding observations, it is easy to agree with the critic who wrote that, “Rorty's
assumption that there is a private self which can be formulated independently of the
public one neglects the social origins and implications of the self.”
351
This is as true
of the strong poet as of the decent citizen.
In post-Cold War eastern Europe, as in the rich North Atlantic, political
power has been reinvested in private associations and non-state public associations,
augmenting the power of the new ruling classes. As noted, one reason for this is
that the range and scope of existing state institutions has increased as a result in part
of greater access to technologies and procedures of surveillance and control. As 1
have emphasized in this section, however, another important reason for this is the
role that non-state institutions play, including mass media and the “free press,”
churches, schools, reformist unions and the bourgeois family, at least in some of its
permutations. Even domestic drug trafficking gangs could count as highly
350.) Weber famously acknowledged the importance of “political circumstances”
vis-a-vis religious ideas (refer, for example, to Weber, pp. 277-8, note 84).
351.) Haber, p. 61.
no
“functional” associations in the latter category, considering their demoralizing and
demobilizing effect on working class neighborhoods.
On the other hand, it should be stressed that discourses and activities that
subvert prevailing relations of domination are not all the result of dysfunctional
public institutions. To take some obvious examples, the most consistently militant
workers parties, unions, national liberation movements and Christian base
communities have not been public institutions that just did not do what they were
“supposed” to do. These institutions have been characterized by internal
organizational structures and practices geared for battle against the state and the
ruling class alliance. These structures and practices may have included
clandestineness, democratic or bureaucratic centralism, abstention from electoral
politics or the use of elections for merely “pedagogical” purposes, and a
preparedness to resort to such militant tactics as general strikes, armed struggle and
so on. Such organizations have come into conflict with coercive institutions of the
state when they have done what they were “supposed” to do.
It would seem that the demands of a subaltern group cannot be launched
from a platform beyond the sanction of the state, without at least posing a threat to
the dominant position of the ruling class force. As long as Jim Crow remained on
the books, police and FBI officials viewed even the avowedly peaceful civil rights
movement of the 1950s and 1960s as a threat to “national security .” By contrast,
when legal and extra-legal impediments to the activism of subaltern groups are
removed and the political struggle is transferred to terrain within the compass of
state surveillance and control, the political struggle, however heated, takes place on




These observations are all the more poignant when it conies to accounting
lor the resilience of capitalist class rule in the West. In "the most advanced states,
Gramsci noted.
... civil society’ has become a very complex structure, and one
which is resistant to the catastrophic 'incursions’ of the immediate
economic element (crises, depressions, etc.).
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The modem state and what Gramsci referred to as civil society break up opposition
the way a Pnsm breaks up white light. Both state and nonstate institutions channel
dissent into a myriad of legal institutions and in this way they absorb the shock of
opposition into themselves. Gramsci described this process well:
The massive structures of the modem democracies, both as state
organizations, and as complexes of associations in civil society
constitute for the art of politics as it were the “trenches” and the
permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position: they
render merely “partial’ the element of movement which before used
tr\ r\P nrUrkl/%"
In the East, by contrast (and evidently Gramsci had Russia foremost in mind), “the
general-economic-cultural-social conditions [and] the structure of national life are
embryonic and loose, and incapable of becoming ’trench or fortress’.”
354
352.
) Gramsci 1971, p.235. Gramsci did not succeed in finding a single, wholly
satisfactory conception of civil society in relation to the state. On occasion, for
example, he described the state as political society + civil society,” and as
“hegemony protected by the armor of coercion” (Gramsci 1971, p. 263); elsewhere,
he wrote that “in concrete reality, civil society and State are one and the same.”
Gramsci sometimes used the term civil society “in the sense of political and cultural
hegemony of a social group over the entire society, as ethical content of the State...”
(Gramsci 1971, p. 208n). Still elsewhere, he wrote: “Between the economic
structure and the State with its legislation and its coercion stands civil society”
(Gramsci 1971, p. 208n).
353.
) Gramsci 1971, p. 243.
354.
) Gramsci 1971, p. 236.
It would seem, then, that within the context of the contemporary' north
Atlantic, both the public and the private spheres must be brought at least in large
part under the sway of dominant political institutions, state or non-state, or the
continuity of prevailing relations of production and class rule will be at risk. If, for
instance, a ruling class attempts to maintain its political domination by proscribing
the contest for control of representative institutions from the arena of legal political
activity, this struggle may then take the form of a military' siege by an enemy which
is then, by definition, opposed to the state.
According to the account presented so far, it will be noticed, both the private
and the public are political constructs.
35
' The private sphere is itself at least in part
an effect of politics, conceived broadly not as tinkering aimed at consensus and
amelioration of suffering, but as a struggle among classes, the highest stakes of
which are state power.
Proceeding a step further, one may even describe the self to which the strong
poet recognizes a duty as itself largely an effect of state institutions and other public
institutions. Thus, one may conclude, pace Rorty, that autonomy, or lack thereof, is
to a large extent an effect of social institutions. It should be noted, moreover, that
one may accept this conclusion without thereby subscribing to the view against
which Rorty convincingly polemicizes, to the effect that autonomy is “something
which all human beings have within them and which society can release by ceasing
to repress them.”
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So far, I have sketched a picture of the state as inseparable from the reality
of class domination, of state power as a stake of political struggle, of state
institutions as sites of class struggle and of political power as an effect ot non-state
355.) Haber, p. 61.
356.) CIS, p. 65.
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institutions, as well as state institutions. This sketch contrasts sharply to Dewey's
picture ot the state as ‘“the organization of the public effected through officials for
the protection of the interests shared by its members," to Rortv's picture of “social
institutions as experiments in co-operation,"
337
and to Dewey's assumption, which
Rorty shares, that “politics is a matter of everyone pulling together to solve common
problems."
338
We are now in a better position to compare Rorty’s account of the apolitical
private sphere, presented in Chapter One, with the account of the state and the
private sphere sketched in this section. A convenient way of doing this would be to
evaluate the very different ways in which the two accounts allow us to compare the
defunct nominally socialist states of eastern Europe with the liberal democracies of
the north Atlantic.
Privatization and Socialism
I will begin by making hay of headlines in an admittedly distasteful manner.
As late as 1987, Rorty wrote that “...time seems to be on the Soviet side,”
3
' and in a
paper published two years later, he wrote, with reference to the "spectacularly
successful” “Communist oligarchs" in the Soviet Union:
Orwell was not the first person to suggest that small gangs of
criminals might get control ofmodem states and, thanks to modem
technology, stay in control forever.
3 *'"
357.
) Rorty, in Malachowski, p. 295.
358.
)
Fraser, p. 104; see also Haber, p. 62.
359.
)
“Thugs and Theorists,” p. 566.
360.) CIS, p. 171.
A mere two years after disparaging the “unchanging second World run by an
impregnable and ruthless Inner Party,”
361
this "world” its “intractable,”
monstrous regimes and its "ruthless leaders, collapsed like a circus tent,
scattering less debris in Moscow than settled on the streets of Los Angeles the
following Spring. Since then, the victorious former dissidents apotheosized by Cold
War liberals have presided over the impoverishment and disenfranchisement of
their populations, the worst political repression in Europe in half a century and
blood baths on a dozen killing fields, from Bosnia to Tajikistan.
Surely it is bad taste to toss an author's political forecasts in his face from
the unfair vantage point of six year retrospection. After all, Rorty could easily rally
a legion of equally embarrassing prognostications from the same period authored by
erstwhile admirers of “existing socialism.' Moreover, he provides us with evidence
that he was not entirely oblivious to the changes taking place around him: In a
footnote presumably added for the 1991 republication of a text first published in
1 989, he acknowledged that what two years earlier he had referred to as “the
unbreakable grip of the KGB in the Russian people and of the Soviet army on a
third of Europe” has been broken, thanks in large part to Mikhail Gorbachev, "the
Abraham Lincoln of Eastern Europe.”'
6 '
361.
) CIS, p. 182.
362.
) ORT p. 22 1 . Also refer to “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 566, with reference to
“...the steady extension of Moscow's empire throughout the Southern Hemisphere,”
a development which, in 1987, Rorty felt was likely to take place in the next
century.
363.
) EH, p. 26n. One wonders, parenthetically, whether Lincoln was hated as
thoroughly and unanimously by those he freed from slavery' as Gorbachev is by the
Russians he supposedly freed from totalitarianism. Still, Rorty's evaluation of
Gorbachev compares favorably to the inane descant in Kolenda, pp. 65-84.
Sometimes, however, distastefulness is warranted There are two reasons
why
1 permit myself to use Rorty's political prognostications half a decade ago to
motivate the discussion in this section:
First ot all, he engages in this sort ot maneuver himself, and turnabout is fair
play. Not only has he gainsaid socialist tnumphalists retrospectively, in the light of
developments at the beginning ot Gorbachev's tenure, but he also has condemned
writers who, twenty years earlier and more, clung to the hope that the Soviet Union
could have been reformed.
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Secondly, and more significantly for the present discussion, he shares
something important with socialist tnmphalists in the West: Whether lamenting the
prospect or exalting in it, both sides confidently subscribed to an image of “existing
socialism” which was at least in one respect a projection of the image of the liberal
political systems within which they lived: According to this image, the Soviet
regime was stable, in control and in possession of lots of resources to stay in
control. Non-tnumphalists to the left of Rorty could also be indicted for the same
offense, including the Frankfurters and Foucault, who, by casting both East and
West into the same “technological,” “post-industrial” or “carceral” pot, greatly
overstated the flexibility and resources of the regimes in the East and in this respect
greatly underestimated the differences between East and West.
The question we will raise for Rorty, then, must also be directed to many of
his critics on the left: How could a person who “has read lots of books” have been
so far off the mark as late as 1989 when it came to assessing the stability of the
rapidly disintegrating regimes of the Eastern Bloc?
364.) Refer to CIS, p. 170, with reference to the grip of “Bolshevik propaganda”
on the minds of French intellectuals.
A possible response might be that these cosmopolitan academics have
tended to underestimate the central role that virulent nationalisms played in their
velvet revolutions. Faithful heirs of the Enlightenment, including Gorbachev
himself, preferred to think of their allies against the old guard as fellow democrats
with normal civilized goals, rather than as the opportunists, obstreperous
megalomaniacs and ethnic cleansers they so often turned out to be.
Another possible response to this question, one that is more relevant to the
present discussion, might entail defending the following claim: Whether or not the
Soviet leadership was a gang of criminals in some special but unspecified sense in
which the leadership of, say, the United States is not,
3 ° the Soviet Union most
certainly did not exemplify a “modem state,” at least with reference to institutions
which generate the consent of the governed.
This last point is particularly evident with reference to private forms of
association under “actually existing socialism.” Past claims of the Novosti Press
Agency to the contrary, it does not appear that in eastern Europe private life had
been made public. On the contrary, as a previously-cited source has noted.
Since the late 1950s the Soviet people have gradually but
unswervingly diverted their interests from the state to their primary
groups (family, friends, and lovers) and to semi-legal and illegal civil
society as well as to illegal activity inside the public sector.
(
As is well-known, this process of privatization had been taking place for a
long time, at the individual, family and friendship levels, at the level of the
Korporationen (including the so-called mass organizations), and even at the level of
the highest aparatchiks. Ample evidence of this trend could have been collected by
almost anyone with even casual contact with the woefully inefficient state-owned
365.) To his credit, Rorty also describes the “shadowy millionaires manipulating
Reagan” as a gang of thugs (“Thugs and Theorists,” pp. 565-6).
366.) Shlapentokh, p. 13.
industrial enterprises, or the cooperative and state farms, or the venal state
functionaries and party officials who regularly took advantage of their positions for
personal gain
Because of their corruption and inefficiency, the old regimes of eastern
Europe were forced to augment their more directly repressive state institutions, even
to the point of resorting to foreign military intervention to quell popular uprisings,
as in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 Predictably enough, these and
other repressive measures had the opposite effect. As Nicos Poulantzas wrote at
least thirteen years before 1991:
Not only does authoritarian statism fail to enclose the masses in its
disciplinary web or to 'integrate” them in its authoritarian circuits; it
actually provokes general insistence on the need for direct, rank-and-
file democracy--a veritable explosion of democratic demands.
367
These regimes did not just provoke democratic demands, however; they also
created the space both within state institutions and outside them for the formation of
subversive associations. What rendered state institutions in eastern Europe highly
dysfunctional was not just inefficiency within their domains of authority, but also
the limited scope of their operation. In some cases, such as widespread black
marketeering within state-owned enterprises, state power did not even saturate
important state institutions, let alone private associations. Rather than being
controlled to a great extent by state institutions, as in the West, the private sphere
came to be determined in large part by fissiparous and increasingly assertive
institutions lacking state sanction. These included organized crime syndicates, the
church, the samizdat, human rights watch groups, and later, independent trade
unions, nationalist fronts and full-blown opposition parties.
367.) Poulantzas, p. 247.
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Even the most intimate primary groups were transformed at least partially
into subversive institutions. Surveys conducted in the final years of the Soviet
period indicate the prevalence of private institutions—including that sanctum
sanctorum of the private sphere, the family—over public ones, including state
institutions, in forming the value system of the respondents.
368
Smaller families, a
growing desire for economic independence on the part of the younger generation
and rejection of cohabitation with parents after marriage-all of these developments,
and many more besides, testify to increased “privatization within private life,” and
they also provide an impetus for further privatization.
36
1
Similar observations apply to other areas of the private sphere, as well as to
other eastern European states. In one case after another, the private sphere was first
a refuge from state power, then a fortress, and then a secure rear base for a frontal
assault against the state.
However accurate this model of the relationship between the state and non-
state associations may have been with reference to eastern Europe, however, it does
not fit well with reference to the advanced capitalist West. In the liberal
democracies, even the most intimate realms of activity play an important role in
maintaining dominant social relations of production. For example, although the
importance of the nuclear family in this context has diminished in relation to public
schools and television, Althusser and others have emphasized the role of the family
^70
in reproducing prevailing relations of class domination. This view may well have
been too unilateral with reference to the French bourgeois family under the Fifth
368.
) Shlapentokh, p. 164.
369.
) Shlapentokh, pp. 168-9
370.) Althusser, pp. 143-5
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Republic, let alone the transmogrified family structures of the contemporary United
States.
' 1
Nevertheless, to the extent that the institution of the family in the liberal




it may simply be because the bourgeois family itself has not
required much state intervention to function as a guarantor of the continuity of
ruling class power When, for any of a number of reasons, a particular family
structure no longer reproduces dominant social relations efficiently (as, for
example, in the case of France in the closing years of the nineteenth century, or the
United States in the final years of the twentieth century), it has been subject to the
increased intervention of state institutions.
37 '
Poulantzas has argued that the state's ability to reproduce itself depends on
the institutional integration of power relationships. Ironically, in the case of the
highly centralized states of the East these power relationships were far less
integrated than in the liberal democratic states of the advanced capitalist West. In
view of the diminishing power of subversive institutions in the advanced capitalist
371.
) Many working class, poor and black families in the United States today
appear to lack the stability requisite for a well-functioning apparatus of class rule.
At present, for instance, the patriarchal nuclear family, consisting of a male
breadwinner and a female housewife, accounts for only twelve percent of the
households in the United States, while the single parent household is becoming the
norm, due in part to a fifty percent divorce rate.
372.
) It is not a foregone conclusion, however, that this has been the case (refer to
Donzelot).
373 .) Donzelot has reported that, at the turn of the century in France, the state took
steps in the areas of public assistance, juvenile law, medicine, public schooling,
public housing and psychiatry that reduced patriarchal authority, and hence the
autonomy of the family among the “less-favored” classes (Donzelot, p. 89).
According to him, the family in its contemporary permutations is neither a
guarantor against the encroachments of the state, nor is it an ideological apparatus
of the bourgeois state, as Althusser would have it (Donzelot, pp. 52-53).
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West, Poulantzas' observation carries even more weight today than when it was first
made:
[There is] no limit dejure or in principle to the modem State's
encroachment on the private. However paradoxical it may seem, the
very separation of public and private that is established by the State
opens up for it bound-less vistas of power.
374
If in eastern Europe the private sphere was continually violated by a handful
of enormous and enormously unwieldy, corrupt and incompetent bureaucracies, in
the West it is supervised not by one or two centralized bureaucracies, but by
multiple networks of overlapping institutions, both state and non-state, public and
private, which are not limited to such narrowly repressive state agencies as the FBI,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms. Consider, for example, such private sources of information as
employment records, telephone accounts, academic transcripts, credit reports,
actuarial projections, medical records, psychodiagnostic assessments, background
checks by insurance agencies and private investigators, and omnipresent electronic
monitors in the labyrinthine panopticons of shopping malls, parking lots, white
collar worksites and cyberspace. All of these sources of information testify to the
pervasiveness of non-state surveillance, regulation and manipulation of private life
in the rich North Atlantic.
To complicate matters, it is not always a straightforward task to distinguish
«
state from non-state agencies of surveillance and control. This is true particularly in
the West, where, as we have already noted: (a) the administration of the state
374.
) Poulantzas, p. 72.
375.
) In his book The Naked Consumer , Eric Larson describes the formidable
private sector networks that monitor, track and manipulate consumers.
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extends far beyond the traditional bureaucracy, to encompass central banks,
regulatory commissions, lobbies, nonprofit corporations, policy planning institutes
and other agencies, each of which has its own resources for information gathermu
and control, and (b) the power of big business has merged seamlessly with the state.
Furthermore, as we have indicated, the scope of state intervention, the
compass of state power, has been anything but fixed. One generalization to be
drawn from a survey of the labor history of the United States is that terrain
contested by state power has been one of many flashpoints of class conflict.
Working-class organizations have fought long and hard to expand state supervision
in the areas of union recognition, minimum wage laws, corporate taxes, regulation
of industry and commerce, social security, occupational safety, environmental
safeguards and social programs. At the same time, some of the same organizations
have fought bitter battles for a rigorous implementation of the Bill of Rights, to
restrict the operation of state agencies, especially repressive ones, in the private
sphere. And in each of these battles, they have encountered much resistance from
ruling-class forces. The character and compass of state and non-state public
institutions have been a bone of contention vis-a-vis both Korporationen which are
not state institutions, and the “primary groups” of the private sphere. The first
category would include conflicts over regulation, anti-trust legislation,
376
use of
public lands, environmental degradation and corporate liability, subsidies to
industries, health care, social security and so on. The second category would
include contention over freedom of speech, reproductive rights, sodomy laws, the
separation of church and state, “family values” and so on. In recent years the battle
zone has expanded to cyberspace, as opponents have clashed over the
376.) Which in any case amounted to little more than a pro-forma concession to
widespread popular discontent. Refer, for example, to the discussion in Munkirs,
pp. 12-44.
Telecommmun i cations Bill, the future of the so-called information super-highway,
surveillance of the Internet and control of the content of multimedia programming
These examples underscore the observation already made that the border
between state and non-state institutions and between the public and private spheres
are blurry, elastic, discontinuous and shifting lines of scrimmage which are often,
though not always, located on political terrain defined by state institutions.
Moreover, at the nsk of further complicating a picture that is already exceedingly
complex, it is important to keep in mind the class character of the terrain itself and
the fact that it also undergoes constant transformation.
As the foregoing considerations would suggest, it is inaccurate to depict the
negative rights embodied in documents such as the Bill of Rights as somehow
carving a sphere of freedom away from the mechanisms of class rule and political
domination. To paraphrase Michel Foucault, we must not think that by saying yes
to the private sphere we say no to political power.
377
The contrast-term for “private sphere” is “public sphere,” not “the state.”
Moreover, as 1 have indicated, state power far over reaches state institutions. It
would seem, then, that Martin Jacques’ picture of a power shift from the state to
civil society is inaccurate, or at least stated in a misleading manner. True, many
functions which, at least at the official level, used to be reserved for public
institutions of the state have indeed shifted squarely to the non-state institutions of
what he calls civil society, and to more intimate realms. Far from detracting from
the power of the ascendant ruling class alliance, however, this shift has greatly
enhanced that power.
Let us recall the instances Jacques cites to illustrate his claim: the
burgeoning membership in environmental groups, the “range of cultural activities,”
377.) Foucault 1980, p. 153.
and the massively enhanced role of the media today. As it turns out, each one of
these instances could be turned convincingly against Jacques' claim One might
note, for starters, the co-optation and political neutralization of events such as Earth
Day by corporations and state commissions, or the political use of the rain forest
issue by the I M F. to inhibit the development of more independent capitalist
economies in the South. In relation to cultural activities, one might consider the
monotonous, soporific and demoralizing effects of the increasingly corporate-
sponsored’™ cultural activities in the rich North Atlantic, or recall John Foster
Dulles’ prescient observation that culture is the leading edge of U S. foreign policy.
Edward Said's remark might also be relevant in this context:
I would like to suggest that many of the most prominent
characteristics of modernist culture, which we have tended to derive
from purely internal dynamics in Western society and culture,
include a response to the external pressures on culture from
imperium
Moreover, with reference to the enormous influence of the media today, Jacques
would do well to consult Ben Bagdikian's documentation of the rapid and massive
concentration ol ownership ot the electronic and print media in fewer and fewer
hands, and the ever closer connection between the corporate media and the
^80
government.
These observations bring us back to the conclusion that in the advanced
capitalist West, the private sphere conforms to and bolsters the liberal democratic
state and capitalist class rule: Almost all domestic political opposition is loyal
opposition; the content of the omnipresent and increasingly corporate-owned press
378.
) Refer to Schiller.
379.
) Said, p. 188.
380.) Refer to Bagdikian.
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and entertainment industries meshes ever more finely with state policy, and nearly
all “cultural expression,” including supposedly subversive art, has been tolerated
and even subsidized by the state.'
M
As Foucault and Poulantzas have indicated each
in his own way, surveillance in a “pluralist society”-that is, a setup in which there
is a broad mix of functions of public and private institutions--reins in nearly the
entire panorama of life.
Ironically, then, Rorty’s ominous prognostications about some twentieth-
century states miss his intended target. If there are regimes that have stayed in
power thanks in large part to modem technology, they were not the member-states
of the Warsaw Pact, but rather the rich North Atlantic democracies, including
Rorty's own liberal democratic experiment, the United States of America. The
private sphere is not a realm of freedom insulated from political power-least of all
in the liberal democracies of the West, where it is thought to be freest. Like herds
of American bison, “Emerson’s American sense of a new kind of social freedom”382
survives in a much-diminished form, as a simulacrum of a sentimentalized past,
within a well-circumscribed and controlled domain.
Thus, Orwell's question, which Rorty approvingly repeats,™' is aimed one
hundred and eighty degrees in the wrong direction: The question whether one can
remain free inside should be directed in the first place to the rich North Atlantic,
where the private sphere functions very efficiently to ensure the hegemony of a
minority of exploiters.
381.
) Refer to Schiller.
382.
) EH, p. 4.
383.) CIS, p. 176.
Leninists frequently have been accused of postulating the absence of civil
society. Indeed, the apparent reassertion of civil society, and the intractability of the
private sphere in eastern Europe seem to be chief reasons why Jacques and other
leftists have claimed that Leninism “has had its day.” It may well be true that what
distinguishes the Leninist view ot state power from other perspectives is the
repudiation in theory of the notion of civil society, as well as skepticism as to
whether it is at all meaningful to speak of a private sphere in the absence of the
state. What has been said so far, however, would suggest that by at least one
possible interpretation, Lenin was affirming a great truth when, speaking of the
Bolsheviks, he once said “We do not recognize anything 'private'.”385 To the extent
that the private is a legal category instantiating the system of ownership of the
means of production, and to the extent that (except in the imaginations of some
political philosophers, their populanzers and the many under their sway) the state
stands above the law, Lenin’s rejection of the notion of a nonpolitical private sphere
may well be an advantage, for descriptive purposes other than apologetics for
bourgeois liberalism.
This, however, does not imply that, despite appearances, everything is really
public “deep down.” I have presented a case for concluding that nothing is
naturally or intrinsically either public or private. Nevertheless, as 1 have
emphasized, the private sphere is not a pure illusion produced by false
consciousness, either. It is, rather, an important component or aspect of
384.) It is interesting to note that nowhere in volume thirty-eight of Lenin's
Collected Works will one find a conspectus of Hegel's Philosophy ofRight, and a
perusal of the index to the Collected Works reveals little evidence that the founder
of the Bolshevik Party ever read the book. For Lenin, who in other respects was a
great admirer of the German idealist, Hegel's philosophy of history was “obsolete
and antiquated” (Lenin 1976, p 312).
385.) Quoted in Therbom, p. 69
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contemporary social relations, an element that public policy-makers ignore at their
own risk.
The proposals advanced during the period of perestroika confirm the view
that Soviet leaders were compelled to acknowledge that a pervasive and vigorous
private sphere had long ago become an established fact in the Soviet Union. It is
instructive to consider several of their more sweeping proposals, with reference to
public institutions of the state:™
6
Dismantle the unwieldy central planning bureaucracy and attempt to develop
some sort of market mechanism to conform costs of production more closely
to consumer prices—hopefully, within the context of economic planning (as
we know, however, Gorbachev's economic initiatives terribly undermined
the well being of direct producers, while at the same time depriving workers
of the old mechanisms for redress of grievances);
Decentralize production by eliminating state subsidies to inefficient
enterprises and legalizing forms of “personal property” and cooperative
enterprises which effectively amount to private ownership of the means of
production (though not necessarily to large-scale exploitation, as long as
cooperatives are prohibited from hiring large numbers of direct producers);
Foster independent workers’ unions and legalize the right to strike;
Scrap the scores of prohibitions and security measures obstructing access to
new technologies, information, foreign travel and resource allocation;




) Granted, this list is selective; various constituencies advanced other
demands which were less compatible with the point argued here. However partial
this list may be, however, 1 believe it is representative of one dominant trend within





) On February 7, 1990 the Soviet Party's Central Committee voted to repudiate
Article Six of the 1977 Constitution of the U.S.S.R. This article guaranteed that the
Party would determine “.. .the general perspectives of the development of society
and the course of the domestic and foreign policy of the U S S R ,” as well as “the
great constructive work of the Soviet people
”
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Distinguish sharply between the property, rules, norms and organizational
principles of voluntary political organizations and those of state institutions;
Develop an institutional framework of representative democracy—preferably,
as a foundation upon which to build some form of participatory democracy^
workers' and consumers' councils and mass organizations;
388
Develop more effective guarantees for the negative rights of liberal
democracy, and de-emphasize such "positive rights” as workers’ self-
management and the right to a job;
Institutionalize mechanisms for oversight and accountability to enforce strict
legality, both within state institutions and within the Party;
Inaugurate a looser All-Union federal arrangement (perhaps along lines
proposed in the democratically ratified March 17, 1991 referendum),
granting a greater degree of self-determination to nations within the multi-
national state, and permitting much greater latitude for economic, cultural
and political initiatives at the republic level.
389
It would be accurate to characterize the proposals on this list as part of a
movement towards privatization. As I have attempted to indicate, however, it
would be incorrect to conclude from this that they amount to moves to diminish the
extent of state power. True, most of the proposals listed involve expanding the
388.
) Gorbachev was correct at least in the view that this proposal-and for that
matter, every other proposal on this list—is compatible with Leninist political
practice. Referring to the Pans Commune, Lenin wrote.
We cannot imagine democracy, even proletanan democracy, without
representative institutions, but we can and must imagine democracy
without parliamentansm. (Quoted in Wnght, p. 201.)
389.
) Ronald Suny Has argued a point analogous to the present one, with reference
to nationalism in the Transcaucasus. "Not without its own contradictions and
paradoxes,” Suny writes, "the Soviet experience resulted in stronger, more coherent
and conscious nationalities than entered the federation at its inception” (Suny, p. 22;
also see; Langman). Similarly, I have argued that instead of making the private
public, “actually existing socialism” continued the production and expansion of the
private sphere inherited from the pre-revolutionary pasts of the Soviet nationalities.
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private sphere at the expense of the public sphere, and state institutions in
particular; nevertheless, none of them requires a retreat of state power from the
private sphere. On the contrary, implementation of some of these proposals has
arguably intensified and expanded the terrain of political domination by giving state
sanction to large areas of private life previously ignored on the official level, while
simultaneously bringing these areas under the authority of the state. Consider, for
the sake of illustration, the myriad enterprises which constituted the so-called
shadow economy of Russia: As these enterprises have been forced to function
above board, they have become subject to greater state regulation and taxation.
From the fact that these economic and political reforms proved to be too
little too late for the Soviet Union, it does not follow that they are in principle
incompatible with socialism. Indeed, as 1 have suggested, prospects of alternatives
to this sort of privatization would appear to be poor in the foreseeable future: If
workers are to retain state power after winning it through political struggle, they
will have to transform private forms of association into mechanisms of workers'
power, instead of attempting to proscribe them by means of repression.'
90
390.) With reference to multi-party democracy, for example, one well-known
“culture critic” has noted that:
The one-party totalitarian regime is an unstable form— it defuses the
political scene, it no longer assures the feed-back of public opinion,
the minimal flux in the integrated circuit which constitutes the
transistorized political machine. (Baudrillard, p. 131.)
It might be suggested that, rather than seeking to bring all subversive
institutions within the compass of state sanction, democracy and workers' power
would be better served by maintaining the existence ol oppositional institutions in
tension with state institutions. Holding the latter accountable even to the most
hostile criticism might actually strengthen them by enhancing their efficiency and
stability. Paradoxically, however, once the ruling class is confident enough of its
political power and in possession of sufficient resources to sanction the existence of
oppositional institutions, this gesture itself has amounted to the co-optation and
effective transformation of them into reformist institutions.
129
In the next section I will bolster the case against Rorty's account of the
inviolable private sphere by elaborating on the point that social institutions and
practices, including voluntary associations and state institutions, play a crucial
role in defining not only the character of public selfhood, but also to a large extent
the character of private selfhood. My aim is to clear away obstacles that he claims
preempt as a fruitful topic of conversation how one's notions of community and
how even private self-descriptions conduce to or inhibit prevailing relations of
exploitation and political domination. In the course of doing this I will argue for a
conception of ideology which is immune from his criticisms of Ideologiekritik.
Private Selfhood and Ideology
David Hall has noted that “The grounds for Rorty's hope and Foucault's
hopelessness lie in the different attitudes of these two thinkers toward the relations
of the public and private sphere.”
391
Hall is repeating a theme of, for instance, the




Insisting upon distinguishing the public and private spheres risks
begging what for both Rorty and Foucault is the essentially empirical
question of whether there is an efficacious private life for
individuals, in liberal democratic societies.
391.
) Hall, p. 156.
392.
) CP, pp. 203-8.
393.) Hall, p. 155.
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Rorty answers this essentially empirical question in the affirmative, of
course. As one might guess by now, however, this answer follows almost trivially
from his definition of a liberal society as one which guarantees Kundera's right to an
inviolable private life.
In this chapter we have encountered a very different view of the private
sphere. 1 have suggested that the state is a condition of actuality of both the public
and the private spheres, and that private institutions as well as public ones play
crucial roles in bolstering relations of exploitation consonant with capitalist class
rule. While I have pointed out good empirical reasons for rejecting Rorty’s picture
of an apolitical private sphere, I also have indicated that the private sphere is not a
pure illusion of false consciousness, either.
So if Hall takes the modifier efficacious in the passage just cited to signify
that the distinction between public and private life makes a big nonlinguistic
difference, then his “empirical question" may be answered as follows: Yes, of
course there is an efficacious private life for individuals in liberal democracies.
After all, the sphere of private life and private property is instantiated in architecture
and urban planning, individual behavior, patterns of consumption and production,
and so on, as well as thousands of constantly re-enacted legal procedures,
institutional routines and norms and so on.
It seems more likely from the context of Hall's passage, however, that he
holds that private life is efficacious to the extent that it is somehow self-sealing, or
is prior to politics or separable from institutions of the state. If this is a correct
interpretation of his view, then, as I have indicated, there are good reasons not to
answer his question in the affirmative. If we take “efficacious" in this sense, then
apparently Hall has failed to distinguish between the public sphere on the one hand
and institutions of political domination on the other hand as distinct analytical
categories. This would account for his and Rorty's assumption that wherever there
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is an efficacious private sphere there is also freedom and the possibility of
autonomy, as they use these terms.
For Foucault and many Marxists, by contrast, extensive state recognition of a
private sphere is not synonymous with the expansion of negative freedom and the
opportunity to achieve autonomy. On the contrary, if private associations and
practices play such an important role in securing near-total submission to the
established order in existing liberal democracies, then acknowledging the
efficaciousness of the private sphere enables Foucauldians and Marxists to say more
nasty things about “actually existing liberalism,” not fewer. It allows them, for
instance, to add a new chapter to their stories of class rule or disciplinary practices,
a chapter that could be entitled “How the Private Sphere Enhances the Domination
of the Bourgeoisie.”
I do not propose to write that chapter here. Rather, I want to scrutinize some
of Rorty’s objections to such an undertaking. In particular, 1 want to examine his
disparagement, in CIS and subsequent works, of the very attempt to describe the
private sphere and private selfhood in a political light. This requires turning our
attention to his disparagement of the use of the word “ideology” and its cognates.
Rorty would like to convince his readers that “the” notion of ideology is
useless.
3 M
In the following pages, however, it should become clear that his
criticisms miss the mark when it comes to at least one conception of ideology,
which I will recommend. Although we may grant that the proffered conception may
be worse than useless for Rorty's apologetic purposes (to which we will return in
Chapter Six), it should become clear that others who are less prone to such
apologetics may well find it useful not only for private purposes of “tracing the
394.) CIS, p. 59n.
blind impresses our behavings bear, but also for redescnbing personal behavings
in a way that is conducive to quite different political purposes.




Speaking in the most general terms, he associates disquisitions about
ideology with representationalist accounts of knowledge. He characterizes
Ideologiekritik as an attempt to strip away systematically distorted representations
of a thing, to unmask the one true description of it, its underlying dynamics.
397
Thus, if representational ism goes, so does Ideologiekritik.
As noted in the Introduction above, Rorty has convincingly argued that
representational ism should go. He congratulates Wittgenstein for diagnosing the
urge to ask “...questions as to the essence of language, of propositions, of thought,”
and concluding that we must cure ourselves of the fixation that “the essence is
hidden from view.”
398
Rorty also ascribes to some IdeologiekrHiker, namely Marxists, “...a fuzzy
distinction between 'ideology' and a form of thought (the Marxists' own) which
escapes being 'ideology.
'“399
With a little help, perhaps, from Kolakowski and
395.
) Rorty discusses Philip Larkin's trope in CIS, pp. 23-43.
396.
) Geuss clearly has informed Rorty's discussion of Ideologiekritik (CIS, p.
59n; Geuss, pp. x, 3). Geuss uses the word Ideologiekritik to designate “a reflective
theory which gives agents a kind of knowledge inherently productive ot
enlightenment and emancipation,” where enlightenment involves attainment of
knowledge of one's
“
true interests'\Geuss, p. 2).
397.
) “Thugs and Theorists,” pp. 569-70; EH, pp. 1 87-8.
398.
) EH, p. 60. Some key points in Rorty's case against searching for such
essences have been glossed in the first section of the Introduction above.
399.
) CIS, p. 59n. This description, it will be noted, does
not square easily with
1 •> *>
1 ->J
Castonadis, he interprets Marx, a man whose favorite motto was De omnibus
duhitandum
, to have held that, at long last having ascended to the heights of
Science, it is possible to cast all previous knowledge at once into doubt. By this
account, Marx would appear to be one of those ‘'committed to the construction of a
permanent neutral framework for enquiry, and thus for all culture.”
400
Further on, Rorty provides an important clue as to what he means by
“ideology” when he writes:
The question [of whether or not the critique of ideology is central to
philosophy, as Habermas and others would have it] turns on whether
one thinks that one can give an interesting sense to the word
“ideology”-make it mean more than “bad idea.”401
Rorty, of course, does not believe that one can make “ideology” mean anything
more interesting than “bad idea.” Presumably, a bad idea is an idea which one is
warranted in declaring to be false, evil, unjust or clumsy, because it has proven over
time and in a variety of cases to be useless or detrimental for a particular purpose.
To the extent that the false is the bad in the way of belief, then, Rorty's “deflated”
notion of ideology is truth-functional.
. . .the idea Havel mocks when he says that a mark of the good
communist is that he “subscribes to an ideology and believes that
anyone who doesn't subscribe to it must therefore subscribe to
another ideology, because he can't imagine anyone's not subscribing
to an ideology.” (“The End of Leninism,” p. 10; Rorty cites Havel's
collection of interviews published under the title Disturbing the
Peace
, p. 80.)
400.) PMN, p. 8. Cf. Castonadis' similar claim that Marxism
...attempts to submit all of history to categories [including relations
ofproduction , which are determined “in the last instance” by the
productiveforces, as well as “politics” and other “autonomous”
fields of activity within the “superstructure”] that have a sense only
for capitalist society in developed countries. (Castoriadis, p. 29.)
401.) CIS,p. 84n.
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Ideologiekntiker claim super science status when they aspire to adjudicate
beliefs in all vocabularies for all time and when they deny they are using a
“particular historically conditioned and temporary vocabulary.”
402
They have
claimed to fulfill the latter role in at least one of at least two ways. (1 ) by
permitting us to escape “class subjectivism,” thus providing us with a putatively
objective or scientific knowledge, something of a “view from nowhere”; or (2) by
assuming the standpoint of the proletariat, thus allowing us to transcend the class
subjectivism of those who, having a great deal more to lose than just their chains,
have a vested interest in remaining blind to the sources of their privilege, the
ignominious origins of the present regime and the irrationality, contingency and
transitoriness of the status quo.
Both of these ways of claiming super science status involve revealing the
economic-class determinants of beliefs, determinants which Marx described in a
famous passage from his 1 859 “Preface to A Critique ofPolitical Economy” as the
“real foundation” to which “definite forms of social consciousness” correspond.
Lukacs' proletariat, for example, is in a position to gain scientific knowledge of its
own debasement and the possibility of redemption because, as the objectified
subject of history, it is the most thoroughly disillusioned subject heretofore.
4" '
Rorty might have had some such formulation in mind when he wrote that
Ideologieknt ik is at the center of “the Marxist idea that a philosophical super-
science can tell the working class their true situation
”4"4
402.
) CIS, p. 48.
403.
) Rorty approves of Habermas' rejection of “Lukacs's idea that the working
class-the Marxist version of the transcendental subject--is in an epistemologically-
privileged position” (“Posties,” p. 12).
404.




Against the view that those who remain prisoners of bourgeois class
subjectivism remain blinded by ideology, Rorty protests that performing such tasks
as sensitizing an audience to cases of suffering which they had not previously
noticed is simply a matter of “redescnption.”
405
One way in which the notion of
being blinded by ideology differs from “redescription” is that the latter term, unlike
the former, is truth-neutral.
By Rorty's lights, then, “the” notion of ideology opposes false imaginings to
the real. Accordingly, he criticizes a notion of ideology as:
(a) False consciousness, mystification (Condorcet), socially necessary
illusion, Althusser's “imaginary version of a real relation,” “distorted
discourse,”
406
Geuss' “ideology in the pejorative sense”
407
or what Novosti
literature sometimes used to refer to as “illusory ideology,” in contrast to
“scientific ideology.”
The literary output of the vulgar economists exemplifies this meaning of
“ideology,” as do (arguably) the fetishism of the commodity and the wage form.
This pejorative sense of ideology
,
however, is only one of several uses to
which Marxists and others have put the word. Consider some other meanings of the
word, to be found in the works of Marxist writers:
(b) Constellations of beliefs, attitudes, dispositions and so on which serve
400
to “mask social contradictions”;
405.
) CIS, pp. 173-4.
406.
)
The obvious reference here is to Habermas. Also see Nielsen, p. 213.
Nielsen invokes the notion of “seeing the world rightly” to sustain his conception of
ideology as distorted discourse (Nielsen, p. 214). Rorty, of course, would dismiss
such a formulation as useless for anything but registering approval of a description.
407.
) Geuss, pp. 1 2ff. This presumably would include Gustave Bergmann's
definition of an ideological statement as “a value judgment disguised as or mistaken
for a statement of fact” (cited in Geuss, p. 14n).
408.) Cf. Geuss, p. 1 8.
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(c) Juridical, philosophical and technical principles of state power, as in
the phrases official ideology’ and “the ideology of the state,” or as
embodied in, say, Roman law, Shari’a or the orthodoxy of Stalin’s Russia;
(d) Conscious or unconscious rules, based on principles for morality and
conduct;
(e)* Patterns of behavior (prominently including linguistic behavior), as in
Althusser's formulation, “a lived relation to the world”;




bodies of widely-shared, important and in some
sense highly coherent perceptions or beliefs, as in “the German ideology”;
(g) Ideals; Plekhanov’s “ideology of the higher sort,” consisting of science,
philosophy, the arts and so on;
(h)* Noncoercive practices, prominently including linguistic practices,
which support the economic system or reproduce dominant relations of
production;
(I) A social or collective practice distinct from but concerned with




* A relatively noncoercive field of class conflict or competition for
cultural and political hegemony (as in Gramsci);






) Refer to the discussion of ideology as world-view in Geuss, pp. 9-11.
410.
) Cf. Geuss' “ideology in a programmatic sense” (Geuss, p. 11).
411.
) Rorty comes close to this formulation when he approvingly cites Davidson's
view that “...new metaphors are causes but not reasons for changes ot belief’ (CIS,
p. 50), and when he notes that when metaphors die they cease to be merely causes
and become reasons for beliefs (ORT, p. 171 ).
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This list is not intended to be exhaustive.
4
It should suffice, however, to
bring home the point that various interpreters and different traditions or schools,
Marxist and non-Marxist, have subscribed to different notions of ideology. Rorty is
certainly nght to observe that many writers have used “ideology” to mean “bad
idea.” Others, however, have provided accounts of ideology which are prefigured in
the Marxist classics,
413
or for that matter, in the works of, say, Karl Mannheim or
Talcott Parsons, and which at the same time avoid the assumption that all
contending vocabularies but their own are bad ideas. Consider, for example, the
following variation on “functional” definition (h):
(fo) An attitude, ritual or set of beliefs, dispositions or linguistic practices
viewed with an eye to its role in the reproduction of dominant relations of
production, or alternatively, to its inhibition or subversion of those
relations.
This definition appears at least pnma facie to comport with the items in the
list marked with an asterisk, and does not appear to conflict in any obvious way
with any other items except (a). (The reason the recommended definition conflicts
with (a) is that, in order to fulfill its role in the reproduction of dominant social
relations, a belief would thereby serve the purposes of the dominant social group,
and thus, at least from a pragmatist's perspective, the dominant group would not be
warranted in asserting that it is false or illusory.) By contrast, Rorty's
412.
) It is not clear to me, for instance, that it can accommodate a view Rorty
ascribes to Marx and Habermas, according to which “ideology” is contrasted to “...a
mode of thought which, because it represents ‘human freedom’ rather than any
‘external constraints,’ succeeds in being non-ideological” (“Habermas, Derrida, and
the Functions of Philosophy,” p. 20).
413.
) It will be noticed that Marx’s treatment in Capital of the fetishism of the
commodity and the wage form is compatible not only with (a) and (b), but also with
at least one of meanings (c) through (j).
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characterization of Ideologiekrilik does not comport terribly well with any of the
items on the list except (a), (b) and possibly (f).
414
Ideology, according to definition (In), or in the sense of what Geuss called
“ideology in a purely descriptive sense,” could include both implicit and explicit
discursive elements such as beliefs, concepts and so on, as well as non-discursive
elements such as rituals, dispositions, attitudes, gestures, artifacts
41
^ and what
Dewey has referred to as “the habits of loyalty and obedience” which permit a
government to rule.
410
Thus, it does not appear to be too far from Roily's “forms of
life,” referred to above, which “...have been used to justify the systematic
administration of pain and humiliation.”
41
;
Ideological attitudes, rituals, beliefs
and so on constitute and typically are embodied in institutions and institutional
practices, both public and private.
It will be noted that this conception of ideology trivially proscribes what
Nielsen refers to as nonideological legitimating beliefs : To view a belief as
legitimizing an institution or political practice is to view it as ideology. And the
414.
) With reference to (c) and (h): To the extent that principles of state power or
economic practices are “efficacious," they likely would not be injurious to holders
of state power or economically dominant groups. A similar remark would apply to
(i). With reference to (d): To the extent that the rules in question are “efficacious,”
they likely would not be injurious to those like Rorty who wish to efface the
morality-prudence distinction. With reference to (e): Unqualifiedly injurious
behavior is not likely to be repeated by enough agents to constitute a pattern or lived
relation to the world With reference to (j) and (k): While neither of these
formulations is obviously incompatible with Rorty's notion of ideology as “bad
ideas,” they do not appear to have any special relevance to it, either.
415.
) Refer to the discussion in Geuss, pp. 5-6.
416.
) Dewey 1984, p. 277.
417.
) “Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy,” p. 15.
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same may be said of a belief that problematizes or challenges prevailing forms of
exploitation and domination.
Even the most uncontroversially true, pragmatically confirmed axioms can
be viewed with an eye to their function vis-a-vis the reproduction of relations of
production. Thus, for example, both vulgar political economy and Capital could be
viewed as ideology, without prejudicing the claims of either to truth, scientificity or
usefulness for a given purpose. If the literary output of the vulgar economists, or
the fetishism of the commodity or the wage form are more obviously ideological
than, say, Boyle's Law or Euclidean geometry, then this is because of their function
vis-a-vis dominant social relations, not because of their alleged cognitive inferiority.
Moreover, as Kai Nielsen has pointed out with reference to his own truth-
functional conception of ideology, Davidson's observation about how the mass of
mundane beliefs must be true does not impugn the claim that there are systems of
legitimating beliefs or discourses that underwrite repressive social orders and
reproduce existing relations of exploitation and political domination.
4 1K
Gramsci's
remarks on ideology are instructive here. The Italian Marxist viewed common




moment in its career. At the same time, he recognized that some—though certainly
not all—widely held beliefs have been pragmatically confirmed by many agents over
a long period of time. Gramsci referred to the latter sort of truisms as beliefs of
good sense™ Clearly, there is an overlap of beliefs of good sense and common
418.
) Nielson, p. 213. For the relevant views of Davidson, refer to “A Coherence
Theory of Truth and Knowledge,” in Malachowski, pp. 120-138.
419.
) For our purposes, we can understand the ideology of a ruling class to be the
constellation of beliefs, dispositions and so on which bolster prevailing social
relations, chief among them economic relations.
420.
) Refer to Gramsci 1971, pp. 419-25. Also refer to the discussion in Nielsen,
p. 174.
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sense. Thus, we may readily admit that common-sense beliefs are often true, yet
still be warranted in asserting that they underwrite existing relations of exploitation
and political domination.
Ideology, viewed as a social practice along the lines of definition (h2 ), looks
like “a pluralism of power/discourse formations,”
421
as well as attitudes, ntuals and
dispositions. Thus conceived, the study of ideology would involve producing lots of
“detailed historical narratives of the sort Foucault offers us,” without positing
noncausal conditions of possibility,
422
or constituting the sort of metanarrative
Lyotard and Rorty abhor.
4
~ To view ideology this way is not necessarily to
subscribe to Rorty’s picture of Ideologiekritik as “...penetrating to the 'repressed'
reality behind the 'ideological' appearances.”
424
Nor need the examination of
ideology depend in any obvious way (or, as far as I can tell, in any unobvious way,
either) on the opposition between “true consensus” and “false consensus,” or
validity and power,” either.
4
“ Rather, it could be described simply as a
421.
) EH, p. 173. Rorty quotes Habermas' description of Foucault.
422.
) Cf. EH, p. 55.
423.
) Cf. EH, p. 166. With reference to Rorty's own “Grand Narrative” about the
vicissitudes of Western philosophy, see: Hall, pp. 8, 15, 245-6 note 19. Charles
Taylor believes the result is a metanarrative of the sort Rorty professes to abjure
(Taylor, in Malachowski, p. 257).
424.
) EH, p. 1 85. Reviewing the list of definitions above, it will be noticed that in
cases (c), (h), (j), (h2 ), and possibly in (i) and (k), the study of ideology need not
pose or pretend to solve any heady epistemological problems about the appearance-
reality distinction. After all, to cease opposing appearance to reality as mutually
exclusive categories does not require us, absurdly, to deny the appearance/non-
appearance distinction in first-order discourses. Since appearances presumably
have causes, we could always think of them as part of a larger reality not limited to
appearances.
425.) EH, p. 165.
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particular sort of first-order descriptive activity, one which consists of generating
claims about the effects of discourse, rituals and so on, as well as the purposes, and
hence communities, which are served or frustrated by our ways of talking.426
Students of ideology so conceived would qualify as naturalists
,
in Rorty's sense of
the word as those who believe that all explanation is causal explanation of the
actual, and that there is no such thing as a non-causal condition of possibility. 427
Rorty has written that the genre of literature concerned with “unmasking
bourgeois ideology” “has long been overworked.”
42 *
It is hard to disagree with his
derogatory assessment of the impenetrable and pretentious jargon of many “Cultural
Leftists,” and he is probably right to doubt that they create so much as a ripple
outside the increasingly rarefied atmosphere of university Humanities departments.
Nevertheless, a great deal remains to be said about how, say, public school
curricula, packaged news or clinical psychology have either helped to reproduce
prevailing social relations or have been appropriated by social forces in opposition
to those relations. The same observation applies to religious and nationalist creeds,
a wide range of technical discourses, common-sense platitudes, and, yes, even
Marvel Comics. So when in a rare moment Rorty describes “...’critique of ideology'
as an occasionally useful tactical weapon in social struggles, but as one among
426.
) Cf. Kolenda, p. 8.
427.
) EH, p. 55.
428.) “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 569.
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many others,"'-'' we may dispute his use of the adverb occasionally, but otherwise
agree with him.
* * *
In this chapter, I have sketched a picture in which both state and non-state
institutions in the liberal North Atlantic, on the whole, function to reproduce
prevailing economic and political relations by producing individuals as private, as
well as public, persons or selves. In the course of sketching this picture, it will be
noticed, I have not invoked a picture of repressed potentialities, human essences or
universal autonomy. I have made my case, rather by comparing the scope, scale and
forms of state power within the rich. North Atlantic democracies to other cases,
notably in Eastern Europe during the Cold War. If this account is on target, then
existing liberal democracies could hardly be said to embody one of Rorty’s liberal
ideals than which no other ideal is higher, namely, the ideal of leaving people alone
to pursue their own idiosyncratic visions of perfection.
In the next chapter 1 will turn to Rorty’s public ideal of ameliorating
suffering I will argue that if we give proper attention to the policies and practices
ol the richest North Atlantic democracies beyond their cartographic borders, they
fare no better when it comes to this ideal than they did with reference to the ideal of
individual freedom I also will advance an alternative political setup which, I
believe, holds greater promise when it comes to ameliorating suffering.
429.) EH, p. 135. Also refer to “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 577 note 16, with
reference to feminism as “...the one area of Ideologiekritik where people are
actually having some new ideas.”
CHAPTER 3
THE ILLUSIVE IDEAL OF DECENCY
If we are to believe Rorty, America will go down in history as havinu done
more than any of the “great empires” so far to promote what Sidney Hook called the
cause of “enlarging human freedom in a precarious and tragic world by the arts of
intelligent social control."
4 '"
This prognostication, of course, is probably on target,
at least in the medium-run As Rortv reminds us, “To say that we think we’re
heading in the right direction is just to say, with Kuhn, that we can, by hindsight, tell
the story of the past as a story of progress"
4 ' 1
Judging from more than ample
evidence past and present, however, telling such a story is little more than a
perfunctory gesture that may accompany indefinitely large volume-displacements of
the blood of innocents. The historiographies to which most people are exposed,
after all, are written for, if not entirely by, the victors: As a rule, the victors, their
heirs and scribes are the “we" who spin stories of the past as histories of progress.
Judging from the context in which the passage quoted appears, however.
Rorty intends it to be taken not as an observation about the politics of
historiography, but as a congratulatory statement about the exemplary' moral status




) CP, pp. 69-70.
431.
) ORT, p. 27.
432.
) ORT, p. 15. This may be the place to note that Rorty--the advocate of
abandoning the fact-value, scheme-content and science-culture distinctions—
suddenly bolts from this position when it comes to justifying his preference for
Unger's awkward and misleading circumlocution. Rorty claims that the term rich
North Atlantic democracies is “more neutral” than other widely-used terms,
presumably in the sense that it is less laden with value or emotive connotations.
Here as elsewhere, Rorty has advanced a claim that is incompatible in both tone and
implication with other points he has labored to establish. (Refer, for example, to
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his lights, these countries represent the best hope for propagating the ideals of
freedom from the constraints ot the state and amelioration of suffering. As we have
seen, these are the highest private and public aims of strong poets and decent
citizens, respectively. As ideals they figure prominently in Rorty's definitions of a
liberal community as “one which has no purpose except freedom,”433 and of a
liberal as a person for whom cruelty is the worst thing we do. 434
In Chapter Two, by contrast, we saw that in actual liberal democracies such
as the United States freedom from the supervision and sway of state institutions is
narrowly circumscribed. This consideration casts serious doubt on the claim that
the United States has contributed notably to the cause of enlarging human freedom
within its borders.
In this chapter, 1 will dispute Rorty s claim that the liberal democracies have
done a notably good job of ameliorating suffering beyond their borders. This will
complete the negative side of my indictment of his description of actually existing
liberalism.
To make the case that contemporary liberal democracies continually
promote tyranny and suffering abroad-even massive tyranny and suffering—
however, is not sufficient to compromise Rorty’s paraphrase of Churchill, to the
effect that the existing liberal democracies are the worst political setups imaginable,
with the exception of all the other candidates.
435
Defenders of these liberal
relevant remarks in: CP, pp. 37,74, 195, 196; CIS, pp. 54-5; and ORT, pp. 25, 62.
In the last citation, Rorty acknowledges that “...my holist view of inquiry suggests
that there are no politically neutral instruments to use for defending political
positions ”) In any case, he drops his preference for “more neutral” terms when it
comes to adopting such expressions as Soviet imperialism.
433.
) CIS, pp. 60-1.
434.
) CIS, p. xv.
435.
) Rorty, in Rajchman and West, p. 1 1
.
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democracies could always claim, as they have done, that any realizable alternative
to liberal democracy in its present form would result in even more tyranny and
suffering.
Rorty emphasizes that public criticism gams force by virtue of contrast-
effects. The effect may be achieved by comparing a past or present state of
affairs invidiously with another actual state of affairs, or a past or present state of
affairs invidiously with a particular utopian vision, or one utopia invidiously with
another. The case of Foucault may serve as a negative illustration of this point.
Rorty appreciates the late French author as an ironist theorist who is useful for
tracing the blind impresses our individual behavings bear. However, he dismisses
Foucault as a public thinker, in part because the author of Survei/ler et pumr was
unwilling or unable to offer an alternative vision to the pervasive disciplinary
regimes he described.
Acknowledging Rorty s challenge, then, 1 will make the case towards the
end of the first section of this chapter that it is possible to imagine a political setup
which would be more conducive to the aim of ameliorating pain than mere
preservation and piecemeal reform of existing liberal institutions and practices. In
the second section, 1 will argue that,pace Rorty, existing liberal democracies do not
contain the institutions necessary for improvement along these lines. If my account
is on the mark, it will cast a bad light on Rorty’s claim that existing liberal
democracies are conducive to the liberal ideal of ameliorating suffering.
436.) As, for example, Geras notes (Geras, p. 81 ).
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Liberalism and Suffering
It is, of course, all too easy to compile a long, long list of atrocities
committed by, for and in the name of liberalism. Basil Davidson, Noam Chomsky,
Eduardo Galeano and lots of other writers have described the emergence of the
liberal democracies as a long litany of slavery, pillage and genocide perpetrated in
Asia, Africa, the Americas and elsewhere. And even if we purge from these
accounts all depredations committed during the course of primitive accumulation
and high colonialism and concentrate only on the present and the recent past, the list
of horrors remains very lengthy indeed.
Rorty certainly does not emphasize the causal connections between these
depredations and the existing liberal democracies. But he does not dispute the
claim that genocide, pillage and slavery were conditions of actuality of liberalism as
it has come down to us today, either. 4 Nor does he provide any reason to doubt
that claim. Moreover, he acknowledges that liberal ideals of universal freedom and
equality continue to be betrayed in contemporary liberal democracies He is even
prepared to concede that they are constantly betrayed.
438
He also acknowledges from time to time that the same liberal democratic
governments that promote tolerance and liberty at home may promote tyranny
437.
) He acknowledges, for instance, that “the desire for gold on the part of
bigoted and fanatical sixteenth-century monarchs [...] in fact contributed to an
admirable result,” namely the United States of America (“Dewey between Hegel
and Darwin,” p. 65).
438.
) Correspondence with the author, dated August 29, 1995.
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abroad, and in fact have done so.™ Thus, he would not subscribe to the first
premise in the following simplistic but familiar argument
P] : Any political system which pursues a brutal and
exploitative foreign policy cannot be liberal;
F*2 : The U.S. political system is liberal;
Therefore, by Modus Tollens, etc.
Yet he remains unflinchingly committed to both liberalism and existing
liberal democracies. In view of these observations, the question arises: How can
Rorty remain a liberal, in Shklar's sense of the word as “one who believes that
cruelty is the worst thing we do, while remaining unflinchingly committed to the
institutions and practices of actually existing liberalism 9
Rorty avers a response to this question: In addition to the horrors they have
produced,
. . .the liberal societies of our century have produced more and more
people who are able to recognize the contingency of the vocabulary
in which they state their highest hopes—the contingency of their own
consciences-and yet have remained faithful to those consciences.
441
Such recognition, he adds on the same page, is the chief virtue of those who make
up a liberal public. Over the past two centuries, these people have created
institutions and practices--free presses, independent judiciaries, legal assemblies.
439.
) He admits, for example, that poverty in Latin America is “partially due to
the deals struck between local plutocracies and North American banks and
governments” (EH, p. 135). Also refer to “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 566.
440.
) CIS, p. 46.
441.) CIS, p. 46.
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representative political institutions, free universities and so on
442
~which have been
instrumental in successful campaigns to abolish such practices as chattel slavery,
child labor, direct colonial domination and racial segregation
To advocate the destruction or supersession of these liberal institutions and
practices would amount to condemning instruments which have proven to be
effective in mitigating cruelty and humiliation. Because the liberal institutions that
exist in some parts of the globe (preeminently in the countries that benefited most
from genocide, slavery and pillage in the past) are a means of ensuring that on-
going horrors will be ameliorated, their continued existence may be viewed as a
compensation for the horrors of the past. It may be small compensation in view of
the magnitude of those horrors, but it is compensation nevertheless.
This line of defense of liberalism comports with the following two
assumptions about liberal institutions:
(I) First, free presses, independent judiciaries, legal assemblies,
representative political institutions and so on are compatible with any of a number
of different political and economic setups. We can have these liberal institutions
without the horrors committed by, for and in their name. Furthermore, there is no
“deep link between capitalism and democracy” or other liberal institutions, nor for
that matter between “central economic planning and tyranny.”
443
(ii) And secondly, not only are liberal institutions useful as a means of
ameliorating these horrors, but they are the best means at hand for doing so.
Neither opponents of liberalism nor anyone else have provided an alternative to
extant liberal institutions that realistically could be expected to do a better job of
442.
) Refer, for example, to Rorty's list of liberal institutions in “Thugs and
Theorists,” p. 567.
443.




' Again: Liberalism may be an unattractive political
setup, but it is more attractive than any other candidate.
If these two assumptions stand, Rorty has produced a compelling defense of
actually existing liberalism against its detractors to his left. At best, “radical”
opposition to liberalism would appear to be a pointless exercise in ressentiment.
And at worst, it could under some circumstances come close to reckless
endangerment of fragile institutions than which nothing is more precious.
As one might have guessed from the discussion of socialism and
privatization in the previous chapter, assumption (i) appears to be well-taken. Even
if critics of liberalism succeed in showing the dependence of actually existing
liberalism on betrayal of liberal ideals, they have not succeeded in showing
countertactually that if this connection were broken liberal institutions could not be
sustained. The observation that ex-colonial powers such as Great Britain, the
Netherlands and France managed to retain their liberal institutions in the post-
colonial era might cast additional doubt on this.
With reference to the acknowledged evils of existing liberal democracies,
Rorty writes: “Whereas liberals think of these evils as eventually reformable,
radicals are concerned to show that they are somehow 'integral' to liberal
society .”
44
" If the radicals are right, removing these evils will require things being
changed utterly,
44 '’
including replacing rather than reforming some important
institutions in the liberal West, such as electoral systems that favor pro-capitalist
444.
) “The End of Leninism,” pp 16-17, note 15.
445.
) “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 568. Rorty uses the word radical to describe
persons who harbor no hope of improving actually-existing liberal democracies in a
piecemeal fashion.
446.
) “Movements and Campaigns,” p. 6.
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candidates and, of course, “the market economy’-that is, capitalism. 447 These are
the sorts of sweeping aims of what Rorty refers to as movements, in contrast to
campaigns focusing on piecemeal reform of specific institutions and practices
The radicals hold that, as Richard Berstein has put it.
There are forces and tendencies at work, (e g., class conflict, social
division, patriarchy, racism) that are compatible with liberal political
practices but nevertheless foster real inequality and limit effective
political freedom.
44 *
Rorty s likely response to this might be to agree with Berstein's claim, but to point
out that other forces and tendencies compatible with liberal practices are in place,
too—forces and tendencies such as those already noted, which foster equality and
expand political freedom.
For reasons already mentioned, this is a plausible response. Bernstein,
however, has raised the stakes: It is not merely that the institutions and practices of
actually existing liberalism are compatible with inequality and political unfreedom;
nor is it merely that the former are results at least in part of past horrors. Rather, the
former continue to foster inequality and unfreedom as a condition of their actuality.
As Bernstein has put it, “the structural dynamics of bourgeois society systematically
undermine and belie liberal ideals.”
449
With reference to the manner in which liberal ideals are betrayed, the
difference between Bernstein's adverb “systematically” and Rorty's “constantly” is
447.
) Rorty does not explicitly claim that capitalism is a necessary condition for
liberalism. As we will see, however, he has come to advise against the attempt to
replace it with something else.
448.
) Berstein, p. 553.
449.) Berstein, p. 552.
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pivotal. Bernstein's adverb implies a logical, transcendental or causal relationship
ot some sort, whereas Rorty's need imply little more than frequent occurrence.
Rorty evidently takes the adverb “systematically" to designate a relationship
of final causality or transcendental conditionality. He might well view the
“structural dynamics" allegedly responsible for the systematicity of the betrayal as
synonymous with “essence," and as yet another example of the spurious discovery
by theoreticians of “underlying structures"
4 -"
or “something deep down," a taproot
to be eradicated. Rorty is likely to dismiss the notion of any “dynamics of
bourgeois society" as yet another “large theoretical construct" purporting to unmask
what is really going on, a construct ot the sort that Ideologiekritik is alleged to
provide.
451
By inveighing against exploitation, class conflict and imperialism as
examples of “deep processes" which theoreticians like to invoke, but which
allegedly make no discernible difference to the conduct of public affairs, he thereby
preempts consideration of the hypothesis that there is a causal connection between
exploitation or imperialism on the one hand and actually existing liberalism on the
other. This makes it easier for him to acknowledge that “liberal ideals of universal
freedom and equality are constantly betrayed in bourgeois capitalist societies,” as
Bernstein put it, while ignoring the question (which David Hall notes Rorty never
raises) whether his goals of social justice and amelioration of suffering are at all
likely to be attained under capitalism.
4^ Rorty can lament the shortsightedness of
high office-holders in the rich North Atlantic and the greed of middle-class
450.
) Rorty, in Rajchman and West, p. 5.
451.
) “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 568-70.
452.) Hall, p. 47.
suburbanites, while never raising the question whether his utopian hope for
capitalism with a human face is anything more than a will-o'-the-wisp
For Rorty the historical nominalist, each individual instance of betrayal of
liberal ideals has (efficient) causes. It is the task of the social engineer and the
piecemeal reformer to identify these causes on a case-by-case basis and to eliminate
or modify them one by one.
4 "' An independent judiciary, a free press, free
universities and other liberal institutions play a crucial role in the performance of
this task. In this way, liberal institutions gradually mitigate the betrayal of liberal
ideals.
These considerations, even stated as sketchily as they are here, bolster the
second assumption mentioned above, that liberal institutions are the best means at
hand for ameliorating the horrors committed by and for actual liberal regimes. If
this assumption stands, it serves as a strong support for Rorty’s claim that “Nothing
is more important than the preservation of these liberal institutions.”
454
There is a parallel here between the institutions and practices of liberalism
on the one hand and “technology,” on the other. In response to a correspondent's
453. ) Similarly, a well-known anti-”histoncist” writer has contrasted “piecemeal
social engineering” to “Utopian social engineering,” explaining that,
The piecemeal engineer will, accordingly, adopt the method of
searching for and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils
of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for its greatest
ultimate good. (Popper 1963, p. 158.)
It is perhaps a measure of the fatuousness of this formulation to note that some of
the most sweeping movements of the Twentieth Century-movements of which both
Popper and Rorty presumably would disapprove—have been preeminently struggles
against great and urgent evils, whether they be wars of aggression, the denial of land
to the tillers, foreign occupation or massive poverty exacerbated by IMF
conditionalities.
454.) “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 567 (Rorty's emphasis).
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observation that “much of the poverty of the third world is caused by the West,”455
Rorty impertinently writes: “My hunch is that more Western science and
technology is about the only thing that can cope with the results of prior Western
science and technology.”
4 "''
Only more modem “technology,” not less, will remedy
environmental pollution, diminishing resources, toxic waste disposal and other evils
regularly laid at the door of the rich north Atlantic democracies.
Rorty acknowledges that liberal institutions often function as tools of local
oligarchs. Nevertheless, he claims, if the conditions of actuality of liberalism have
so far undermined and belied liberal ideals, then these conditions can and should be
identified one by one, and either reformed or replaced. This replacement, however,
need not and should not involve the rejection or abandonment of liberal institutions
already in place. As Rorty puts it, “. . .the principal institutions of contemporary
democratic societies do not require
1
unmasking’ but rather strenuous utilization,
supplemented by luck.”
4 '’ 7
Unfortunately, liberal institutions are prey to a number of dangers, including
the dangers of bureaucratization Weber discussed in Wirtschafl und Gesellschaft,
Part III. In addition, in times of sweeping social change liberal institutions have
455.
) Balslev, p. 68, quoting Roger Garaudy.
456.
) Rorty, in Balslev, p. 78 Rorty's techno-panacean views chime with GATT
maneuvers to tie access to the latest technologies to the production of “favorable
investment climates” in the South He hardly dispels this impression with such
revealingly confused remarks as:
The reliance on Marxism on the part of the people trying to
overthrow Third World oligarchies seems to me potentially as
dangerous as their grandparents' reliance on the United Fruit
Company or Anaconda Copper. (“Thugs and Theorists,” p. 577, note
18.)
457.
) “Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy,” p. 2 1
.
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been among the first things to be swept away. Liberal institutions and practices
have been easy targets for demagogues, who in times of crisis have focused on cases
of abuse and inefficiency to transform these institutions and practices into targets of
popular discontent. By inhibiting their operation, demagogues thereby have
removed obstacles to their own unchecked authoritarian rule.
These observations only underscore the preciousness of these “fragile,
flawed institutions.’ Their fragility and preciousness only make it more imperative
to take care to preserve them. Thus, nothing prohibits Rorty from recognizing that,
like the public/pnvate split, liberal institutions also are fortuitous accidents of time
and chance, while at the same time he holds that nothing is more worthy of our
unflinching allegiance.
Without wishing to dispute Rorty's characterization of liberal institutions as
precious, I believe nevertheless that Judith Shklar’s liberal could plausibly deny his
unqualified assertion that nothing is more important than their preservation. In the
course of making this point in the balance of this chapter, 1 will assume that no
institution, liberal or otherwise, should be viewed in isolation from its larger social
context. In order to evaluate whether or not contemporary liberal institutions in fact
do ameliorate suffering, we should take special care to examine the larger context
of state power and global capitalism.
The Solemn Complement of Liberal Ideals
Another reason Rorty cannot accommodate the suggestion that liberal
institutions be recast within the context of working class state power is that, as he
has made clear in more recent wntings, he is committed not merely to the several
liberal institutions mentioned above, but also to “the institutions of large market
economies.” In this, he is once again backing away from Dewey’s New Liberalism
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to a position closer to that of the English classical liberals who associated liberty
with laissez-faire economic policies.
Thus, Rorty at least tacitly recognizes that “large market economies”~that
is, capitalism in its contemporary monopoly form-constitute the “economic
determinants” of liberal democracies. The North Atlantic has achieved its measure
of decency and equality, he claims, by relying on “a free market in capital and on
compromises between pressure groups.”
458
Although Rorty sidesteps questions about exploitation, class domination and
managerial despotism at the work site, he does identify other drawbacks of
capitalism. Capitalism, notably, breeds greed and inequality. Rorty has found no
better way to mitigate the greed and inequality that capitalism spawns than liberal
institutions and the welfare state, together with good will and the patience to
muddle through campaigns for piecemeal reform.
As luck would have it, the liberal democracies themselves have produced
decent public citizens with the requisite patience, toleration and good will.
459
The
allegedly greater ability of members of liberal democracies to enlarge their
conception of “us is itself the result of institutions internal to liberal democracies.
The greater freedom and decreased pain for which liberal institutions and practices
may take credit compensates for the greed and inequality they spawn, as well as the
constraints Foucault associated with them .
460
Indeed, the existence of these
458.
) EH, p. 1 80. These views are consistent with a pluralist approach to political
sociology, represented by, say, Arnold Rose, Seymore Martin Lipset or Robert Dahl.
According to pluralist theory, the state arbitrates the interests of a multitude of
competing pressure groups which vie for limited resources on a more-or-less level
playing field. C. Wright Mills, Grant McConnell, William Domhoff and Michael
Parenti have raised serious objections to pluralist theory.
459.
) ORT, p. 213.
460.) CIS, p. 63.
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institutions is reason enough to hope that the rich North Atlantic democracies may
prefigure the utopian world community envisaged by the charter of the United
Nations and the Helsinki Declaration of Human Rights.”461
Lamentably, bourgeois capitalist society is “irrelevant to most of the
problems for most of the population of the planet.”
462
Rorty decries
...the impossibility of feeding countries like Haiti and Chad except by
massive chanty which the nch nations are too selfish to provide, and
the unbreakable gnp ot the rich or the military on the governments of
most of the Third World.
463
Continuing in this vein, he invokes Robert Kaplan’s “memorable” image of “people
like ourselves-middle-class Amencan and European readers of magazines like
[Dissent]" riding in “.. .a stretch limousine, making its way through a mob of ragged
and desperate people moving in the opposite direction.” “Kaplan’s way of
describing our situation,” Rorty goes on to explain,
...amounts to saying that while Europe and America have been
worrying about how to go forward from capitalism, a lot of the rest
of the world has been hoping to advance to feudalism.”
464
With a bit of nominalism at this point, one might conclude that there are
plenty of ragged and desperate people in Europe and America, too. Surely it is
significant, moreover, that among the most ragged and desperate people outside of
Europe and America are those subjected not to some pre-feudal regime, but to
Europe and America’s neo-colonial surrogates, I M F. conditionalities and super-
461.
) “Relativism: Finding and Making,” p. 26.
462.




) “Movements and Campaigns,” p. 4.
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exploiting megalopolies. Kaplan's image, conjuring up as it does a homogeneously
affluent “us” and a homogeneously ragged and desperate “other,” does little to
advance Rorty's professed aim to de-essentialize the West, “to break up the
lump.”
465
Rorty's (rather selective) disparagement of those who, he says, are constantly




together with Kaplan's image of limousines and ragged mobs
passing each other in opposite directions, complement the claim that bourgeois
capitalism is irrelevant to most of the globe. It would be easy to challenge this
view, of course. One might point out, for example, that the I.M.F., GATT, the
World Bank and the World Trade Organization--G-7 -dominated institutions which
advertise themselves as advancing the ideals of liberal democracy-explicitly have
planetary projects” of their own. These projects, under which top executive
officers of the largest oligopolies and strategic planners in the leading capitalist
centers most assuredly subsume their hopes,
467
include centralized economic
planning on a global scale.
46
* Rorty’s insouciance on this point has prompted one
465.
) Rorty, in Balslev, p. 90.
466.
) EH, p. 182.
467.
) Cf. “The End of Leninism,” p. 9.
468.
) And, to a large and increasing degree, centrally planned domestic
economies, too. After taking care to distinguish his centralized private sector
planning model from the Soviet-style centralized public sector planning model,
Munkirs claims that fifty-five to sixty percent of the U.S. economy is centrally
planned and controlled, with administered prices (Munkirs). Munkirs’ thesis that
the richest economies in the West are characterized by centralized private sector
planning may be simplistic, largely ignoring as it does the inextricable
interconnectedness of corporate and state institutions; nevertheless, it casts serious
doubt on the supposed lesson of 1989 that “...complex societies cannot reproduce
themselves, if they do not leave intact the logic of self-regulation of a market
economy” (“The End of Leninism,” p. 6).
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commentator to score his "skepticism concerning 'metanarratives' that disavows the
movement of world spirit but that seems willfully ignorant of the movement of
world capital.”
469
These considerations notwithstanding, and inadequate “foreign assistance”
aside, Rorty praises the liberal West for its readiness to embrace an ever-more-
mclusive conception ot community. By his lights, “...contemporary democratic
societies are already organized around the need for continual exposure of suffering
and injustice.”
47 ' 1
As he explains it,
the liberal culture of recent times has found a strategy for avoiding
the disadvantage ot ethnocentrism. This is to be open to encounters
with actual and possible cultures, and to make this openness central
to its self-image.
By fostering an ever-broader recognition of suffering and injustice, liberal
institutions make possible the sort of dialogue with foreigners that helps extend
469.
) Martin, pp. 65-6.
470.
) EH, p. 25; “Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy,” p. 21. A
number of commentators might have had this sort of claim in mind when they have
scored Rorty s political naivete (Comay, p. 126; Burrows, in Malachowski, p. 324,
and Haber, p. 66).
471
.
) ORT, p. 2. Edward Said, by contrast, has observed that the amazing thing
about the fact that the United States “...continues to try to dictate its views about
law and peace all over the world,”
...is not that it is attempted, but that it is done with so much
consensus and near unanimity in a public sphere constructed as a
kind of cultural space expressly to represent and explain it. (Said, p
286.)
Rorty does not disrupt this consensus (refer, for example to: “Thugs or Theorists,”
“The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy” (in Malachowski), “The End of
Leninism,” much of EH and the papers in Part III of CIS). Even when directly
challenged by Balsev, Bernstein and others to take measure of the demonstrable
connection between the domestic political stability of the liberal democracies and
the brutality they engender abroad, he has demurred.
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solidarity beyond the borders of existing liberal democracies. 472 This ever-more-
mclusive conception of a public “we" increases with education, just as the number
of communities with which an inhabitant of a nch North Atlantic democracy may
identify increases with civilization.
477
Unfortunately, liberal intellectuals do not always exemplify Rorty’s
professed concern to make sure that one’s fellow citizens notice suffering when it
occurs.
474
Referring to his colleagues in university humanities departments, Edward
Said has written that
There is, I believe, a quite serious split in our critical consciousness
today, which allows us to spend a great deal of time elaborating
Carlyle and Ruskin s aesthetic theories, for example, without giving
attention to the authority that their ideas simultaneously bestowed on
the subjugation of inferior peoples and colonial territories.
475
Rorty has enjoined us to stop worrying about “which theorists to pair off
with which thugs."
476
When it comes to the Suslov’s of the Cold War East,
however, he appears willing to accept that some theorists are thugs, not merely
contingently
,
in the manner perhaps of Eleidegger at the University of Heidelberg,
but in their very capacity as theorists.
477
It should be noted, however, that if we
substitute “moral and political" for “aesthetic" in the passage just cited, Said's
472.
) It is not clear why “conversation with foreigners" should exclude conquest
of them, as Rorty appears to assume (ORT, p. 25). Refer to relevant remarks in
Comay, p. 129.
473.
) ORT, pp. 200-1.
474.
) CIS, p. 93.
475.
) Said, p. 12.
476.
) “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 574.
477.
) “Thugs and Theorists," p. 576, note 13.
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observation applies equally well to Carlyle and Ruskin’s contemporary, J.S. Mill and
Mill’s admirer, Isaiah Berlin. According to Berlin, the younger Mill opposed the
dissolution of the East India Company because “...he feared the dead hand of
Government more than the paternalist and not inhumane rule of the Company’s
officials.
,478
It should be noted that a number of writers have presented a rather
different picture of East India Company rule.
47
" If the latter writers are even close
to the mark, Berlin and Rorty have spent time elaborating Mill and Berlin's political
views while overlooking the authority that their ideas simultaneously have bestowed
on the subjugation of inferior peoples and colonial territories.
480
This is not exactly
a resounding testimony in favor of Rorty’s views on the salutary effects of liberal
democracy when it comes to recognizing suffering. 481
478.
) Berlin, p. 180.
479.
) Refer, for example, to Mukherjee, especially pp. 299-392, and Keay.
480.
) As Rorty recognizes with reference to Jefferson (Geras, p. 97), other liberal
luminaries have bestowed authority on the subjugation of inferior peoples closer to
home. Similar criticisms could be leveled against some of Rorty’s more
contemporary liberal luminaries. To cite one instance from a multitude that rush to
mind, the same Sidney Hook who Rorty praises for having “kept political morality
alive among the intellectuals” during the Depression (CP, p. 63 ) lent his authority
not only to a U S. war against Vietnam that claimed over two million dead but also
to the persecution of “conspirators” in academia during the McCarthy years
(Novack, p. 276). In this and other respects Hook compares unfavorably to his
mentor, Dewey, who in the immediate post-War years opposed the exclusion of so-
called subversives from public teaching positions.
481
.
) Surely it is relevant also to point out the role one leading liberal democracy
played in helping to whitewash one of the greatest planned holocausts in recorded
history, measured in absolute numbers of victims. In consideration of their
usefulness in the War against Communism, U.S. officials and more than one
administration for decades protected from prosecution high-ranking Japanese
military and political leaders, up to and including Emperor Hirohito himself. These
leaders were responsible for the deaths of over thirty million people in China
between the years 1931 and 1945. (Cf. Hams. 1 wish to thank Mr. Kuo-Hou
Chang, of the Alliance for Preserving the Truth of the Sino-Japanese War, and Ms.
Iris Chang for helping me to identify English-language sources dealing with these
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More seriously, however, this example highlights a problem with Rorty's




This problem has less to do with its alleged thinness or thickness
than with its broadness or narrowness.
In one respect, Rorty's notion of community is too broad: As we have
already noted with reference to class divisions within the North Atlantic
democracies, he runs roughshod over existing conflicts, predatory relationships and
political domination within the formations he defines as communities. He assumes
not only that the diverse impulses which animate the liberal democracies can be
harmonized into common purposes, but that they can be identified as “our European
purposes.”
483
Noting this, Fraser asks why we should assume, as Rorty does, “a quasi-
Durkheimian view according to which society is integrated by way of a single
monolithic and all-encompassing solidarity?” Why, she asks, should we not assume
instead “a quasi-Marxian view according to which modem capitalist societies
contain a plurality of overlapping and competing solidarities?”
484
As a good
pluralist, of course, Rorty would agree that the liberal democracies contain a
plurality of overlapping and competing solidarities. Clearly, however, Fraser is
referring to competing solidarities which are distinguishable on the basis of a
events. It took five decades and a shift in U.S. policy towards China for these
sources to become readily accessible to scholars in the U.S.) This case alone casts
serious doubt on Rorty's claim that “...contemporary democratic societies are
already organized around the need for continual exposure of suffering and
injustice” (EH, p. 25).
482.
) CIS, p. 60.
483.
) Rorty’s formulation is quoted in Connolly, p. 129.
484.
) Fraser, in Malachowski, p. 308.
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predatory relationship, such as that between exploiter and exploited or perpetrator
of violence and target of violence.
Perhaps the most obvious response to Fraser's question is tied up with
Rorty's “we’s,” discussed above. The reason “we” should not assume Fraser’s
“quasi-Marxist view” is that it makes it more difficult to mount apologetics for
bourgeois liberal democracy. As Edward Said has noted, with reference to the all-
important “we,”
...this pronoun, almost more than any other word, fortifies the
somewhat illusory sense that all Americans, as co-owners of the
public space, participate in the decisions to commit America to its
far-flung foreign interventions.
48:1
In another respect, Rorty’s notion of community is too narrow: Communities
in the rich North Atlantic which establish ties of solidarity abroad have not always
done so by first expanding their sense of solidarity to all or even most of their
fellow citizens. Often, a community will demonstrate greater solidarity with
“foreigners” and groups abroad than with their fellow citizens.
486
This is not just a
matter of small solidarity groups within the rich North Atlantic joining hands with
the wretched of the Earth, in opposition to “our European purposes.” More
consequential contemporary scenarios include corporate officers and top
managements of G-7 -based transnational corporations joining with their brokers in
the South to move production facilities to cheaper labor markets, and foreign policy
officers in the North collaborating with their counterparts in the South to create
“favorable climates for investment” that result in higher unemployment and lower
485.
) Said, p. 293.
486.
) Refer also to the interesting discussion in Part One of Geras, with reference
to “the righteous of the nations” who opposed Nazi atrocities against “foreigners” in
central and eastern Europe.
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wages in the North and deeper burdens of debt, poverty and pollution in the South
This example might suffice to indicate that Roily's "quasi-Durkheimian view" is not
well-suited for descnbing the reality of global, transnational capitalist class
solidarity at the close of the American Century.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty noted that “It is not just a question of knowing what
the liberals have in mind but what in reality is done by the liberal state within and
beyond its frontiers/’
4 ' 7
Rorty the pragmatist might well have endorsed Merleau-
Ponty's statement if the words “Marxists” and “socialist” were substituted for
“liberals” and “liberal.” As one critic has noted, however, when it comes to
evaluating liberalism, Rorty
...tends to downplay what has become a major problem for liberals,
viz. “the disparity between the ‘ideals’ of liberty and equality that
liberals profess and the actual state of affairs in so-called liberal
societies."
48'
As we have already noted, Rorty concedes that the existing liberal
democracies constantly fall short of their ideals. One important reason for this is
that, unfortunately, as he writes in a paper published in the waning years of
Gorbachev's tenure,
...the social democratic scenario of steady reform along increasingly
egalitarian lines [...] has been stalled for decades, largely because the
political right within the First World (made up of the people who
have no interest in increasing equality) diverted public attention,
money, and energy to combating Soviet imperialism.
4' ;
487.
) Merleau-Ponty, p. xiv.
488.
) Bhaskar 1991, p. 104. The passage quoted within the citation is from
Bernstein, p. 552.
489.
) “Thugs and Theorists,” pp. 565-6.
164
"Soviet imperialism,” Rorty hastens to add. “is indeed a threat."
490
If this account is at all in the ballpark, then with the disappearance of this
threat, and all other things being equal, one would have expected to see
moderates or "the political center” within the victorious First World seize the
initiative: One would have expected at minimum to see signs of the resurrection of
Rort> s social democratic scenario, ot the expansion of the welfare state. In view of
the enormous military buildup in the 1980s, for example, one might have expected
in the post-Cold War era to have seen deep cuts in military spending, and perhaps
the reallocation of tax revenue from “defense" to education, health care,
environmental protection and so on. One would have expected at least to have seen
some sort of more or less substantial “peace dividend.” One certainly would not
have expected hundred-billion-dollar contracts for a new generation of weapons
systems, even greater spending on the CIA, cuts in non-military “foreign aid” and
the sweeping dismantlement of domestic social programs in the United States, as
well as England, Italy, France and other leading liberal democracies.
What we have witnessed in the wake of the Cold War, of course, is not a
decrease but an increase of inequalities of wealth and opportunity within the U.S.
and other liberal democracies, along with exacerbated inequalities between North
and South. These developments, moreover, have taken place despite propitious
circumstances for Rorty's social democratic scenario, including a liberal democratic
490.) Rorty has decried “graduates of Patrice Lumumba University [now defunct—
MM]” who, he fears, are likely to head up “ruthless oligarchies” in the Third World
(“Thugs and Theorists," p. 566). As far as I am aware, however, he has never gone
on record to discommend the School of the Americas, located just down the road
from Charlottesville, Virginia. In the name of the democracy and freedom Rorty so
regularly invokes, and with his tax money, this institution has so far graduated some
50,000 alumni, among whom may be counted some of the most prodigiously
murderous tyrants since Cortez and de Soto.
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administration in Washington D C., quiescent leaders in the South and an abjectly
subservient regime in Moscow.
It should be stressed that these trends do not appear to have been caused
because the institutions ofliberal democracy are fragile or vulnerable. On the
contrary, liberal democracy has been least amenable to self-improvement along the
lines Rorty suggests
4 " and has diverged most sharply from Rorty's liberal ideals
precisely when it has found itself without threats from either the Evil Empire or the
Militant Tendency.
It might strike one as strange that, at a time of almost undisputed U.S.
world leadership,’ hundred-billion-dollar weapons systems and far-flung military
interventions on four continents, Rorty has lamented “the postwar failure of
American nerve and “...the loss of America's hope to lead the nations.”492 It has
long been conceded even by observers in the West that the prospect of Soviet
retaliation served to chasten U.S. leaders when it came to decisions whether or not
to launch nuclear strikes against Korea, China and North Vietnam. And it is hardly
less controversial that the fear of expanding Soviet influence spurred the Marshall
Plan and a host of other ambitious foreign aid projects in Asia, the Middle East and
Latin America and helped to accelerate the post-War decolonization of Africa and
much of Asia.
Turning to the domestic scene, a convincing case could be made that some
of the most important initiatives benefiting the most disadvantaged within the
liberal democracies themselves were at least in large part responses to the threat of
militancy on the home front as well as fear of the expanding influence of
Bolshevism. These initiatives included the New Deal, social security, corporate
491.) CIS, p. 63.
492.) ORT,p. 77.
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income tax, publicly-funded liberal higher education, civil rights legislation, the
reveal mgly-ent,tied National Security Education
495
and National Security Highway
Acts, affirmative action and so on.
Rorty has written that
We should concede Francis Fukayama's point [...] that if you still
long tor total revolution, for the Radically Other on a world-
historical scale, the events of 1989 show that you are out of luck
Fukayama suggested, and I should agree, that no more romantic
prospect stretches before the left than an attempt to create bourgeois
democratic welfare states, and to equalize life-chances among the
citizens of those states by redistributing the surplus produced by
market economies. J
Leaving romance aside, events since 1989 have shown that, if you still long
for capitalism with a human face,” you would appear to be out of luck, too. It
would appear that the “social democratic scenario” has to a large extent consisted
not of self-reforming liberal institutions but of forced concessions in the face of
resolute foreign and domestic opposition. This appearance is fortified by the
observation that, Rorty and Sidney Hook’s assumptions notwithstanding, as the
perceived threat to capitalism has disappeared in the final years of the American
Century, so have the liberal concessions.
4 ^
There is strong empirical evidence, then, to doubt Rorty's claim that
...contemporary liberal society already contains the institutions for its own
493.
) It will be recalled that Dewey ascribed salary hikes for high-school and
college instructors after the Great War to “a fear that poorly paid ‘intellectuals’
would be attracted toward Bolshevism” (“What is the Matter with Teaching?” in
Dewey 1984, p. 1 17).
494.
) “The End of Leninism," pp. 1-2. A more consistent nominalist might have
described the social surplus as having been produced by workers rather than
“market economies.”
495.) Refer to relevant remarks in Steel.
167
improvement.”496 Indeed, if the lessons of the past are any guide, the case could be
made that the best hope for the resurrection of the so-called welfare-state in the rich
North Atlantic is the renewed threat of popular insurrection at home or abroad
Of course, these observations, taken singly or in combination, do not prove
that existing liberal democracies systematically undermine and belie liberal ideals.
If this claim is to be corroborated, then the burden of proof still lies with the critics
of liberalism. They must identify the dynamics that belie liberal ideals, explain how
they work and argue that they make a big difference. Moreover, by the very nature
of the question, they must do this on a case-by-case basis, building up enough of a
body of evidence to justify a generalization about bourgeois society as a whole. If
they fail to do this, then we are justified, at most, in withholding judgment.
It may not be an easy task to meet this burden of proof. But it is not
necessarily a transcendental task, either. Surely it is possible to determine-in a
first-order, non-transcendental sense of the verb—whether or not, say, capitalist class
rule, or imperialism are compatible with liberal political practices but nevertheless
foster inequality and cruelty and limit effective political freedom. Rorty's public
vocabulary may not be particularly well-suited to this task. 497 Fortunately,
however, alternative vocabularies are available, and at least one of these alternative
vocabularies, namely the one introduced in Chapter Two, does not involve
specifying transcendental conditions of anything at all.
496.
) CIS, p. 63.
497.
) It would require a clock shop full of epicycles to pretend that, say, the forty
cases of CIA subversion of democracy which William Blum examines in his book
Killing Hope were merely the result of moral failure or shortsightedness on the part
of “greedy” individuals who, as a matter of merely contingent fact, just happen time
and again to have ensconced themselves in high office.
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Describing the international scene in this vocabulary, it becomes apparent
that massive violence and exploitation have constituted not only causal conditions
for the appearance of liberal democracy, but conditions of its on-going actuality
Merleau-Ponty’s observation continues to be as poignant in the final years of the
American Century as it was in 1947:
Judging from history and by everyday events, liberal ideals belonu to
a system of violence which, as Marx said, are the “spiritual point'




We have already granted that, at least to some extent and in some cases,
liberal institutions have as a matter of fact mitigated the on-going depredations
committed by, for or in the name of liberalism. Nevertheless, in view of the sheer
scale, persistence and frequency of these depredations, it should not be surprising
that some parties—especially the targets and victims themselves—have come to
suspect that there must be more efficacious means of ameliorating suffering than
existing institutions of liberal democracy alone.
Rorty, however, claims that neither the “radical” opponents of liberalism nor
anyone else has offered a workable alternative to liberalism that would be better at
ameliorating pain and making the scene safe for strong poets. For one thing, few of
these left-wing opponents except the Marxists among them have registered any
notable success in so much as even tabling a sustainable program for sweeping
social change in the twentieth century. Moreover, the alleged attempt of Marxists to
abolish private property—a proposal that Rorty describes as “just about the only
498.) Merleau-Ponty, pp. xiii-xiv. He cites passages from Marx's Introduction to
Contribution to the Critique ofHegel's Philosophy of Right
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constructive suggestion Marx made”JW~did not work. This record of failure has
lead him to conclude that,
Though 1 was brought up to be a socialist, I no longer want to
nationalize the means of production (because the experience of
Central and Eastern Europe suggests that nationalization is, to put it
mildly, no help in redistributing wealth and power). 1 suspect we are
stuck with market economies-which means with private nroDertv-
for the foreseeable future.
500
On those occasions when Rorty acknowledges that the word “socialism’' has
a use-and as we have seen, he sometimes advocates abandoning the term-he uses it499.
) “Review of Spectres ofMarx,” p. 8. Rorty ’s claim just cited underscores
what some commentators have observed, namely, that he does not display much
familiarity with Marxist literature (Fraser, in Malachowski, p. 320, note 5; Bhaskar
1991, p. ix). This should have been apparent long before his unapologetic
admission of the fact (“Review of Spectres ofMarx,” p. 2). Fie has confirmed this
impression, for example, when he has written that “Nobody [on The left’] bothers to
criticize the Tdeology’ of communist countries” (“Thugs and Theorists,” p. 576.
note 13), or when he poses what he apparently takes to be the rhetorical question:
“Has the left any positive suggestions about some actions for the American
government to take, or some middle-range policy goals9” (“Thugs and Theorists,” p.
577, note 1 5), or when he blithely states:
Dissent remains pretty much the only leftist organ in the U.S. which
is more concerned with spelling out tactics for fighting injustice than
with maneuvering for strategic position in intellectual or political
circles. (“Movements and Campaigns,” p. 8.)
500.
) Rorty, in Balslev, p. 89. With reference to Rorty’s upbringing as “a
socialist,' it is interesting to note that his maternal grandfather, the social gospel
advocate Walter Rauschenbusch, is one of the “six liberals” to whom Rorty
dedicated CIS (Rajchman and West, p. 274, note 14). Another person to whom the
book was dedicated, namely his father James, reportedly had been active with
Sidney Hook in “Communist front organizations” until they publicly broke with the
Communists in 1 933, two years after the younger Rorty was bom (Klepp, p. 1 1 7).
With reference to an instance of James Rorty’s subsequent political writing, refer to
Geras, p. 43.
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to mean someth,ng like “attempts to foster institutions conduce to liberal aims.’’5'"
He contrasts this to what he (perhaps under the influence of Kolakowski) apparently
takes to be a Marxist use of the word, to designate “nationalization of industry" or
abolition of private property.
502
Rorty prefers Alan Ryan's suggestion that the best we can hope for is
,
.
a kind of welfare-capitahsm-with-a-human-face, not easy to
tstingmsh from a ’socialism’ with a big role for private capital and
individual entrepreneurs.
503 F
It is worth noting, however, that the two “isms” which Ryan’s hope invokes
would not be hard to distinguish if one were to define socialism as state power of
workers rather than capitalists. As we have seen, however, Rorty does not wish to
draw sharp distinctions along class lines or to emphasize political domination. To
do so would clash with his Deweyan vision of the Great Community as a voluntary
association of publics united by shared interests. It might even raise the question of
the legitimacy of capitalist class rule in the rich North Atlantic. As we have seen,
however, Rorty associates sweeping schemes for reordering the political landscape
with, at best, pointless ressentiment. He expresses the hope that our successors in
50 1
.
) Review ol Spectres of Kiarxf p. 8. It is worth noting that the experience of
the Nineties has, to put it mildly, cast suspicion on Rorty's suspicion about
nationalization and redistribution of wealth: At the date of this writing, one would
be hard pressed to cite even one case in Eastern Europe or the ex-Soviet Union in
which Je-nationalization ol the means of production has not coincided with ever-
wider disparities of wealth and deeper poverty for the majority.
502.
) “Review of Spectres ofMarx,” p 8. Dewey, also, has critiqued the demand
that ‘industry should be taken out of private hands” and should pass into the hands
of “the public” (Dewey 1984, p. 286).
503.
) “The End of Leninism,” p. 1 . Rorty is quoting Alan Ryan, from his article,
“Socialism for the Nineties,” in Dissent (Fall 1990), p. 442.
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the next century will agree that “...history is an endless network of changing
relationships, without any great big climactic rupture or peripit.es.”504
Rorty gives the impression that, by dismissing the Marxist competition, he
has dispensed with all programs for abrupt, sweeping change that need to be taken
seriously. Foucault, who is sometimes described as an anarchist, offers little or
nothing in the way of an alternative to liberalism. Various brands of “progressive
nationalism " have either felicitously resolved themselves into liberalism (as in, say,
India, the Philippines or Tanzania) or-more typical ly-have been commandeered by
thugs (or both, as in, say, Mexico, Algeria or Egypt), Unger might represent a more
attractive option, but he is working within the liberal tradition.
Whether or not Rorty is right on this point, there is reason to believe that he
has not in fact dispatched Marxism in at least one of its forms. In addition to the
abolition of private ownership of the means of production, of course, Marx made at
least one other suggestion which many people have considered to be constructive:
From the Communist Manifesto { 1848) to the Critique ofthe Gotha Program
( 1 875), he insisted that the first step in working class revolution is “...to raise the
proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy.”505
With this in mind, an obvious response to Rorty's defense of liberal
institutions could be: All right, let us accept that the many betrayals of liberal ideals
are only contingently related to such institutions and practices as an uncensored
press, free universities, an independent judiciary and so on. And let us assume,
furthermore, that these institutions and practices are effective instruments for
ameliorating suffering. Let us have them, then-but let us have them within the
context of working-class state power, instead of corporate capitalist rule.
504.
) “Movements and Campaigns,” p. 1 1
.
505.
) Communist Manifesto , in McLellan, p. 237.
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Since workers far outnumber capitalists in the “rich North Atlantic
democracies;' this would appear to be a recommendation for a more democratic
set-up than exists even under the most liberal capitalist regimes. It also comports
with a long-standing Marxist emphasis on democracy and republicanism as the most
appropriate forms of political rule under the dictatorship of the proletariat
If indeed liberal institutions are not a priori incompatible with non-capitalist
alternatives, then it is natural to ask why such institutions could not be combined
with, say, working class state power or armed defiance of U.S. military domination.
In a paper published in 1 987, Rorty came as close as he has ever come to posing this
question:
There is one question I wish Marxists would discuss more than they
do. Why can we not yet point with pride to a noncapitalist
democracy?
506
Without pausing for a response from Guatemalans, Chileans or Nicaraguans, he
immediately adds, apparently with a straight face:
Is the only answer that you cannot, in the present situation, be a
Marxist government without becoming a client of Moscow, and that
Moscow will not let its clients encourage a free press, free
universities, and so on 9 Does this entirely explain the absence of
such institutions in, for example, Cuba9
Escalating U.S. aggression against the Republic of Cuba in the post-Soviet
era suggests a rather different answer to these questions: U.S. leaders and their
agencies have resorted to sponsorship of massive terrorism, unilateral acts of war
and economic blackmail—frequently in violation of international law and numerous
agreements of which the U.S. is itself a signatory--to destabilize dozens of countries
and impoverish their people precisely in order to foment political instability.
506.) “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 576, note 7.
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thereby obstruct,ng the development of “a free press, free universities and so on .”
50
For three decades, until pliant leaders in Moscow bowed to Washington's demands
that Russia abrogate mutually-beneficial trade agreements with Cuba, Washington
has viewed socialism in Cuba not as a failure but as an alarm,ngly workable
example to others. When it has come to health care, nutrition, literacy,
occupational safety, worker self-management and other important components of
social welfare, Cuba has demonstrated its clear superiority over the so-called
democratic regimes Uncle Sam has foisted onto people elsewhere in Latin America
and the Caribbean. Moreover, as Uncle Sam's eventually successful campaign of
enforced impoverishment of the island reminds us, Cuba's thirty-year record of
achievement was won in the face of vicious and unrelenting foreign aggression
Rorty has written that
Only if one refuses to divide the public from the private realm will
one dream of a society which has “gone beyond mere social
democracy,” or dream of “total revolution.”
508
The foregoing discussion, by contrast, should at the very least have indicated that
one can indeed imagine going beyond social democracy, while also retaining the
liberal institutions that Rorty is concerned to preserve. Of course, this goaf if
achieved, is bound to fall short of what Bernard Yack has dubbed “total
507.) Sometimes this aim has been surprisingly explicit. For example, Edward
Rorry, the Eennedy-liberal U.S. ambassador to Chile during the Umdad Popular
years, stated that the U.S. would
...do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to
utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to
come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in
Chile. (Quoted in Chomsky, p. 395.)




Nevertheless, if achieved, it might involve sweeping and perhaps
convulsive social change, including perhaps the overthrow of one or another
existing liberal regime, or the dismantlement of some of the existing liberal
institutions than which, according to Rorty, nothing is more precious
* * *
In Chapter One we saw that Rorty envisions a liberal utopia which serves the
highest purposes oftwo paradigmatic figures, the strong poet and the decent citizen.
These two figures are personifications of two liberal ideals: leaving people's private
lives alone and minimizing suffering, respectively. 510 Rorty believes there should
be no aims higher than these.
In Chapter Two, I suggested that Rorty seriously underestimates the role
social institutions, including political institutions, play in defining the private sphere
and private selfhood. Taking this into account, the rich North Atlantic democracies
do not appear to exemplify Rorty ’s ideal of leaving people’s private lives alone.
In the present chapter I have suggested that Rorty also has failed to take full
measure of the extent to which his favorite liberal democracies proiect power
beyond their cartographic borders. Once we do so, however, it becomes clear that
he has not provided convincing evidence that liberal institutions are the best means
at hand for ameliorating the suffering liberal regimes continue to cause. In view of
these considerations, actually existing liberalism could hardly be said to exemplify
Rorty’s ideal of public decency.
509.) The longing for total revolution, according to Yack, is the longing for “a
world without social sources of dissatisfaction” (Yack, p. 365).
510.) CIS, p. 63.
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As I have emphasized, however, one would not be warranted in concluding
from this that liberal institutions such as a free press and representative democratic
institutions are incompatible with a vision of the future in which a minority of
exploiters no longer wields state power. Indeed, a vision of these institutions within
the context of workers’ power might well satisfy Rorty’s pragmatic requirement for
an alternative vision that more closely approximates his public ideal than either the
status quo or his liberal utopia.
As the title of one of Rorty s better-known papers would indicate, he
advocates placing politics before philosophical considerations. Before bringing this
discussion to a close, then, it would be wise to take a look at his public and private
vocabularies from the perspective of his explicit political commitments.
CHAPTER 4
OF LIGHT MINDS AND HEAVY HANDS
We have already noted that existing liberal institutions and practices are, in
important or systematic ways, incompatible with Rorty's two highest liberal ideals.
In the balance of this discussion, we will examine his public role as an advocate of
actually existing liberalism in relation to his private role as a lighthearted ironist. It
should become clear that Rorty the ironist is similarly at cross-purposes with Rortv
the apologist for actually existing liberalism.
Rorty's Politics
Increasingly, Rorty has written as though pragmatism is not and should not
be merely “an anti-representationalist account of experience and an anti-essentialist
account ot nature, but also, as Dewey has put it, “a project for a social-democratic
utopia. In a footnote, he avers that Dewey would have endorsed Unger's slogan,
"everything is politics.” Unger's slogan, he says, follows from Dewey's observation
or admonition that we “...start with our social hopes and work dowTi from there to
theories about standard philosophical topics.”
512
511.) EH, pp. 27-49; p. 47. According to Guignon and Hiley, Rorty's more recent
writings on moral and social issues make explicit “...the moral and social
commitments that have motivated his critique of epistemology-centered philosophy
from the outset” (Malachowski, p. 339). The point might be overstated, but Rorty
himself comes close to corroborating it in “The Priority of Democracy to
Philosophy.”
512.) The last two quoted passages are from “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 578, note
20 .
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'Working down from there' does not involve the futile exercise of trying to
provide philosoph,cal just, f,canons or foundations for one's social hopes. Rather, as
he indicates in “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy" among other places, it
involves redescribing things, past, present and future, in terms that will make one's
social hopes appear attractive and convince others to embrace them. This being the
case, says Rorty, “[I]t would be well for us to debate political topics explicitly,
rather than using Aesopian philosophical language.”515
With reference to the suggestion that he ought to have some theoretical
justification for the claim that freedom and equality are “the West’s most important
legacy,’ for instance, Rorty has written:
1 do not have any philosophical backup for this claim, and do not feel
the need of any. The claim is little more than a hunch that the way in
which the recent West differs most interestingly from other cultures
that have existed is in the utopian social aspirations which it has
developed.
514
Theory is useful for public purposes when it comes to thinking through these
utopian visions. Accordingly, ...the philosopher of liberal democracy may wish to




Rorty stresses, however, that,
. . .such a philosopher is not thereby justifying these institutions by
reference to more fundamental premises, but the reverse; He or she is
putting politics first and tailoring a philosophy to suit.
516
513.
) EH, p. 25.
514.
) Rorty, in Balslev, p. 20.
515.
) ORT, p. 178.
516.) ORT, p. 178.
178
In keeping with this view, he acknowledges promoting a particular account
of selfhood, namely the Davidsonian-Freud account glossed in Chapter One above,
primarily because it suits the political purposes of “us social democrats.”517 As one
might recall from Chapter One, he refers to this sort of tailoring operation as
philosophical articulation of a political vision. Liberal democracy does not require
philosophical justification or backup, though it does stand to gam from
philosophical articulation.
51
" In this context, “Apologetics”~a word we have
already encountered above, and to which we will return in the final section below-
could be used interchangeably with “articulation ” And both are clear instances of
ideology, as I defined this word towards the end of Chapter Two.
At times, Rorty has identified himself as a “leftist intellectual” addressing
what he supposes to be a left-wing audience."
17
This is apparent, for example, when
he has recommended Roberto Unger to Third World leaders,520 or advised a future
generation of leftist university students to adopt Vacislav Havel as a hero,
521
or
lamented the overtheoretical obsessions of left-wing Americans,”
522
or collegially
chastised the Cultural Left”"
-5
for worrying so much about such topics as The
517.




) “The End of Leninism,” pp. 3-4, 7, 9; “Review ofSpectres ofMarx” p. 2.
520.
) EH, pp. 177-192.
521.
) “The End of Leninism,” p. 7.
522.
) “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 570.
523.) EH, p. 137.
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Meaning of Modem,ty .ha. „ has faded to help ge, hberal Democrats elected ,o
Office
5-4
(as if this goal were uncontroversially acceptable to “leftists"!).
Although he expresses impatience with what, following Harold Bloom, he
dubs The School of Resentment
,
545
he betrays a somewhat bemused sympathy for
"the Cultural Left" and a more somber sympathy for some feminists .
526
Perhaps in
part because of the last two cons,derations, some commentators have claimed that
his occasionally-alleged cultural conservatism is not backed up by political
conservatism .' 27
Key terms in Rorty's alleged cultural conservatism that would be easy to
confuse with political conservatism are elitism, aestheticism, etknocentrism and
humcenmsm. - Indeed, he has made it so easy for “third-rate cntics” to conflate
his own cultural use of these words with prevalent political uses that one suspects




) Reply to a question from the audience at Rorty’s January 17 1 99"> lecture at
Northwestern University, entitled “Intellectuals at the End of Socialism.”
525.
) EH, pp. 179, 184.
5_6. ) Rorty speculates that the reason feminist Ideologiekritiker “are actually
having some new ideas” is “...in part, because the patriarchy-nonpatnarchy
distinction swings free of the capitalism-socialism distinction” (“Thugs and
Theorists,” p. 577, note 16).
527.
) Hall, p. 1 76. Presumably, allegations of cultural conservatism are a
consequence of his conception of social change as largely cultural change, the
dependence of cultural change on changing vocabularies and the parasitic
dependence of abnormal discourse on normal discourse.
528.
) “Review of Spectres ofMarxf p. 4.
529.
) With reference to “know-nothing” critics, refer to CIS, p. 82.
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There is, of course, no hard-and-fast factual connectton between the two
conservatisms: Lots of political radtcals have been cultural conservattves, and at
least as many cultural radtcals have been political conservatives. As Rorty's social
and political views have become more explicit, however, his 1987 statement
(unsupported by citations) that “fortunately" he has received “as much flak from the
right as from the left”
530
has become increasingly doubtful. Witness not only the
generally hostile reception he has received from his supposed fellow social
democrats
5 1
but also the increasing sympathy with which he is viewed by
neoconservatives like Dinesh D'Souza.
One reason he has been receiving more sympathy from the right might well
be his escalating expressions of antipathy to “radical” critics of existing liberal
democracies. In such recent writings as “The Priority of Democracy,” “Thugs and
Theorists,” “Post-Modern Bourgeois Liberalism,” “The End of Leninism,”
“Movements and Campaigns” and “Review of Spectres ofMarx,” Rorty
increasingly sounds like a proponent of what Bhaskar described as “old-fashioned
cold war liberalism.” 53 - Indeed, he has come close to describing himself as such. 533
Among other things, Rorty objects to the frequent claim by many leftists that
their politics are guided by theory. He scores Marxists, in particular, for insisting
that ...we theorists (and in particular, we philosophers) have an important role to
play in achieving socialism.”''
34
This is because they “...see political theory and
530.
) “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 575, note 5.
531.
) “Thugs and Theorists,” pp. 564; 574-5, notes 2 and 3.
532.
) Bhaskar 1991, pp. 99- 1 00.
533.
) “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 576, note 1 1
.
534.
) “Thugs and Theorists,” pp. 568-9.
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Philosophy as foundahonal because they see i, as penetrating ,o a social reality
behind contemporary appearances.”' 35
Rorty associates the attempt to “penetrate to the true, natural ah.stoncal
matrix of all possible language and knowledge”536 with what he describes (with the
unselfconsciousness of the vanquishing missionary) as the “state religion” of
Marxism. Taking another cue from Kolakowski, perhaps, he lumps Marxists
together with Hegel and Acton, as votaries of History with a capital H.
537
Writers of
History present us with a long story of the realization of a latent potential ity-the
return of Spirit to itself in its plenary fullness, the realization of freedom or
increasing technological command over nature. In other words, such writers present
us with teleological sagas of maturation.
538
The twists and turns in these sagas,
their main phases or chapter structure, reveal the “shape and movement of
History.
3
As we have seen, Rorty advocates turning away from this sort of
radical critique ’ and the movement politics associated with it. As he describes it:
The turn away from movements to campaigns which 1 am suggesting
is, in philosophical terms, a turn away from Kant, Hegel and Marx
and toward Bacon, Hume and Mill-considered not as empiricists but
as proto-pragmatists. It is a turn away from the transcendental
question “what are the conditions of possibility of this historical
movement 9” to the pragmatic question “what are the causal




) EH, p. 25.
536.
) EH, p. 25.
537.
) Refer, for example, to “The End of Leninism,” p 1
.
538.
) “Movements and Campaigns,” pp. 5-6, 14.
539.
) “The End of Leninism,” p 1.
540.
) “Movements and Campaigns,” p. 16.
In this passage, Rorty associates programs for sweeping political change, or as he
pats it, -movement politics,” w„h the transcendental project, and reformist politics
with pragmatism.
Upon a little reflection, however, this association is both undermotivated
and implausible. Although one would not guess it from Rorty, the larger part of
Marx’s writings consists of thousands of pages of detailed narratives about what
“certain contemporary communities” have done in the past and what they might do
in the future. Clearly, the preconditions for the appearance of capitalism which
Marx discussed in, say. Part VIII of Capital, Vol. I, are straightforward, non-
transcendental historical causes. So are the preconditions for the emergence of
private property, political institutions, pre-capitalist economic formations, and so
on. These constitute the sort of first-order “historical narratives” of which Rorty the
historical nominalist should approve. So when he writes that Marxism involves
“metaphilosophical scientism,” or that it is “a perfect example of the metaphysics of
presence, he appears to have scored yet another direct hit on a large, slow-
moving straw man bearing the placard: “Karl Marx: Transcendental Philosopher ”
At times Rorty’s opposition to Marxism, and especially to what he describes




) “Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,” p.585.
542.
) Rorty ascribes to Marxists a notion ot “History” as an inspiring blur (“The
End of Leninism, p. 4). It should be pointed out, however, that some Marxists
could without difficulty restrict themselves to talking about the constitution of
modes of production at given times and places, and dispense entirely with “history,”
whether capitalized or not, except as an abbreviation for “social transformations.”
543.
) “Thugs and Theorists,” p. 578, note 21.
544.
) “The End of Leninism,” p. 2.
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ordered on caricature This is apparent, for instance, when he writes: “But now
that we leftist intellectuals can no longer be Leninists, we have to face up to some
questions which Leninism helped us evade.”545 One of these questions has to do
with the importance of theory to politics. Leninism allegedly has held an appeal
Within academia(
') precisely because, enthralled as academics are with deep
theories about deep causes,
5J
‘ they have reserved a place of honor for philosophers
to play within the Proletarian Movement. 547 By encouraging academics to imagine
themselves as occupying this place of honor, Leninism allows them to pretend they
can play an important public role, while at the same time gratifying
...our blood-lust by letting us picture ourselves as swept up by the
aroused masses-bome along toward the slaughter-bench of history
,
the altar where the bourgeoisie will be redemptively sacrificed.
548
In order to avert this danger, and in recognition of the futility of the attempt
to combine sublimity and decency in one overarching theory, he advocates
abandoning not only Leninism but the very attempt to get underlying realities right
545
- ) The End of Leninism,” p. 3. To read such passages, one might never guess
that the greater part of Rorty's audience resides in the rich North Atlantic, where, it
is safe to say, Leninists have always been a small and persecuted minority. I have
not encountered any evidence that would suggest that Rorty ever considered himself
to be a Leninist in any familiar sense of the term.
546.
) “The End of Leninism,” p. 3. Rorty disparages “Lenin’s blood-curdling
sense of objective’
11
(CP, p. 1 73). Not only does this sound silly, but it is unfair, in
view of the regularity with which Western academics, editors and opinion makers
have wielded the word “objective” and its cognates as a handy stick with which
indiscriminately to beat their Marxist opponents.
547.
) Refer to Thugs and Theorists,’ pp. 570. This view does not square well
with Rorty's more recent observation that left-wing intellectuals in the ITS. typically
have not ascribed much importance to philosophy (“Movements and Campaigns ” p
6 ).
548.) “The End of Leninism,” pp. 3-5.
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before proceeding to political utop.as. To eschew such "political theorizing," he
argues, would not require giving up very much that is useful for the public purposes
of a liberal. The concerns of public morality, after all, are the sorts of concerns
which are "codifiable in statutes and maxims.”549 These concerns are adequately
handled by the greatest happiness principle and the principles of procedural justice
already built into current liberal democratic political structures. Thus, when it
comes to “Western social and political thought,'’
J.S Mill’s suggestion that governments devote themselves to
optimizing the balance between leaving people's private lives alone
and preventing suffering seems to me pretty much the last word. 550
Rorty’s Dickensesque references to “poor inner city children” and “a
desperate third world” victimized by “greedy white suburbanites,” “greedy, short-
sighted democracies,” “greedy and stupid conservatives”'-
1
and so on appear to be
self-conscious reaffirmations of the futility of political theory. If leftists would stop
trying so hard to penetrate to a social reality underlying contemporary appearances,
they would have more time and energy to devote to getting on with the hard work of
ameliorating suffering and extending freedom. Thus, not only do leftists not need
deep theories about deep causes, but the obsession with such theories is an
impediment to getting on with the main event.
To avoid this distraction, Rorty advises leftists to transvalue banality in
public discourse. As he puts it,
...I hope we can banalize the entire vocabulary of leftist political
deliberation. I suggest that we start talking about greed and
549.
) Rorty, “Freud and Moral Reflection,” in EH, p. 153.
550.
) CIS, p. 63. Cf. Fukayama.
551.) CIS, p. 170.
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One striking feature about this passage and Rorty's advice to those to his left
in general is how poorly motivated they are. In the passage just cited, for example,
he writes as though talk abou, class divisions and differential per-pup,l expenditure
on schools were an “ei,her-or” proposition: Either you do one or you do the other
bu, you can', do both.
553
Clearly, however, this is no, the case a, all: One could
perfectly well talk abou, expenditure on schools or access to health care-and much
else besides—as these mark out class divisions. Indeed, lots of opponents of existing
liberalism have done just this.
554
It may be worthwhile to illustrate this point by turning, however briefly, to
the liberal institutions Rorty praises. As we have already noted, the more carefully
we attend to the details that Bagdikian, Parenti, Herbert Schiller and others have
provided, the clearer i, becomes that the print and electronic media are increasingly
corporate-owned, the corporations that own them are ever fewer and larger in
number, the range of opinions presented approximates ever more narrowly the
552.
) “The End of Leninism,” p. ]
,
553.
) By presenting the matter in this manner, it will be noted, he casts doubt on
his claim that.
There are no tacts about economic oppression or class struggle, or
modem technology, which that vocabulary [that is, the vocabulary of
social democratic politics which Dewey and Weber helped cobble
together-MM] cannot describe and a more ’radical’ metaphoric can
(EH, p. 26.)
554.
) Berstein has scored “Rorty's fateful, although shifting, dichotomies--the
either/or s that structure his thinking.” These dichotomies “lead him to all sorts of
dubious and double-edged claims” (Bernstein, p. 549).
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opinions of corporate owners and advertisers and there is a seamless connection
between state institutions and what the corporate media itself refers to as “the
business community- In view of these observations, I,beta, democracies today
can hardly be said to promote domination-free communication. 556
It would be easy to make similar remarks with reference to the alleged
inviolability of the private sphere, the “independence" ofjudicianes, the
representative" character of political institutions, the “freedom” of universities, the
vigilance" of public opinion, and so on down Rorty's list of liberal institutions as
they actually exist in the rich North Atlantic. In each of these cases, the more
details one attends to, the less precious the institutions and practices under scrutiny
might well come to appear, when measured against the vety ideals of which they are
the solemn complement. More importantly, perhaps, such an exercise might well
cast additional doubt on Rorty's claim that “...the rich democracies of the present
day already contain the sorts of institutions necessary to their own reform ”557
- - ) Refer tor example, to Bagdikian, Parenti and Schiller. It should be noted
that Roily acknowledges “such things as the control of mass-circulation magazines
V people who want to safeguard their own wealth and power at the expense of the
poor and weak' (“Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophv,” p 3). Inthe case of doing this, however, he lumps particular cases of exploitation and
domination together as mere variations on the “old, old” story of the rich
"continuing to steal” (as he puts it in “Review ofSpectres ofMarx ” p 8) from the
poor. This raises a number of questions: One is tempted to ask, for starters, how
' s that he knows what people who own mass-circulation magazines want.
What if some of them do not want what he claims they want? What if the major
shareholders of, say. Time Warner or Gannett are not especially greedy or power-
hungry personalities9 And even if they were, as seems unlikely, why should one
assume that corporate policy would be appreciably different if those individuals
happened to be more attractive personalities7
556.
) Compare to Rorty’s claim, at CIS, p. 68.
557.
) ’‘Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy,” p. 21.
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Rorty, Dewey and Weber may be correct in pointing out that, once ends are
decided upon, it is often a straightforward pragmatic exercise to determine what
means are at hand to meet those ends. This may amount to little more than simply
looking steadily and carefully. Once ends are set, it may well be true that “...no
'radical critique' is required, but just attention to detail”
53* Rorty's invocation of
attention to detail-together with his /^attention to the question “Which detail?”— is
instructive, however, coming from one who has reminded us more than once that
nature has no preferred self-description. By reminding us also that alternative
descriptions of the same causal process are useful for different purposes,
559
he
acknowledges what in any case is well enough conceded on all sides, namely, that
different observers will attend to different details, depending on their purposes,
among other things.
Before one can identify the most efficient means, one must of course first
identify one's ends. The latter task, however, involves a familiar difficulty: Just as
surely as one cannot get outside one’s skin, one cannot describe a problem from no
perspective at all, or from all at once.
v,t
And the problems we identify—not just the
ways we conclude how to ameliorate “avoidable suffering,” for example, but the
very evaluation from case to case of what constitutes avoidable suffering
3 ’ 1 —these
problems themselves depend on our political ends. They depend on who we are.
Even the words used to describe a problem-”freedom fighter” as opposed to
558.





) Refer to Burrows’ discussion in Malachowski, pp. 328-9.
561
.
) Rorty advocates substituting “the struggle against avoidable misery” for “the
anticapitalist struggle” (“The End of Leninism,” p. 1 ).
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terrorist,’ for example, or 'Tiof as opposed to “upnsing'-often cannot be settled
empirically, without reference to political ends
Rorty, presumably, would not dispute this point When it comes to
particular cases, however, it is not always clear that he is in accord with it. To take
one particularly relevant example, the standard vocabulary of corporate journalism
portrays a central theme of political philosophy as an age-old trade-off between the
rights of the individual and the rights of “the community” Whatever the latter
term is assumed to be, it typically is viewed as a monolithic given, which exists in
contrast to individuals. Rightists are champions of the rights of individuals, while
leftists are champions ol community welfare. Thus, the hallowed dilemma “Higher
taxes or fewer social programs 9 is portrayed as a litmus test, to distinguish left
from right Leftists want higher taxes and more social programs; rightists want
lower taxes and less government. In either case, ‘‘government” is assumed to be a
neutral given, devoid of class character or hegemonic function. As we have seen,
Rorty s vocabulary, and his account of the public/private split in particular, is
consistent with this usage.
After reading a book by, say, William Domhoff, Victor Perlo or Michael
Parenti, however, one might come to view this supposedly intractable dilemma as
arbitrary and unperspicacious. One might instead pose the alternatives: “Higher
taxes for corporations and capitalists or higher taxes for workers?” or “More social
programs for the working class and the poor, or more social programs, subsidies and
bailouts for monopolies and the super rich 9 Here we have one example, among
dozens that could be gleaned from daily headlines, of how an alternative public
vocabulary may enable one to pose very different questions from the conventional,
banal questions Rorty wishes exclusively to focus on.
189
These observations are significant when it comes to Rorty's claim that.
We [liberals closer to Daniel Bell's end of the political spectrum than
to radicals like Althusser and Jameson] think that Dewey and
Weber absorbed everything useful Marx had to teach, just as they
absorbed everything useful Plato and Aristotle had to teach and got
rid of the residue.
562
The judgment ot what is useful, to repeat, follows from one’s purposes. In
this case, it follows from Rorty's prior commitment to apologetics on behalf of
actually existing liberalism. If indeed “everything is politics,” it is not surprising, in
view of the prior political commitments of Daniel Bell and Rorty, that they would
consider what Marx has to say about, say, exploitation, class struggle and the
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie to be a useless residue, at best. Nor is it surprising
that Rorty would give his readers permission to write off any description of
capitalist exploitation, class rule and imperialism as an instance of ressent intent, or
“Hegelian romance,”
5'”
or the yearning for "total revolution”
564
or the “Radically
Other, or the satisfaction of blood-lust or some other similarly pernicious trait of
those on the left with whom he disagrees.
Technocrats, “mainstream social scientists,” official speechifiers and editors
of corporate-owned newspapers do not need to start talking about greed, selfishness
562.
) "Thugs and Theorists,” p. 571 it is not clear, however, that Dewey had
enough of an exposure to Marx to absorb very much at all. A sympathetic reviewer
has noted that in Freedom and Culture
, where Dewey discusses Marx at greater
length than anywhere else in his published opus, he “...does not reveal even to the
extent apparent in some earlier references, first-hand knowledge of Marx's writings”
(Cork, p. 335; in the following pages, the reviewer surveys and dismisses what he
takes to be three of Dewey's most serious criticisms of Marxism). Compare Cork’s
assessment to Dewey’s remarks on Marx and “radical socialists” in Dewey 1984,
pp. 309, 378.
563.
) “The End of Leninism,” p. 2.
564.
) Yack, p. 385. Rorty cites Yack at CIS, p. 65.
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and short-sightedness rather than bourgeois ideology, the commodification of labor
power and class divisions. Despite obvious problems with using psychological
terms to describe institutional policies, they have long preferred Rom's prescribed
ways of talking. This, after all, is what makes these ways of talking banal in the
first place. Indeed, talking the way Rorty advises his readers to talk is arguably just
part of what it is to be a /?ow-leftist intellectual.
When Rorty advises "us” to start talking this way, then, he would appear to
be referring to (though not necessarily addressing) the small number of embattled
dissenters from hegemonic public vocabularies. By thus exercising his right not to
take all vocabularies seriously, he abets those who would limit "responsible”
political discourse to the narrow parameters of conserv ation versus reform, "big”
versus “small” government, and incumbent leadership versus loyal opposition. So
Rorty s real leftist politics
6
would appear to be coterminous with reform within
the political framework of corporate capitalist rule. Within the context of actually
existing liberalism, then, his advice once again amounts to the promotion of
conformity to a political vocabulary which already exercises a near-monopoly on
public discourse. This is a strange view, coming from a professed advocate of
“keeping the conversation going,” one who hopes that the crust of convention will
be as superficial as possible.
366
As we have seen, Rorty 's vocabulary is poorly suited to the task of
describing such contemporary trends and states of affairs as the enormous and rapid
concentration of capital, gaping distributive inequalities, overproduction and
565.
) "The End of Leninism,” p. 4. On the same page, the author contributes to
our appreciation of banality in public discourse by defining “real leftist politics” as
“initiatives for the reduction of human misery.”
566.
) EH, p. 18.
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militarism on a global scale Noting this, David Hall has identified "the strand of
modernity" Rorty effectively omits from his Grand Narrative as "...the interweaving
Ot the capitalist/Marxist dialectic in the origin and development of the modem
age.”
367
"In modern society-,” Hall writes, with reference to one side of the
aforementioned dialectic, “the capitalist celebrates the multiplication of desires and
their transmogrification into needs .”
568
He concludes:
It seems to me that if, as Rorty contends, pragmatism "helps us get
what we want ” then we should certainly be worried about the
manner in which a capitalist liberal democratic society helps us to
shape the character of wants and needs .
569
Rorty, like Dewey, would like to maintain a consensus on the question of
wants and needs to be met. The public Rorty approximates Nancy Fraser's “cartoon
version ' of the technocratic impulse which sees history as “a succession of social
problems posed and social problems solved, a succession that is in fact a
progression, thanks to good luck, increasing technical competence and public-
spintedness. Solidarity consists in arriving at a consensus as to the problems to
be solved and how to go about solving them
Surely it is relevant to note, however, that in view of considerations noted
above with reference to class rule and the corporate media, such a consensus, pace
pluralist claims, is likely to continue to reflect the priorities of “the business
community.” "The business community,” however, accounts for a rather small
567.
) Hall, p. 41.
568.
) Hall, p. 45.
569.
) Hall, p. 46.
570.
) Fraser, in Malachowski, p. 304.
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proportion of the total populatton of the nch North Atlantic. Furthermore, it is not a
foregone conclusion that its perceived interests are the interests of everyone else
It will he noticed that we have come full circle: Confronted with the charge
that existing liberal institutions systematically betray liberal ideals, Rorty
acknowledges constant betrayal, but claims that, thanks to those very same
institutions, it is possible to approximate the ideals ever more closely. In so dome,
however, he assumes the point originally in question, namely, the efficaciousness of
existing liberal institutions when it comes to realizing liberal ideals. He
acknowledges the circularity of this sort ofjustification, but can see no way around
it. With reference to “we pragmatists,” he writes:
We should say that we must, in practice, privilege our own group,
even though there can be no noncircular justification for doing so.
We must insist that the fact that nothing is immune from criticism
does not mean that we have a duty to justify everything. We Western
liberal intellectuals should accept the fact that we have to start from
where we are, and that this means that there are lots of views which
we simply cannot take seriously. 571
One thing that makes “Western liberal intellectuals” what they are,
presumably, is that they already do not take certain views seriously. Thus, we may
rephrase Rorty's position as follows: People who do not take certain views seriously
should not take those views seriously. This amounts to a circular justification so
tight that it has no circumference. The question Rorty raises here is not the
innocuous: "Can we start from anywhere but where we already are?” The question,
rather, is: “Can or should we go anywhere from where we already are?” And his
answer appears to be “No.”
572
571.
) Rorty, in Rajchman and West, p. 12.
572.
) William E. Connally has noted that:
Recumng to the dtscusston at the end of Chapter Two, then, one might agree
with the commentator's observation that: -Just because sophisttcated liberalism
professes to be non-ideologtcal, does not mean that it is non-ideological.”577
Indeed, as the same commentator has added, Rorty's claims that he is beyond
ideology "... just are what liberal ideology comes down to.”574 As a self-descnbed
apologist for bourgeois liberalism, he would not be doing his job if he failed to
claim as much
Before bringing this section to a close, it should be noted that Rorty cites at
least one additional reason for rejecting the vocabularies of opponents to his left.
As he has put it:
As one becomes progressively more attentive to the style which
governs his writing, as one becomes more alert to its strategy of
gaining assent, the Rorty philosophy of edification begins to look less
like a hermeneutic circle which constantly calls its own preliminary'
judgments into question and more like a tinted mirror held up to
American technocracy. (Connally, p 131.)
Comay adds: "'Hope-cured of its histrionic fervor-becomes, in Rorty, the happy
desire that we keep on going just the way we are” (Comay, p 124)
573.
) Burrows, in Malachowski, p. 327.
574.
) Burrows, in Malachowski, p. 327. Rorty, the advocate of “anti-ideological
liberalism (ORT, p. 64), has wntten that:
Whether soviet imperialism is a threat is a paradigm of a non-
Gdeological,” unphilosophical, straightforwardly empirical,
question. It is a question about what will happen if such and such
other things happen (if NATO collapses, it South America goes
Communist, and so on). (“Thugs and Theorists,” pp. 578-9, note 25.)
In order to resolve such questions in a suitably non-ideological way, he advises us to
read the appropriate “intelligence reports on what the Politburo and the Soviet
Generals have been saying to one another lately” (“Thugs and Theorists,” p. 579,
note 25). Presumably, neither the opinions just quoted nor the intelligence reports
would quality as ideological because none of them is “a bad idea”~at least with
reference to the purposes Rorty has set himself.
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This passage, published as late as 1992, is fully ,n keeping with an author who
reinterprets objectivity as mtersubjectivity, or as solidarity”
576
Less than one year after these lines were published, however, it had become
clear that the consensus gentium ,n Eastern Europe had shifted dramatically. By
that time, Polish workers had pretty much abandoned the Solidarity union in favor
of the former Workers' Party union, and Polish voters had returned self-described
socialists to national office, where they came to dominate the government and the
parliament. A year latter, in Hungary~the country free-marketeers most frequently
pointed to as their exemplary post-Soviet success story-voters overwhelmingly
elected self-descnbed socialists to local and national office. In the years 1994 and
1995, similar election results were reported in Ukraine, Slovakia, Slovenia and
Bulgaria, while in Poland, self-described socialists also won the presidency. 577 In a
1995 radio interview. pro-Western journalist Vladimir Posner reported that anti-
Amencan sentiment among his fellow Russians was higher then than it had been at
575.
) “The End of Leninism,” p 9.
576.
) ORT, p. 13.
577.
) It would be easy, of course, to challenge the Marxist credentials of these
predominantly nationalist forces. Speaking loosely, there is no more reason to
believe that Gennady Zyuganov is a genuine Marxist than that Vladimir Zhirinovsky
is a genuine liberal democrat. Moreover, many of the self-styled socialist leaders in
Eastern Europe, exemplified by reformed communist Aleksander Kwasniewski,
clearly qualify as what Rorty would call social democrats, rather than Marxists.
These observations, however, are irrelevant to Rorty’s claim that such labels as
capitalism and socialism have lost currency in Eastern Europe.
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the height of the Cold War. And by 1996. the largest of several self-titled
communist parties in Russia had rebuilt a burgeoning membership of over half a
million, handily defeating all "pro-reform'' parties in elections to the Duma 578
During the Cold War, news correspondents in Moscow and expatriate
omedians enjoy ed reporting the most recent jokes circulating on the streets. This
predilection for popular wtt seems to have abated in the Post-Cold War era. In any
case, one joke that circulated among Muscovites in the mid-1990s poses the
question: What have five years of capitalism achieved that seventy years of
socialism failed to accomplish^ The punch line: It's made socialism look good.
Rorty wrote of the label social,si that “The quarter of the world which has
worn that label the longest never wants to hear the word again.”579 As we can see,
however, his statement, only a few years old, has already been outrun by events.
Nevertheless, he has repeated similar statements as late as 1 995: “If one reminds
Czech or Ukrainian intellectuals that Marx was a remarkably original thinker [...]




) Yeltsin s victor}7 in the July 3, 1996 presidential run-off is hardly a
vindication of Rorty s view, when one takes into account his co-optation of
opposition rhetoric, his monopoly of television, and the Western-subsidized hype
and bribery that drove his campaign. More importantly, Yeltsin's electoral victory
may well be the prelude to a larger defeat, as it becomes clear to more and more
Russians that Yeltsin and his pro-Washington clique are not delivering on their
campaign promises, and offer no realistic plans for doing so.
579.
) “The End of Leninism.” p 15, note 13.
580.
) Review of Spectres of Marx," p. 1 . The saving grace of this statement is
that, thanks in large measure to the operation of Rorty's “large free market
economies' (ORT, p. 209), it has become much more difficult for a Czech or
Ukrainian dissident to make herself heard. The erosion of state subsidies for
intellectuals, the evaporation of academies of science and writers unions, a newly-
acquired popular disinterest in books, and the brain drain from impoverished
1%
In view of the fact that so many of these intellectuals’ compatriots have
come to view self-tdemifted socialist accounts of these developments as more
compelling than liberal accounts, the last-mentioned reason for rejecting anti-
capitalis, vocabularies is itself defunct. To paraphrase Mark Twain, the reports of
Marxism’s death are exaggerated. And they are likely to remain so as i, becomes
Clear to more and more people that the liberals, self-procla.med democrats and "free
market reformers" in Eastern Europe and elsewhere have fa, led miserably to live up
to their promises.
Rorty's Incompatible Rnlec
Rorty and his sympathizers have used the adjectives de-divmized
,
hiS,°ric,:ed
' deflattonary and relaxed to describe his views on a broad
range of topics, including social science, culture, liberalism and community All or
some of these adjectives, presumably, are roughly synonymous with “thin”-another
adjective commentators have used to describe his views. Instances of his celebrated
thinness might include: his pragmatist definitions of such words as truth and
rationality
; his abandonment of the search for foundations of knowledge, justice,
and culture; his disparagement of Philosophy; his deflationary conception of the
sciences; his disparagement of “methodolatty" and preference for narrative over
theory';*
1
his dismissal of theories of reference in favor of a notion of “talking
about
; his definition of rationality as “the way things are done around here”; the
light he makes ot attempts by everyone from psychologists to critical theorists to do
Central and Eastern Europe—all of these developments have relieved the current
rulers of much of the annoyance of a new generation of influential dissident writers.
581.) Refer, for example, to Hall, p. 53.
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deep thinking and «o discern deep processes a, work; his non-essentialis, conception
0f SCll1l00d; hlS ident'fieation of autonomy with self-enlargenten, and restriction of
autonomy to the private sphere; and his emphasis on the contingency of human
affairs.
A variety of cntics have taken Rorty to task for presenting ,oo thin a picture
of our predicament * Early in this discussion, by contrast, I registered my
substantial agreement with him when it comes to such topics as his -an,,-,sms," his
views on selfhood and rationality and h.s substitute for a theory of reference. I
might also have revealed a mild sympathy when it comes to his prognostications
and recommendations regarding Philosophy as afetch™
I have not criticized Rorty' for excessive histoncism, nominalism or thinness.
Indeed, turning to several of his preferred topics, 1 am of the opinion that his views
fu r eXamplC ’ t0 Geras ’ P 85 ’ ^ding Rorty's “nothing deeper”account of the basis of solidarity; Prado, p. 137, regarding “Rorty’ s perhapsexcessive histoncism”; Nielsen, pp. 29-3 1 , regarding Alastair MacIntyre’s reported
inability to stomach Rorty's thin analysis of truth, and p. 31 regarding MacIntyre's
criticism of Rorty for telling too thin a story of the history of analytic philosophy
Nielsen, pp 39ff regarding Jaegwon Kim, Ian Hacking and Alvin Goldman's
elenses of putatively central tenets of analytic philosophy against Rorty; Kolenda
p 91, regarding David Hiley and Michael Sandels' objections to Rorty's Humean
notion of the self as a web of beliefs and desires; Lovibond 1992, with reference to
Rorty's anti-universalism and anti-essentialism; Habermas’ criticisms of Rorty on
truth and other topics, as Rorty reports them in “Habermas and Lyotard on
Postmodemity (EH, pp. 164-176) and elsewhere; Tom Sorell’s claim that Rorty 's
account of intellectual change is “too deflationary” (Malachowski, p. 20); Bernard
Williams criticisms of Rorty for having seriously underdescribed the sciences
(Malachowski, pp. 26-37); Jacek Holowka's protest against “the promptness with
which Rorty' abandons philosophy” (Malachowski, p. 188); Farrell’s disparagement
of Rorty s extremely thin world emptied of the given, and so on.
58j.) It bears at least passing notice, however, that I do not agree across the board
with all of Rorty s non-sociopolitical views. I have suggested, for instance, that his
account of intellectual and cultural change exaggerates the efficacy of discourse in
human affairs, at the expense of biology, work, power and other predominantly
nondiscursive processes and practices (cf. Comay, p. 123; Farrell, pp. 122-125).
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could stand to be further deflated, less divinized, more h,stone, zed. more
consistently nominalist and thinner. 584 These topics include: his insistence on
viewing human affairs as more than ' just more nature"; his account of liberal
community as essentially harmonious and homogeneous; his invocation of "our
European purposes," and his picture of the inviolable private sphere neatly insulated
from political power.
Rorty's thinness is selective, and this selectivity works in favor of his explicit
forensic aim of making bourgeois liberal democracy look good.
585
This poinl
becomes obvious, for example, when he ignores his own advice to abandon the
attempt "to find a successor to 'capitalism' or 'bourgeois ideology.' as the name of the
Great Bad Thing,"
581
After all, "Leninism,” “Stalinism,” and "Soviet imperialism"
seem to have done the same work for Rorty that other scare words designating evil
essences have done for the Marxists he has criticized, and that “logocentrism”
allegedly has done for Derrida and Noms. 587 Keeping in mind that a devil is a
fallen angel, it is hard to see how Rorty's diabolificat.ons do not detract from his
avowed aim of de-divinizing culture.
^84 ) Although it is beyond the scope of this discussion to elaborate the point, I
should at least register one respect in which I believe Rorty’s views are too thin—
namely, what 1 would describe as his undervaluation of causal depth in social
science explanations. This undervaluation is related to what Bhaskar. among
others, has described as Rorty's "basically positivist account of the logical form of
sentences in science and of the structure of scientific theories” (Bhaskar 1989, p
148; see also: Bhaskar 1991
, p 6).
585.
) As one commentator has observed, Rorty s “conservative instincts
sometimes work against the grain of his theses” (McCamev, p. 6).
586.
) “The End of Leninism,” p. 12.
587.) EH, p. 1 12n.
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Further examples are not hard to find Reviewing them, it ,s possible to
distinguish between his apologettcs for the mstitutions and practices of existing
bourgeots liberal democrac.es on the one hand and at least two other elements of his
discourse. These two elements are: (a) his highest liberal ideals: and (b) other
related historicist and ironist formulations he wishes to defend. The latter category
would include Rorty's admonition that when it comes to discourse every metaphor
should have its chance for self-sacnfice™ or .ha, the crus, of convention should be
as thin as it can be gotten.
589
I have taken up point (a) in Chapters Two and Three. In the remaining
pages I will add a few words about (b).
In the course of this discussion, I have highlighted Rorty's blind spots,
590
points where his conversation abruptly fades to silence, irony lapses into
apologetics, and lightmindedness becomes heavy-handedness. This happens most
notably when it comes to his inattention to the political character of the private
sphere. It also happens when it comes to his inability or unwillingness to break up
the lump of the West and in particular to his lack of recognition of the state on the
one hand and the public sphere on the other as distinct analytical categories. It
happens when it comes to his dismissal of exploitation, class conflict and class rule
as constraints on the possibility of consensus within liberal democratic
communities, and of imperialism as a constraint on the extension of solidarity
abroad, too. And it happens when it comes to his lack of recognition that his “we's”
588.
) EH, p. 18.
589.
) Geras has argued that Rorty's repudiation of a universal human essence
undermines his warm commendation of “the culture of civil rights” (Geras pp 71-
105).
590.) EH, p. 87.
do not encompass the entire range of tolerant, cruelty-averse intellectuals in the
north Atlantic.
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A recurring pattern is discernible among these lapses, omissions and
unconscious presuppositions’: 591 Time and again Rorty the ironist appears to lose
nerve when he encounters Rorty the apologist for bourgeois liberalism This pattern
constitutes the background of a certain silence
592
which, once attended to,
simultaneously compromises his credentials as ironist and confirms what he
acknowledges to be his role as apologist for ‘'bourgeois liberalism
,,59:?
If liberal ironists of the past have escaped this conflict-if their roles as
apologists did not get too much in the way of (and at times perhaps even
complemented) their roles as iromsts-this was because they were comparing liberal
ideals or utopias yet unsullied by repeated betrayal invidiously with incumbent
institutions which repudiated these ideals and openly stood against them In
Enlightenment France, for example, where the bourgeoisie had yet to settle final
accounts with the ancien regime, it was easier for ironists to be apologists for the
bourgeoisie. Rabelais, Montaigne, Moliere, Bayle and Voltaire contributed to the
selt-image of an increasingly confident bourgeoisie facing down the reaction Their
public enemies, namely the Church and the political reaction, corresponded more or
less neatly to their private enemies, the hidebound defenders of Tradition and the
enemies of free expression.
In Jefferson's day, public office and diplomacy seemed to be exciting and
attractive fields of self assertion, along with scientific and technical innovation.
591.
) The term is from EF1, p. 87.
592.
) Refer to Rorty's remarks on Heidegger in EH, p. 46
593.
) Refer, for example, to: CP, p. 207; CIS, p. 54-5.
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The second U.S. ambassador to France, like the fist one, hurled himself headlong
into both public affairs and Natural Philosophy. However, over the course of the
next century and a half, as the natural sciences attracted fewer of the natural ahstoi,
the mamage of ironic self-creation and apologetics for bourgeois liberal democracy
became increasingly problematic, too. Liberal ideas came to be less “infused with
passion.”
594
Even assuming the disputable point that the equality and freedom that
Tocqueville celebrated survived the nineteenth century, it is less certain that either
principle’ has survived the twentieth century intact. When Rorty notes ruefully
that “...most American intellectuals in Dewey's day still thought their country' was a
shining historical example,”
595
we might lay special emphasis on the word still.
During Wilsons tenure it was still possible for a conscientious young opponent of
the Spanish-American War to read Whitman without giggles.596 Song ofAmerica,
not yet overwhelmed by Twain's War Prayer
, found a diminished echo in Sandburg.
Yet Dewey had a problematic and sometimes inconsistent reaction to U.S.
imperialism.
597
Although he courageously defended war resisters, he eventually
594.
) Daniel Bell’s expression appears in a citation in Bernstein, p. 555.
595.
) ORT, p. 201.
596.
) EH, p. 187.
597.
) Rorty gives the impression that Dewey's Marxist critics unanimously write
him off as ’4he philosopher of American imperialism” (EH. p. 133). Some have
indeed denounced Dewey's version of pragmatism as such “the philosophy of
American imperialism or “the main-line philosophy of U.S. imperialism” (the
references, cited in Novack, p. 275, are from Maurice Comforth's Science versus
Idealism (1955), p. 422 and Harry K. Wells’ Pragmatism: Philosophy of
Imperialism (1954), p. 187). Adorno, Horkheimer and other members of the
Frankfurt School also have associated pragmatism with U.S. business values
(Kolenda, p. 220). Other Marxists, however, have provided more nuanced
characterizations. One, for example, has argued that Rorty's pragmatism was not
the outlook of rising finance capital and the monopolies, but of
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threw his support behind the War to End All Wars, even to the point of allowing
chauvinist-sounding writings to be published, implicating Hegel as a prop for the
Kaiser.
Dewey appeared on the scene at a time of rapid urbanization,
industrialization, the changing demographic character that resulted from waves of
immigration, and the growth of a laissez-faire ideology, in the face of a newly-
emerging monopoly capitalism.
5'* As a leading figure of the Chicago School, he
personified progressivism as a political movement.
599
“If radicalism be defined as
perception of the need for radical change, he famously wrote, “then today any
liberalism which is not also radicalism is irrelevant and doomed.”
600
This oft-quoted passage~so different in tone from what one finds in
Rorty
6'"
-should, however, be read in light of the fact that many of Dewey's
contemporaries were convinced that the conservation of U S. capitalism required
sweeping change. The thirty-second president of the United States summarized this
. . .the educated petty bourgeoisie in the epoch of the climb of
American capitalism to world domination and the transformation of
bourgeois democracy into imperialist reaction. (Novack, p. 41.)
According to this account, Dewey's pragmatism is “...the conciliatory' philosophical
instrument of the middle classes on the downgrade, trying to clutch at any means for
salvation” (Novack, p. 278).
598.
) Berstein, p. 538; Munkirs, pp 12-20.
599.
) Novack, p. 40.
600.
) Quoted in Bernstein, p 540 and Bhaskar 1991, p. 108, note 4. The passage
appears in its original context in “Liberalism and Social Action,” in The Later
Works ofJohn Dewey , Vol. 1 1 (Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press,
1987), p. 45. Refer to Rorty 's comments on this passage in “The End of Leninism,”
pp. 15-17, note 15.
601.) Cf. Bernstein, p. 541.
conviction when he declared: “Liberalism becomes the protection of the far-sighted
conservative.”
Stalin's depredations lent life to the increasingly dysfunctional marriage
607
of
liberal apologetics and monism in the West. Both the Orwells and the Nabokovs
adopted and promoted the official vocabularies of the Free World. During the Cold
War years, and especially after the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U., the
samizdat sustained a burgeoning readership in Eastern Europe, while dissidents
there found a sympathetic liberal audience in the West, confirming the officially-
promoted metaphoric of Iron Curtains, captive nations, dominos and Gulags.
In 1987, Rorty wrote that "There is no way to consolidate our enemies in an
interesting Theoretical' way" Among these enemies he counted “the shadowy
millionaires manipulating Reagan" as well as “the nomenklatura in Moscow, the
Broederbond in South Africa, and the ayatollahs in Iran.”
604
And among the rogues
in his gallery he counted the Soviet leadership as the worst by far.
With the disappearance of the Evil Empire in the final years of the American
Century, however, the liberal imagination has been deprived of a suitably
threatening Great Bad Thing with which invidiously to contrast actually existing
liberalism. At the same time, class divisions deepen and wages and standards of
living continue to slip in the north Atlantic,
605
the Free Market has brought
prosperity to few Eastern Europeans outside a clique of financiers, foreign brokers
and mafiosos, and the gap between North and South gapes ever wider. In spite of
602.
) Quoted in Novack, p. 16.
603.
) 1 have adopted this poignant metaphor from Haber, p. 64.
604.
) Citations in this paragraph are from “Thugs and Theorists" p. 566.
605.
) According to Bureau of Labor Statistics figures cited in Los Angeles Times
(September 4, 1995), pp. Iff.
204
the momentous changes, however, it does not appear that it is any easier for Rorty to
consolidate his enemies in an interesting theoretical way.
606
One reason tor this difficulty might be that his public allies are his private
enemies: The functionaries and apologists for existing liberal democracies-the
defenders in word and deed of the public institutions than which, according to
Rorty, nothing is more precious-just happen to help inhibit not only majority rule,
informed consent, freedom abroad, national self-determination and the mitigation of
suffering, but also such private desiderata as an inviolable private sphere and a thin
crust of convention.
As Nancy Rosenblum has noted, privatization, detachment and self-
absorption are typical responses to powerlessness. Rorty's message of privatized
theory, ironic detachment and duty to self as distinct from others is a message of
diminished expectations for the powerless/’" By virtue of their poverty and
vulnerability, those who stand to benefit most from Alan Ryan’s “welfare-
capitalism-with-a-human-face” have little chance of achieving it by relying on their
own resources and efforts. If Ryan’s hope is to be realized, it must be achieved for
the poor and vulnerable by others in positions of influence and with access to
resources.
Nancy Fraser has described Rorty as vacillating between technocratism , or
the view that solutions to public problems are best left to technical experts, and
romanticism
,
characterized as the belief that self-creation is the highest aim in
life.
6"* Within this context, as we can see. politics is not a field for the self-
606.
) As we are lead to believe, for example, in “Review of Spectres ofMarx"
607.
) Though of course it is not a message addressed to the powerless.
608.
)
Rosenblum argues that what made liberalism and romanticism mix was that
the two movements both cherished privacy: Liberalism requires a sharp distinction
between public and private spheres, the latter of which is the domain ot toleration ot
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emancipation ol the working class or any other underdog community. Rather, it
becomes a field tor philanthropists, noblesse oblige and "well-intentioned,
confused, university-trained young crypto-leftists.”609 These civic-minded
individuals mark their time in the public sphere not by trying to come up with new
political vocabularies and theories or by listening to the language of the oppressed,
but by patiently seeking technical means to ameliorate the suffering of the less
fortunate, whose fates are describable in the inherited vocabulary of social
democracy that Weber and Dewey helped cobble together.
Social experimentation, stripped of "pompous" theoretical dissertations
610
and reduced to little more than the piecemeal tinkering of earnest technocrats, is
hardly an inspiring career choice for the best and the brightest youth, Jefferson’s
“natural aristoi. At times, Rorty appears to acknowledge the uninspiring state of
liberal affairs, at least with reference to “we rich, fat, tired North Americans.”611
Nevertheless, he defends liberal democracy as much preferable to all competitors.
religious, artistic, ethical differences. Similarly, the romantic imagination can
flourish only within a context of deep respect for private fantasies. Hence
romanticism is liberalism in literature (as Victor Hugo claimed, against Sainte-
Beuve's view that romanticism is royalism in politics), in its disregard for classical
decorum and in its subversion of classical rules.
609.
)
For example, Rorty applauds Unger's assertion that hope for the victimized
masses lies not in the workers and peasants of Brazil (that is, not in the victimized
masses themselves) but rather in the hands of well-intentioned petty-bourgeois
technocrats (EH, p 1 82). Unger, it would seem, is guilty of the charge of elitism
and condescension which Kolakowski, Castoriadis and others have regularly leveled
against Leninists.
610.
) “Thugs and Theorists,” cited by Jo Burrows, in Malachowski, p. 338, note
28.
611.
) In his essay “Unger, Castoriadis and the Romance of a National Future,’
included in EH, pp. 177-192.
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The fact that liberal democracies produce so many petty, greedy, narrow-minded
people is offset by the freedom such political setups provide.
At other times, however, it seems Rorty would like his fellow' citizens to
rekindle Dewey's sense of national mission It is not hard to discern the
promotional tone of passages such as the following:
We Deweyans have a story' to tell about the progress of our species, a
story whose later episodes emphasize how things have been getting
better in the West during the last few' centuries, and which concludes
with some suggestions about how they might become better still in
the next few/’
1 "
Aside from the occasional expression of enthusiasm, however, he provides
little in the way of inspiration to nudge the natural aristoi of a coming generation in
the direction of public-spirited community' service. When it comes to his
conceptions of democracy, autonomy and resolution of the opposition between
public and private spheres, as we have seen, he has backed away from Dewey and
reverted to formulations of the classical liberalism of Locke, Bentham and the
Mills—the professed spring of inspiration of contemporary neoliberals/’ 1
'
612.
) ORT, p. 212. Elsewhere, Rorty protests against Foucault’s “amazing one-
sidedness”:
You would never guess, from Foucault's account of the changes in
European social institutions during the last three hundred years, that
during that period suffering had decreased considerably, nor that
people's chances of choosing their own styles of life increased
considerably. (EH, p. 195.)
613.
) The rise of “Neo-Liberalism,” which Merquior dates to around 1980
(Merquior, pp. 147ff), coincided with the publication of Rorty's most influential
works. Haber makes the case, plausibly enough, that Rorty speaks for classical
liberalism (Haber, p 62). It is interesting to note in this regard that, with
reference
to Marxism, Rorty has written:
We see no more point in trying to rework a political vocabulary
developed in the middle of the nineteenth century than in trying to
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Dewey could still convince himself and others that his public role as
advocate ot the ideals of the French Revolution did not conflict with his public role
as defender of the institutions and practices of existing liberal democracies. As 1
have attempted to point out, however, it has become more difficult to believe Rortv
when he makes the same claim Rorty’s interventions in socio-political discourse,
appearing as they do in a context of slipping wages and living standards in the rich
North Atlantic, a growing gap between rich and poor both at home and abroad and
the dismantlement of the so-called welfare state, have a very different political
thrust from Dewey's era of optimistic social engineering/
14
Rorty has described himself as a happy-go-lucky pragmatist.
615
As an ironist
who, like Nietzsche, manages to be ironic about theory, the private Rorty does
appear to qualify as such. When it comes to what Rorty and Jefferson considered to
be the properly private themes which allegedly give meaning and purpose to our
lives-those religious and metaphysical themes of ultimate purposes-Rortv
encourages good-natured public indifference:
If one’s moral identity consists in being a citizen of a liberal polity,
then to encourage light-mindedness will serve one’s moral purposes
Moral commitment, after all, does not require taking seriously all the
matters that are, for moral reasons, taken seriously by one’s fellow
rework one developed in the middle of the fourth century'. (“Thugs
and Theorists,” p. 571.)
Apparently, however, he sees a point in reworking a political vocabulary developed
in the eighteenth century.
614.
) See: Dewey 1957, Introduction, p. vi. Compare to: Rorty, in Malachowski;
“Post-Modern Bourgeois Liberalism,” “Thugs and Theorists," CIS; “Unger,
Castoriadis and the Romance of a National Future," in EH, pp. 177-192.
615.
) “Review of Spectres ofMarx,” p. 3
.
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citizens. It may require just the opposite. It may require trying to
josh them out ot the habit ot taking those topics so seriously. 616
Playfulness and moral commitment come together here because, by promotinu “the
air ol lightminded aestheticism the sort ot playful maneuvering Rorty describes
is a way of promoting the Jeffersonian compromise.
It should be noted, however, that when it comes to his social hopes, the
happy-go-lucky persona abruptly exits stage right. For instance, Rorty is irritated by
what he calls the “loose, resentful Heideggenan talk about Russia and America
being 'metaphysically speaking, the same,'“ and “all the loose, resentful analogies
between the Gulag and the 'carceral archipelagoes' of the democracies.”
618
He
himself, however, has produced loose, resentful analogies of his own, as in his
statement that the difference between Lenin, Stalin and Hitler is merely one of
facial hair/'
1 J
Echoing Daniel Bell, he even asseverates, off-handedly, that by the
time Orwell wrote Animal harm,
...the effort to see important differences between Stalin and Hitler,
and to continue analyzing recent political history with the help of
616.
) Rorty, in Malachow'ski, p. 293.
617.
) Rorty, in Malachowski, p 293.
618.
) EH, p. 192n.
619.
)
“Intellectuals at the End of Socialism.” Rorty associates Lenin with Stalin
(as for example at EH, p. 25), Stalin with Hitler (EH, p. 1 89; CIS, p. 1 74), and Lenin
directly with Hitler, too (CIS, p. 1 57; “Review of Spectres ofMarx" p. L), while at
the same time excluding liberal leaders from the mix.
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terms like “socialism” “capitalism.” and “fascism.” had become
unwieldy and impracticable.
620
--as it this preposterous pronouncement were becoming common knowledge.
It is hard to be happy-go-lucky when one is surrounded by evidence that the
institutions and practices one considers to be most precious are in the process of
being hauled out the back door to the dumpster. In the final years of the American
Century, the liberal democracies have achieved virtually undisputed global
hegemony. Yet liberal hopes for equality, justice, amelioration of suffering and a
realm of negative freedom beyond the pale of state institutions appear to be ever
more wistful exercises in nostalgia
Of course, one could describe the existing liberal democracies differently, as
I have done in Chapters Two and Three above, and then evaluate them from the
perspective of a “we” with no big investment in their continued existence. This
might be one way to josh oneself out of the habit of taking seriously, say. Uncle
Sam s pretensions as the disinterested arbiter ot global conflicts, or the increasingly
grotesque spectacle of Yankee electoral politics, or the importance of good
citizenship in the age of the corporate-government nexus, or any of dozens of other
idols on very high-and by now very shaky-pedestals. By thus relinquishing the
view that these institutions as they presently exist are exceedingly precious, one
might well be in a position to be more happy-go-lucky and more consistently or
persistently ironic than Rorty. There are, after all, some Marxists and others far to
the left of Rorty who view the degeneration of liberal institutions and the
620. ) CIS, p. 1 74. When Rorty writes that Marxism has done nothing to clarify
“the struggle for power between those who currently possess it [...] and those who
are starving or terrorized because they lack it” (EH, pp. 25-6), one might be tempted
to ask just what it would take to “clarify” such struggles. This question is especially
acute in view of Rorty's claim that “bourgeois liberal democracies” are “already
organized around the need for continual exposure of suffering and injustice.. .” (EH,
p. 25; Rorty's emphasis).
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evaporation of the so-called welfare state with a sort of bemused detachment
unavailable to Rorty's dutiful citizen.
Horn Fern Flaber has noted that Rorty's aesthetic and political impulses,
essentially private and public concerns respectively, “seem to be at odds with each
other. Viewed in the light of the preceding remarks, this observation is well-
taken, as tar as it goes. The mere drawing of a distinction between public and
private spheres, however, does not necessarily set public and private concerns
against each other. As I indicated earlier in this section, public and private impulses
have not always been at odds in the manner Rorty's are. His particular impulses are
at odds in a way that liberal impulses were not at odds with ironism in
Enlightenment France, or Tocqueville's northern states, or Whitman's America, or
Dewey's Chicago, or behind the Iron Curtain. Ironic self-creation and civic-spirited
decency do not necessarily conflict. Nor do ironism and apologetics for bourgeois
liberalism. However, ironism and apologetics for bourgeois liberalism at the end of
the American Century do appear to conflict. Rorty's public vocabulary~the
vocabulary he uses to defend the liberal democracies-is at odds with his private
vocabulary~the ironic, de-divimzed, anti-essentialist vocabulary he uses to satisfy
his duty to himself. In order for him to fulfill his role as apologist, he must become
not merely a /ww-ironist, but an r//?//-iromst.
This point may be illustrated with reference to Rorty's comments about
“thoughtlessness,” in Heidegger's sense of the word, as meaning “inability to
imagine alternatives to the particular beings that have been opened up by the
languages we are speaking.”
6" In his role as apologist for the existing set of
political institutions of liberal democracy, he must be thoughtless with reference to
621.) Haber, p. 49.
622.) EH, pp. 43, 46.
the distinction between public and private persons, the political character of the
private sphere, relations ol exploitation and so on Thoughtlessness thus conceived
is a far cry from the lightmindedness or insouciance which he prescribes for theory
in the private sphere.
Rorty can, of course, switch back and forth between his public and private
roles. In this sense, his public and private selves can and do coexist. They coexist,
however, at each other's expense, problematically, like two enemy armies of
metaphors locked in mutual siege (to mix metaphors bomnved from Nietzsche and
Gramsci,
623
respectively). As we saw in Chapter Two, it is literally self-defeating-
that is, it defeats purposes defining either a public or a private self--to commit
oneself, as Rorty' does, to the inviolability of the private sphere on the one hand,
while defending actually existing liberalism on the other: Where bourgeois
liberalism obtains today, there the private sphere has tended to be least inviolable
vis-a-vis institutions of the state and other public institutions. Moreover, as we saw
in Chapter Three, Rorty's public role as apologist for the liberal democracies is
incompatible with his public role as mitigator of evitable pain, particularly with
reference to the massive suffering these countries continue to engender beyond their
cartographic borders.
The problem, then, is not that Rorty’s two roles are incommensurable in
principle
;
rather, they are incompatible in fact. On the one hand, the better he
fulfills his role as ironist theorist, as defender of the inviolability of the private
sphere or as mitigator of suffering, the more clearly he abrogates his role as
apologist for the bourgeois liberal democracies. The better he is at defending the
institutions and practices of existing liberal democracies, on the other hand, the
more he contributes to “thoughtlessness,” the concealment of cruelty1 , the “freezing
623.) Gramsci's metaphor appears in Said, p. 195.
over of culture and the constriction of permissible discourse. This might be an
example ol what David Hall has referred to as Rorty's “dichotomy of the
intellectual and the moral virtues.”
624
This helps explain why, in the words of one commentator, his pro)ect
“...refuses to give birth to the offspring it conceives,”
625
or why, in the words of
another commentator, his argument “...loses its grip whenever reassurance is being
dispensed.”
626
As yet another commentator has put it, “..Rorty shrinks back from
the potentially subversive or utopian implications of his own undertaking and
retreats to safer ground,” when those implications threaten his apologetic purposes
627
As I have indicated, Rorty’s lapses of critical acumen conspicuously benefit
his apologetic aims. When his apologetics conflict with ironism, as they frequently
do, the apologetics more often than not come out on top. As Haber has noted with
reference to Rorty, “In the wedding of liberalism and ironism, one of the partners is
dominated by the other.”
628
* * *624.
) Hall, p. 167.
625.
) Rajchman and West, p. 268 In a similar vein, William Connolly has
observed that “...Rorty drops out of the conversation just when it should become
more intense and demanding” (Connolly, p. 131 ).
626.
) McCamey, p. 6.
627.
) Comay, p. 125.
628.) Haber, p. 64.
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These observations lend credibility to the conclusion that.
...despite occasional protests to the contrary, it begins to look as if
Rorty's defense of liberalism is little more than an apologia for the
status quo-the very type of liberalism that Dewey )udged to be
“irrelevant and doomed .”62
'
In the meantime, and this could be a long time, much of Rorty’s audience is
likely to view his pragmatist defenses of actually existing liberalism as conclusive,
despite the defects registered in this discussion In the class struggle, after all, there
is no argument like success.
629.) Bernstein, p. 541.
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